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This thesis is broadly involved with growth economics. It starts with a theoretical 
analysis of the relation between credit markets and economic growth. It considers 
an exogenous production function model with risky investment projects in which a 
borrower's (an investor's) risk type is private information. This asymmetry induces 
lenders to offer loan contracts which separate borrowers as to type. Self-selection 
can be induced by credit rationing or a screening mechanism which allows lenders 
to acquire information about a borrower's type. Screening is assumed to be imper- 
fect in the sense that lenders can draw an imperfect inference if borrowers declare 
themselves as low-risk. The joint determination of the equilibrium loan contract and 
the economy's growth path and the steady-state capital stock is then explained. The 
next chapter investigates the extent at which financial development or trade openness 
of a country influences competition using data for 50 sectors for 8 Eurozone member 
states and the U. S. over 1981-2004. Financial depth may be associated with greater 
ease of entry and thus increased competition. Moreover, the effect might be greater 
in sectors where firms are relatively more dependent on external finance. The relation 
between trade openness and competition is then investigated. In response to greater 
foreign competition and increased imports, the market share for domestic producers 
falls and markups should decline. This relation might be stronger for those industries 
for which the relative volume of international trade is greater. The fourth chapter 
is an empirical analysis of the relationship between inequality and growth following 
on from the AER paper by De La Croix and Doepke. They suggest a mechanism 
whereby inequality has large effects on growth via the effect on differential fertility of 
rich and poor and provide empirical support for this thesis. This chapter goes back 
to the original data and also extends the econometric techniques used to analyze 
the relationship. Moreover, it suggests a more comprehensive measure of differential 
fertility and human capital inequality and finds that the relationship between differ- 
ential fertility and growth is very fragile. It also raises concerns about the use of the 
squared value of a RHS variable as instrument. This point is addressed in the last 
chapter which investigates the properties of such instrument and the effect on the 
size of the bias of the Instrumental Variables's estimator. 
Dedicated to my mom Anna and the memory of my dad Gerasimos 
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This thesis is broadly involved with growth economics. It consists of four chapters 
which discuss distinct though interconnected questions and a concluding part. Credit 
markets and asymmetric information, competition, financial development and trade 
openness, income inequality and differential fertility and instrumental variables are 
some of the concepts which would be also mentioned. In what follows a brief intro- 
duction is given to the questions each chapter addresses and this thesis endeavours 
to assist the advancement of our understanding. 
The second chapter investigates the relation between financial markets and eco- 
nomic growth. Although academic research has long acknowledged the link between 
the two, economists disagree about the exact role of the financial sector in economic 
growth. The theoretical research has developed around two directions: the poten- 
tial transmitting mechanisms through which financial development may influence 
growth, and financial development as a natural outcome of growth itself. Nobel 
Laureate Merton Miller (1998, p. 14) argues that "[the idea] that financial markets 
contribute to economic growth is a proposition too obvious for serious discussion". 
Financial development affects growth by increasing the productivity of investments 
(as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)) or by increasing the fraction of savings chan- 
neled to investment (as in Bencivenga and Smith (1991). However, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992) argue that financial development is a natural 
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outcome of growth and thus finance responds to changing demands from the "real 
sector". The empirical research supports the theoretical reasoning. Levine (2005) 
gives an excellent theoretical and empirical survey. 
Advancing our understanding of the role of finance in economic growth will have 
policy implications as it will influence the priorities that policy makers and advisors 
set to policies related to reforming the financial sector. Moreover, it will shape 
interdisciplinary policy-oriented research. 
An important feature of financial markets is the possible informational asymme- 
tries between lenders and borrowers. Azariadis and Smith (1993), Tsiddon (1992) 
and Bencivenga and Smith (1993) show that informational problems cause frictions in 
financial markets which affect the accumulation of capital and thus economic growth. 
Lenders need to evaluate potential investment possibilities in the face of asymmetric 
information (adverse selection) and thus try to separate borrowers as to risk type 
by means of the borrower's contract choice. In Bencivenga and Smith (1993), this 
separation is achieved by credit rationing. Bose and Cothren (1996,1997) build on 
Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and suggest that self-selection can be induced by credit 
rationing or a screening mechanism which allows lenders to acquire information about 
a borrower's type at an exogenous real resource cost. 
However, research has treated screening in a simple way. The screening tech- 
nology is assumed to be perfect in the sense that lenders can identify the type of 
a screened borrower with certainty. In reality, modern screening techniques are far 
from perfect. Even more with the current credit crunch which shares characteristics 
of past financial crises being an obvious proof of that idea. Rationing, on one hand, 
has been rendered an appealing strategy for most banks as sophisticated securitiza- 
tion processes have been failing and the Basel Rules on capital adequacy are arguably 
part of the problem, not of the solution. On the other hand, and what is of higher 
relevance to the motivation of this paper, the credit crunch has showed that although 
screening techniques have greatly changed since the times of Captain Mainwaring- 
the banker who knows everyone in his local community- there is still scope and need 
for great improvement of modern computerised techniques such as credit scoring. 
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The second chapter of this thesis builds heavily on the afore-mentioned bench- 
mark models of Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and Bose and Cothren (1996,1997). 
It addresses the problem of informational imperfections in the credit market and 
investigates its effects on the capital accumulation process in a neoclassical growth 
model by making more realistic assumptions about the screening processes. More 
specifically, screening is assumed to be imperfect. Lenders can identify the true type 
of the borrowers who declare themselves as high-risk with certainty but can draw an 
imperfect inference if borrowers declare themselves as low-risk. The accuracy of the 
inference depends on the quality of the screening technology used. 
By examining the case of compulsory screening for the borrowers who declare 
themselves as low-risk types the main finding of BC, that of the mutual dependency 
between the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium dynamic path, is verified. How- 
ever, the assumption of imperfect screening technology although it leads to the same 
rationing contract with the case where screening is perfect, leads to differences for 
the screening contract. More specifically, the screening contract is not the same 
with BC nor unique anymore. Two screening contracts emerge from the maximiz- 
ing behavior of lenders and borrowers which differ in the probability of rationing 
some of the borrowers (zero or positive). The ultimate driving force behind the 
two screening contracts which our model predicts are the cost and/or the quality of 
screening. Thus, the importance of the assumption about the imperfections in the 
screening technology is immediately apparent since lower quality of screening might 
entail rationing some low risk borrowers and thus preventing them from running their 
investment project. This finding contrasts the predictions of BC who find that under 
the screening regime all low-risk borrowers get a loan with certainty. Moreover, the 
model predicts that in undeveloped economies screening is not relevant and the only 
possible way of separating borrowers is rationing. It is only in developed economies 
that both means of separating borrowers are feasible and a developed economy grows 
along the highest dynamic path when the screening technology is used to separate 
borrowers and none of them is rationed. Contrary to the findings of BC, the screening 
regime does not always dominate the rationing regime. It follows, that screening is 
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not a panacea for developed countries in the sense of leading to the highest dynamic 
path and steady state capital stock. Finally, some policy implications are discussed 
regarding the impact of a change of the screening cost or the quality of screening on 
the growth path and steady state of capital of an economy in general cases or cases 
complimentary to the literatures of threshold externalities. 
The third chapter engages in the relationship between the competition in differ- 
ent industries across countries, financial development and trade openness. It is an 
empirical investigation for 50 sectors for 8 Eurozone member states and U. S. over 
1981-2004. The degree of competition in a sector is measured by a markup ratio. A 
markup ratio bigger than one implies that prices exceed marginal costs and are, thus, 
evidence of market power in a sector. Various macroeconomic variables have been 
suggested to influence the degree of competition in different industries across coun- 
tries. Barriers to entry and product differentiation are examples of industry specific 
determinants of competition whereas openness to trade and financial development 
are some of the potential country specific factors. 
The relation of markups to macroeconomic variables is interesting from the stand- 
point of competition regulators. Policy-makers need to know whether certain policies 
are conducive to competition and analysts of trade policy and the financial sector 
need to understand their effects on competition. 
This chapter is part of the research effort attempting to bring the various theo- 
retical predictions to the data. The analysis is based on the Solow residual, a growth 
accounting methodology which measures the growth rate of productivity. Financial 
development or trade openness variables are then introduced in an attempt to identify 
the extent at which they influence competition. More specifically, the relation be- 
tween financial depth or the degree of banking liberalization and industry competition 
is investigated. Financial depth may be associated with greater ease of entry and thus 
increased competition. The chapter also looks on the case of financial depth having 
a greater effect on competition in sectors where firms are relatively more dependent 
on external finance, drawing on the central idea of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The 
relation between trade openness and competition is then investigated. In response 
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to greater foreign competition and increased imports, the market share for domestic 
producers falls and markups should decline. This relation might be stronger for those 
industries for which the relative volume of international trade is greater. 
The robustness of the findings is examined via the use of different specifications 
such as cross section estimations, a "two-stage" approach and the simultaneous inclu- 
sion of the two macroeconomic variables of interest. Furthermore, different measures 
of financial development or external dependence and a shorter time period are used. 
The findings suggest that financial development has pro-competitive effects. Fur- 
thermore, there is strong evidence that increased trade openness is linked with higher 
competition and thus lower markups. This relation appears to be more robust for 
industries with a higher degree of tradedness. 
The fourth chapter is involved with economic growth and inequality. Growth's 
enhancement, usually measured through the change in GDP per capita, seems to 
have been an easy target for modem world. Inequality, on the other hand, is still 
a distressing, almost embarrassing, fact of the so-called advanced world. According 
to Milanovic (2002) and Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), the group of the most de- 
veloped countries has the lowest Gini coefficient and high inequality seems to be a 
characteristic of less developed countries. 1 The income of the developed countries 
accounts for 58 percent of world income and their population accounts for 16 percent 
of world's population, the analogue numbers for the "Third World" are 29 percent 
and 76 percent respectively. 
Kuznets (1955) first suggested a link running from output to income distribution 
with an inverted U-shaped relation. However, later studies have consistently refuted 
the soundness of the Kuznets hypothesis and have generated skepticism about causal 
links running from economic growth to inequality. 2 The evidence about the empiri- 
cal link is controversial. The significance of the estimated coefficients is not always 
'Inequality is calculated from the world distribution for individuals based entirely on household 
survey data from several countries, and adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity between 
the countries. 
'See, among others, Benabou (1996), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Ravallion and Chen (1997). 
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convincing and the results are often sensitive to changes in specification and other ro- 
bustness tests. Benabou (1996) surveys 23 papers on the relationship between growth 
and inequality. He finds that in ten of these papers there is a consistent significant 
negative relationship. The other thirteen papers find effectively no correlation. 
The empirical inconclusiveness is not surprising since academic research has sug- 
gested a variety of ways in which growth and inequality could be linked. Numerous 
studies try to identify which direction the causality runs. The several suggested mech- 
anisms could be classified in five categories: capital market imperfections channels, 
political economy, sociopolitical unrest and conflict, saving rates and human capital. 
Differential fertility has been recently added to suggested mechanisms and Chapter 
4 engages in its relativity. 
More specifically, Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
inequality and growth following on from the AER paper by De La Croix and Doepke 
(DLCD). The key point behind the paper of DLCD is that inequality has large ef- 
fects via the effect on differential fertility of rich and poor and provide empirical 
support for this thesis. They build on the human capital theory of Becker and Barro 
(1998) and note that there are two possible channels linking inequality and growth 
via human capital. First, if there are diminishing returns to human capital at the 
individual level, then greater human capital inequality will lead to lower growth 
(holding average education levels constant). This can be seen by considering the 
effect of a mean-preserving spread on human capital - the loss to the poor (whose 
marginal product is high) will exceed the gain to the rich (whose marginal product 
is low). The second channel is differential fertility. People with lower human capital 
will not only choose less education for their children but also choose a higher num- 
ber of children. Thus, more weight is put on families who provide little education, 
which reduces future human capital. In their empirical result, DLCD use a panel 
data set containing 68 countries over the years 1960-1992 and find that when differ- 
ential fertility is included in growth regressions, it not only is a better explanatory 
than inequality, but that inequality ceases to matter at all. This would have two 
consequences. First, regarding human capital, inequality is related to growth only 
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through the second channel proposed above: diminishing returns are not important. 
Secondly, there would appear to be no residual explanatory power of inequality via 
mechanisms (such as political economy) listed earlier. 
This chapter focuses on the influence of differential fertility, and contests De La 
Croix and Doepke's empirical conclusions on two counts. First, some problems with 
their data is discussed. There are particular problems with the measure of differential 
fertility which they use, since is frequently based on very small proportions of different 
countries' populations and is thus likely to contain significant measurement error. 
The significance of the fertility differential in their results is not robust to different 
measures of differential fertility or to other important corrections in the data they 
use. Finally, the econometric techniques used to analyze the relationship are being 
extended, in particular looking at the reliability of the instrumental variables and 
panel data techniques. Second, an appropriate measure of human capital inequality, 
which is the relevant source of inequality according to the theoretical model of DLCD 
is suggested. A robustness check follows which uses various estimation methods and 
more general specifications. 
One of the points raised in Chapter 4 is the reliability of the instrumental vari- 
ables used. More specifically, concerns were voiced about the use of the squared value 
of some of the endogenous RHS variables as instruments. Such a specification might 
capture any possible non-linear effects between the RHS variables and the indepen- 
dent variable and thus improve the fit of the regression. However, the properties 
of such instruments as well as the implications for the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator have not been investigated. The fifth chapter of the thesis investigates 
whether the squared value of an endogenous RHS variable is a weak instrument and 
whether the IV estimator is biased in large or small samples. Moreover, it suggests 
two measures of testing the size of the bias of the IV estimator specific to the case 
when an endogenous variable is instrumented by its squared value. 
Chapter six outlines the conclusions reached by the thesis and discusses interesting 
extension of the work presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Laughing all the way to the 
bank: Imperfect screening, 
rationing and growth 
2.1 Introduction 
Academic research has long acknowledged the link between financial markets and 
economic growth. The theoretical research has developed around two directions: fi- 
nancial development as a natural outcome of growth itself (Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) and Saint-Paul (1992)) and the potential transmitting mechanisms through 
which financial development may influence growth. More specificaly, financial sys- 
tems affect growth by producing information and thus improving resource allocation 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)), by monitoring investments and exerting corpo- 
rate governance after providing finance (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005)), by 
trading, hedging and pooling the risk or by pooling savings (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997)) and by easing the exchange of goods and services. 
The empirical research supports the theoretical reasoning. King and Levine 
(1993a, 1993b) give cross-country evidence of the importance of a financial sys- 
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tem. in determining the rate of economic growth. Jung (1986) and Demetriades 
and Hussein (1996) are initial time-series studies which show that the direction of 
causality frequently runs both ways, especially for developing countries. However, 
later time-series studies document that the dominant direction of causality runs 
from financial development to economic growth (see, among others, Neusser and 
Kugler (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel 
(2001)). This hypothesis is also supported when additional econometric sophisti- 
cation is used (Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004)). Panel data techniques draw a 
similar picture (Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)). 
Finally, microeconomic-based evidence is consistent with the view that financial de- 
velopment ease external financing constraints which firms face (Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)). 1 
However, the above research disregards an important feature of the financial mar- 
ket, the possible informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Azari- 
adis and Smith (1993), Tsiddon (1992) and Bencivenga and Smith (1993) show that 
informational problems cause frictions in financial markets which affect the accu- 
mulation of capital and thus economic growth. This asymmetry induces lenders to 
offer loan contracts that separate borrowers as to type (high-risk versus low-risk) 
by means of the borrower's contract choice. To that purpose, an environment that 
induces self-selection is needed. In Bencivenga and Smith (1993), this separation is 
achieved by credit rationing. Bose and Cothren (1996,1997) build on Bencivenga and 
Smith (1993) and suggest that self-selection can be induced by credit rationing or a 
screening mechanism which allows lenders to acquire information about a borrower's 
type at an exogenous real resource cost. However, screening is modeled in a simple 
way. The screening technology is perfect in the sense that lenders can identify the 
type of a screened borrower with certainty. 
In reality, the mere nature of asymmetric information not only imposes an ex 
ante (to the screening process) asymmetry but it even allows for the possibility of 
'For a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between 
financial development and growth see Levine (2005). 
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ex post asymmetry. Even more with the current credit crunch, the need to vastly 
reconsider rationing and screening tactics is vital. Rationing, on one hand, has 
been rendered an appealing strategy for most banks as sophisticated securitization 
processes have been failing and the Basel Rules on capital adequacy are arguably 
part of the problem, not of the solution. On the other hand, and what is of higher 
relevance to the motivation of this paper, the credit crunch has showed that although 
screening techniques have greatly changed since the times of Captain Mainwaring- the 
banker who knows everyone in his local community- modern computerised techniques 
such as credit scoring are still far from perfect. 
This paper builds heavily on the afore-mentioned benchmark models of Bencivenga 
and Smith (1993) and Bose and Cothren (1996,1997, henceforth BC). It tries to ad- 
dress the problem of informational imperfections in the credit market and investigate 
its effects on the capital accumulation process by making more realistic assumptions 
about the screening processes. More specifically, screening is assumed to be imper- 
fect. Lenders can identify the true type of the borrowers who declare themselves 
as high-risk with certainty but can draw an imperfect inference if borrowers declare 
themselves as low-risk. The accuracy of the inference depends on the quality of the 
screening technology used. We examine the case when screening is compulsory for 
the borrowers who declare themselves as low-risk types. 
The predictions of BC can be seen as a special case of our model (perfect accu- 
racy of lenders' inference about the risk type of borrowers or maximum quality of 
screening). They consider a neoclassical growth model and show that when screening 
is perfect, the contract's form in equilibrium (rationing or screening) depends on the 
level of the capital accumulation in the economy and vice versa. In other words, 
there is a mutual dependency and thus the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium 
dynamic path are jointly determined. They find that for low levels of capital, lenders 
use rationing but as capital accumulates lenders may start using the screening tech- 
nology to separate borrowers. The dynamic path of the economy whose lenders use 
screening is higher than the dynamic path of an economy whose lenders use rationing 
and this corresponds to a higher steady state capital stock. In that way, they rein- 
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force the findings of the literature on the connection between economic and financial 
development. 
Our model predicts that assuming the screening technology is imperfect does not 
affect the rationing contract but the screening contract is not the same nor unique 
anymore. Two screening contracts emerge from the maximizing behavior of lenders 
and borrowers which differ in the probability of rationing some of the borrowers 
(zero or positive). The ultimate driving force behind the two screening contracts 
which our model predicts are the cost and/or the quality of screening. Thus, the 
importance of the assumption about the imperfections in the screening technology 
is immediately apparent since lower quality of screening might entail rationing some 
low risk borrowers and thus preventing them from running their investment project. 
This finding contrasts the predictions of BC who find that under the screening regime 
all low-risk borrowers get a loan with certainty. Moreover, our predictions vary with 
the level of development of the economy. In undeveloped economies screening is not 
relevant and the only possible way of separating borrowers is rationing. It is only in 
developed economies that both means of separating borrowers are feasible. We show 
that a developed economy grows along the highest dynamic path when the screening 
technology is used to separate borrowers and none of them is rationed. Contrary to 
the findings of BC, we show that the screening regime does not always dominate the 
rationing regime. It follows, that screening is not a panacea for developed countries in 
the sense of leading to the highest dynamic path and steady state capital stock. The 
mutual dependency between the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium dynamic 
path is a corollary of our model, similarly to BC. Finally, we investigate the impact 
of a change of the screening cost or the quality of screening on the growth path and 
steady state of capital of an economy and verify previous findings that there are cases 
for which the cost of screening must fall below a threshold level before it can affect 
the economy's growth path and steady state level of capital. We find that the same 
holds for the quality of screening. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we give a description 
of the economy. In section 3 we derive the contracts which would be offered under 
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perfect information in a framework otherwise similar to BC's. Then, we reproduce 
the asymmetric information model of Bencivenga and Smith (1993) and BC and 
show the rationing and screening contracts when screening is perfect. In section 4 we 
introduce imperfect screening and derive the terms of the equilibrium loan contracts. 
Moreover, we show that lenders can use rationing or screening in order to separate 
borrowers only in developed economies whereas rationing will be always be used in 
undeveloped economies. Since monitoring is assumed to be a costly activity which 
involves using productive resources, in section 5 we check how this might affect both 
the growth path of a developed economy and the steady state under each contracting 
regime. In section 6 we derive the equilibrium regimes for a developed economy and 
some interesting policy implications are discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2.2 Description of the economy 
2.2.1 The credit market 
A discrete time economy is considered and time is indexed by t=1,2,..., oo. There 
is an infinite sequence of two-period-lived agents of overlapping generations plus a 
set of initial old agents. The number of agents of each period is normalized to one, 
of which half are lenders and half are borrowers or entrepreneurs. All young agents 
are endowed with one unit of labour. The initial old generation of entrepreneurs in 
the economy is endowed with capital. Agents consume only in the second period. 
The credit market works as follows. Each lender announces loan contracts at 
time t, taking the contracts' announcement by the rest of the lenders as given. Then, 
each lender is approached by a single borrower if his announced contracts are not 
dominated by those of another lender. 
Lenders at the first period of their lives (young lenders) offer their labour to 
the firms of the entrepreneurs (i. e. the borrowers of the previous generation or old 
borrowers) and obtain wt units of time t output i. e. the real wage. Lenders can use 
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the proceeds by converting them to t+1 capital according to their "home production" 
technology. The home technology converts one unit of the wt units of time t output 
to Qe units of time t+1 capital, where Q is a scalar and 0<e<1. Alternatively, 
lenders can lend their proceeds to an entrepreneur through the loan market. In the 
second period lenders rent their t+1 capital at the rate pt+l for time t+ 1 output and 
consume. Since the safe return gives the lender Qept+lwt units of time t+1 output, 
the opportunity cost rate of loaning the funds is Qept+l. We assume that there is 
perfect competition and thus lenders earn zero economic profit on each contract and 
they are risk neutral. 
Borrowers are endowed with an investment project and they belong to two types, 
H and L. The type L borrower is a low-risk and high-return borrower and the type H 
borrower is a high-risk and low-return borrower. A fraction ,\E 
[0,11 of the borrowers 
is of type H. The first period, borrowers can choose between home production and 
operation of their investment projects. The materialization of the investment project 
requires the borrower's own labour and an amount of time t output. Since young 
borrowers are not endowed with time t output they need to apply for a loan. If a 
loan of wt units of time t output is obtained, then with probability pi the investment 
project converts one unit of the wt units of time t output to Q units of t+1 capital 
and with probability (1 - pi) the investment project yields zero, where pi, i=L, H 
is the "entrepreneurial ability" of the borrower or the probability of success of the 
investment project. The values pi satisfy 1> PL > pH > 0. This capital can be 
invested in the second period to give the borrower a return of time t+1 output. 
However, if a young borrower is unable to obtain a loan he uses his own labour 
according to his "home production" technology to produce pi units of time t+1 
output. We assume that ßL >ß fi > 0. This can be viewed as asserting that type 
L borrowers who have higher probability of success PL in their investment projects, 
also have higher quality of labour or access to a higher quality of home production 
technology which results in a higher home production output OL- 
Note that the borrowers who are denied a loan, cannot "sell" their labour like 
lenders but are precluded from doing so by the timing of events. This assumption 
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is imposed in order to ensure that the different types of borrowers have different 
opportunity costs if they are denied credit. 2 In this model, this is reflected by the 
difference in the home production output between the two types. In effect, the in- 
equality ßL/PL > ßH/pp implies that the indifference curves of the two different 
types of borrowers have different slopes and thus a standard "single-crossing" prop- 
erty on borrowers' indifference curves is imposed. 
Figure 1 summarizes the mechanism of the credit market. 
Period 1: Production 
receive wß(1+R, ) units of k., with 
Lend w, prob. q 
Lenders 
Orter labour for units of y, 
receive 0 with prob (1-p) 
uni of y, w, 
Home 
production 
puce Qcw, units of k 
Borrow w produce 
Qw, units of with 
Use labour on units of y, 
prob. A 
Borrowers own project or 
home production produce 0 with prob. (1-p, ) 
Home 
production 
puce ß units of y,,, 
Figure 1 
2.2.2 The output market 
In period t+1, the output producing firms become active. The operators of the 
firms are the borrowers of period t (all the borrowers, not only the successful ones). 
The entrepreneurs rent capital in positive or negative amount (from the current 
generation) and hire labour (from the young generation) at the competitive rental 
rates pt+l and wt+l respectively. The production function exhibits constant returns 
It will become obvious that such an assumption allows us to induce self-selection in the case of 
credit rationing. 
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to scale. A firm employing kt units of capital and Lt units of labour produces yt units 
of output according to the exogenous production function: 
yt = kteLit-e 
The above production function needs some explanation. There is complete factor 
mobility and hence in equilibrium all firms employ an equal amount of labour. Since 
all borrowers become firm operators the number of firms per capita is 0.5. The per 
capita supply of labour is restricted to the number of those agents called lenders i. e. 
0.5 (remember that borrowers who are denied credit are excluded from selling their 
labour by the timing of events). Hence, at each time period the employees per firm 
is tabour/firm - Lt = 1.3 
2.2.3 Information structure 
The main difference between our model and a standard overlapping generations model 
is the existence of informational asymmetries between capital-producing firms and 
lenders. Each lender offers a set of loan contracts for which the borrowers have 
complete knowledge but the type of the borrower is private information. The lender 
separates the borrowers either by rationing or by screening the quality of the project 
at a resource cost. 
2.3 Benchmark equilibrium contracts 
Before analyzing the equilibrium contracts under imperfect screening we need to 
understand how the benchmark models works. We start by deriving the equilibrium 
x=0.6 
3Obviously, the aggregate output is YY =Ey,,. 
. =o 
16 
contracts under perfect information. Then we show how the contract terms change 
once we relax that assumption. More specifically we explain how credit rationing and 
perfect screening can provide a solution to the problem of asymmetric information 
by reproducing the model of BC. 
2.3.1 Perfect information 
When there is perfect information in the credit market, competition leads lenders to 
offer the best break-even contract for each type of borrowers. The contracts terms 
are: Rtt, the interest rate offered to type i borrower at time t, qzt, the quantity of 
loan offered to type i borrower at time t and 7rtit, the probability of getting a loan for 
the type i borrower at time t. Lenders offer the contracts CH = (RHt, qxt, lrHt) and 
CL = (RLt, qLt, lTLt) that maximize the expected payoff of H and L type borrowers 
respectively, subject to the restrictions of the model. 
We start the analysis by defining the expected payoffs of the borrowers. With 
probability 7r; the borrower gets a loan qt and thus operates his investment project. 
With probability p; the project succeeds and yields Qqt units of time t+1 capital. 
This capital can be invested in the second period at the rate pt+1 and used to produce 
time t+1 output. The borrower pays back his lender at the interest rate Rat. With 
probability (1 - p; ) the project fails and yields zero in which case the borrower doesn't 
repay his lender. Finally, with probability (1 - ist) the borrower does not get a 
loan and thus uses his home production technology. So, the expected payoff for the 
borrowers is: 
EPi (C1) = 7rctps (QPt+i - Rt) q2t + (1 - 7r; t) ß; (2.1) 
The following restrictions need to be satisfied by the equilibrium contracts: 




irttP+ (QPt+i - R+t) 4it + (1 - iris) ßt ? ßt (2.5) 
Equation (2.2) is the zero profit condition of the lender (obviously, the cost de- 
pends on the opportunity cost of the loaned funds). Equation (2.3) is a constraint 
for the supply of loans and shows that the amount of a loan qt the borrowers get is 
restricted by the lenders' wage. Expression (2.4) is a constraint for the probability 
of getting the loan. Lastly, (2.5) is the participation constraint of the borrowers. 
Borrowers may have another opportunity available to them which gives some reser- 
vation level of utility. The principal (lender) must ensure that the expected payoff 
for the agent (borrower) is at least this reservation level in order to be willing to 
participate. The outside option in this case is the home technology output 3j. We 
assume that the participation constraint is not binding and we ignore it during the 
maximization process. We then verify that this assumption holds for the equilibrium 
contract terms. 
Moreover, lenders have a participation consrtraint too. With probability pi the 
borrower is successful in his investment project in which case the lender gets a return 
of R;. With probability (1 - p; ) the investment project fails and the lender gets 
nothing. Alternatively, the lender does not give a loan and can thus convert his wage 
into time t+1 capital according to his home production. Intuitively, the lender's 
expected payoff from a loan is at least as high as the expected payoff from the safe 
investment. Thus, the participation constraint of the lender is: 
piqit (1 + R; ) ? gttQE 






We find that as long as 
PiQPt+iWt > Qi + QEPt+iwt (2.7) 
holds, the expected payoff for borrowers is strictly increasing in both control variables 
and thus maximized by the corner solution 
qzt = Wt 
and 
Ott =1 
Proof. Given that lenders earn zero profit on the loans, both high and low risks 
borrowers receive their first best contract. So, the expected payoff of the borrowers 
is increasing in the control variables 1rit and qit when: 
and 
OEP: (C1) 
491r; t pi 
(QPt+l - Wit) qzt - ß; >0 (2.8) 
aEPi (C1) 
== lritPi (QPt+1 - Hit) >0 (2.9) a9it 
Obviously, if (2.8) holds then (2.9) is automatically satisfied. However, using the 
zero profit interest rate R; t and the feasibility constraint (2.3), (2.8) reduces down 
to: 
(p: - e) QPe+iwt > pi (2.10) 
So, as long as (2.10) holds, the expected payoff for borrowers is strictly increasing 
at both control variables i. e. the maximization has a corner solution. 
Notice that the participation constraint is indeed non-binding. If we substitute 
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1rit =1 in (2.5) we obtain: 
Pi (QPt+i - Rit) 4it >_ Qi 
which holds with strong inequality due to (2.8).   
Hence, the equilibrium contracts under full information are 






l) CL = (RLt i qLt , 7rLt) = PL 
Obviously, the actual rate of return from the investment project should be pos- 
itive in order for borrowers to be willing to operate their investment projects i. e. 
pi (Qpt+l - Wit) > 0. Since there are positive expected profits for the borrowers on 
each unit borrowed it is clear now that the above mentioned assumption of a borrower 
being able to approach just a single lender aims at bounding the expected profits for 
the borrowers. As Bencivenga and Smith (1993) note it is not essential that there is 
one-to-one match, rather that each borrower can contact a finite number of lenders. 
Moreover, we make the common assumption that if a borrower is indifferent 
between the two types of contracts, he chooses the contract designed for his type. 
Such an assumption is imposed to guarantee the existence of a closed feasible set. 
For future reference it should be noted that since Qi is a non-negative number, 
(2.10) implies that: 
pi>6 (2.11) 
This can be interpreted as e being sufficiently smaller than p; to ensure loans 
between borrowers and lenders are mutually desirable. 
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2.3.2 Imperfect information 
This subsection reproduces the model of BC to show how rationing and screening 
emerge as a solution to the problem of asymmetric information. 
Rationing 
Credit rationing describes the situation when a lender limits the supply of loans at 
a level lower than the demand of prospective borrowers, although some borrowers 
would accept even higher interest payments. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that 
banks may prefer to reject some borrowers because of adverse selection and incentive 
effects. A higher interest rate attracts riskier borrowers or creates an incentive for 
borrowers to undertake projects with higher returns and thus higher risk. So, if 
the number of risky borrowers in the pool of aspiring borrowers increases then the 
profitability of the bank will decrease. 
The timing of contracting assumed is given by figure 2. 
Borrowers Lenders Borrowers The 
discover offer a choose a contract is 
their type menu of contract executed 
H or L contracts 
Figure 2: Timing of Contracting Under Rationing 
The separating equilibrium can be derived as follows. Since competition leads 
lenders to offer the best break-even contract for each type, both types of borrowers 
will be offered the maximal contracts for them i. e. the best interest rate, quantity of 
credit and rationing probability among the set of contracts that satisfy the constraints 
of the model. We show that an H type borrower gets his first-best contract, since 
a low-risk borrower has no incentive to be considered as a high-risk one, but an L 
type borrower gets the second-best contract. In other words, CL is now affected 
by considerations of self-selection but CH doesn't need to deviate. The lender will 
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distort the low-risk borrower's contract CL in such a way that the high-risk borrower 
is at least as well off accepting CH. In this section, the distortion will be achieved by 
rationing a fraction of low-risk borrowers. It is thus possible to derive the following 
Lemma. 
Lemma 1 The first-best contract for type L is affected by considerations of self- 
selection but not the first-best contract for type H. 
Proof. Let CH and CL denote the first-best contracts for type H and L re- 
spectively, with terms CH = 
(Q pH 
, wt, 1) and 
CL = 
(Q p '-, wt, 1). Hence, 















-QL) wt or PH < PL. In other words CL is affected by considera- 
tions of self-selection but not CH.   
If a young borrower gets a loan, he combines it with his labour endowment and 
materializes his investment project from which he produces time t+1 capital. How- 
ever, if the borrower is rationed, he uses his labour endowment according to his home 
production technology which results in old age consumption ß units of time t+1 
output. The expected payoffs of the borrowers are defined as follows: With proba- 
bility 7ri the borrower gets a loan qt and thus operates his investment project. With 
probability pi the project succeeds and yields Qqt units of time t+1 capital. This 
capital can be invested in the second period at the rate pt+l and produces time t+1 
output. The borrower pays back his lender at the interest rate Rt. With probability 
(1 - pi) the project fails and yields zero in which case the borrower doesn't repay his 
lender. Finally, with probability (1 - 7r; t) the borrower does not get a loan and thus 
uses his home production technology. So, the expected payoff for the borrowers is as 
given in (2.1). 
In a situation of asymmetric information there are typically two sorts of con- 
straints involving the borrower. The first is the participation constraint similar to 
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the case of perfect information which we explained above. The participation con- 
straints, for types L and H respectively, are: 
7rLtPL (QPt+I - RLt) 9Lt + (1 - 7rLt) ßL ý ßL (2.12) 
7rHtPH (RPt+I - RHt) QHt ý0 (2.13) 
For the rest of the analysis we make the simplifying assumption that the home 
technology output for the high-risk borrower is zero i. e. , QH = 0. 
The second kind of constraint is an incentive compatibility constraint and is 
specific to cases of asymmetric information. An incentive compatibility constraint 
shows that if a lender wants the borrower to choose the contract designed for his 
type, he must offer him one which gives him an incentive to do so. In other words, 
the lender should ensure that an H type borrower would prefer the contract intended 
for him rather than the L type's contract and vice versa. To that effect, we need 
to assume that the expected payoff in the case where the borrower reveals his type 
is greater than the payoff in the case where he conceals it. So, in order to induce 
types L and H borrowers respectively to self select, the pair of contracts (CL, CH) in 
equilibrium should satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints: 
ITLtPL (QPt+l - RLt) QLt + (1 - 7rLt) QL 
IrHtPL (QPt+l - RHt) QHt + (1 - lrHt) QL (2.14) 
7rHtPH (QPtt1 - RHt) 4Ht % "LtPH 
(QPtt1 
- RLt) 9Lt 
(2.15) 
The left-hand side of (2.14) measures the expected payoff for a low-risk borrower 
when he truthfully reveals his type and takes the contract CL whereas the right- 
hand side measures the expected payoff when he claims to be a high risk and takes 
the contract CH. Expression (2.15) is similarly interpreted. Thus, under (2.14) and 
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(2.15), borrowers choose truth-telling which weakly dominates lying. It should be 
noted that the Revelation Principle has been applied which restricts the contract 
terms to the pair of optimal choices made by the two types of borrowers and thus 
has simplified greatly the incentive compatibility constraints. 
We proceed by using the common approach where the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the type whose contract is not affected by considerations of self-selection, 
is binding. 4 It follows that the incentive compatibility constraint of the L type 
is not binding. After deriving the equilibrium contracts, we will verify that these 
assumptions are valid (see Proof 1). Similarly, it is assumed that both participation 
constraints are not binding and thus are being ignored during the maximization 
procedure. In Proof 2 we verify that the participation constraints of the two borrowers 
are indeed not binding for the equilibrium contract terms and hence can be correctly 
ignored during the maximization (case 1). We also derive the equilibrium contract 
assuming that the incentive compatibility constraint of the type whose contract is 
affected by considerations of self-selection is binding and prove that this leads to a 
contradiction (case 2). 
In order to deter type H borrowers from applying for the CL, competition leads 
the lender to offer contract terms which maximize the H type borrower's expected 
payoff subject to his own zero profit condition, the incentive compatibility constraint 
of type L borrowers and the feasibility constraint. However, this problem can be 
simplified since the incentive compatibility of type L borrowers is not binding. In 
other words the L type has no incentive to be considered as an H type and so the 
terms of the contract CH are not affected by the behavior of the L type borrower. 
Thus the problem becomes identical to the case of perfect information. So, as long 
as (2.9) holds, the expected payoff for type H borrowers is strictly increasing in both 
control variables and thus maximized by the corner solution. The interpretation is 
that if a borrower denotes himself as type H, he is automatically offered the contract 
'This equilibrium outcome is quite typical in models with adverse selection. It mainly emerges due 
to the equilibrium interest rate differential since the low-risk borrowers are offered a lower interest 
rate than the high-risk borrowers. So, the high-risk borrowers have an incentive to mimic the low-risk 
borrowers but not vice versa (see proof). 
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CH which he always accepts. 
However, the equilibrium contract CL is affected by considerations of self-selection 
since H type borrowers would want to conceal their true type and get the contract de- 
signed for the low-risk type. Thus the lender offers the contract CE = (RLt, qLt, lrLt) 
that maximizes the L type borrower's expected payoff subject to his own zero profit 
condition, the incentive compatibility constraint of type H borrower and the feasi- 
bility constraint, i. e.: 
Maximize 
EPL (CL) _ IrLtPL 
(QPt+1 
- RLt) QLt + 
(1 
- lTLt) QL 
subject to 
7rLt9Lt (PLRL - QEPt+l) -0 
4'Lt <_ Wt 
0<7fLt<1 
IrHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) 4Ht % ITLtPH 
(QPt+1 
- RLt) QLt 
In Proof 1 we show that as long as (2.7) holds, the equilibrium contract terms are 
rrr_ 




Summarizing, this section shows that, under the rationing regime, high risk 
borrowers receive the same contract as when there are no informational imperfections 
in the credit market. However, the contract for low risk borrowers is distorted and 
the distortion is achieved by rationing a fraction of low-risk borrowers. An L type 
borrower is offered the same amount of credit with a high risk borrower but a lower 
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interest rate and his contract bears a positive probability of rationing in order to 
deter the high risk borrowers from applying for it. 
Perfect screening 
Another way to combat the adverse selection problem that arises due to asymmetric 
information is through screening. Lenders can investigate potential borrowers, aiming 
to distinguish between high risk and low risk ones. Screening in practice can take 
various forms. Old fashioned banking as described by Captain Mainwaring- a bank 
manager who knew everyone in his local community- has given way to automatic 
computerised and complicated techniques such as credit scoring. Credit scoring uses a 
borrower's financial history and current assets and liabilities to implement a statistical 
analysis of creditworthiness. Lenders, such as banks and credit card companies, use 
credit scores to determine a potential borrower's ability to repay debt and the contract 
terms such as the interest rate and the credit limit. A poor credit rating indicates a 
high risk of defaulting on a loan, and thus leads to high interest rates, or the refusal 
of a loan by the creditor. 
This section reproduces the screening contract of BC. According to their frame- 
work, lenders are assumed to investigate the type of a fraction only of the potential 
borrowers who declare themselves as low-risk. The probability of a borrower being 
screened when applying for a loan is (1 - 0). Screening implies a real cost ry propor- 
tional to the amount lent i. e. if q"Lt is the amount of the loan then the screening cost 
is ygLt. 5 Screening is assumed to allow the lender to identify the borrower's true type 
with certainty. The optimal level of screening (1 - 0*) is endogenous. The timing of 
contracting is given by Figure 3. 
This proportionality leads to more intuitive results since a non-proportional cost does not allow 
the derivation of analytical solutions for the dynamic growth paths. 
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Borrowers Borrowers Lenders Borrowers The 
discover are offer a choose a contract Is 
their type screened menu of contract executed 
H or L contracts 
Figure 3. Timing of Contracting Under Perfect Screening 
It should be reminded that, in the rationing regime, H type borrowers receive 
their first-best contract. Low-risk borrowers have no incentive to be considered as 
high-risk and thus there are no considerations of self-selection. Moreover, given that 
screening is costly, no further improvement in the expected' payoff of the high-risk 
borrowers is possible by including any element of screening in their contract CH. 
Thus, in an environment where lenders have the option of screening the borrowers, 
the contract offered to the H type borrowers will not change. In other words, the 
borrowers that declare themselves to be type H are not screened and are offered their 
first-best contract CH. 
This is not the case for the low-risk borrowers though. We have already shown 
that in a rationing regime the low-risk borrowers face a positive probability of being 
rationed. The amount of credit or the interest rate have to be different than those 
offered under a rationing regime since now there are resources spent for the screening 
realization. What we will show is that if screening results in a net gain for the low- 
risk borrower, then there will exist a separating equilibrium which is described by the 
same CH contract for the high-risk borrowers but the contract CL will be replaced 
by the contract: 
CL 
- 
[(Ot, RLt' qLt, IrLtý i ýý1 - Ot) + 'Lb 9Lt)] 
which involves some level of screening. Note that the rationing variable Trit does 
not enter into the contract terms for the screening case. The reason is that with 
screening, the borrowers' true type is revealed and hence, the low risk borrowers 
are funded with certainty i. e. irLt = 1. However, lenders can ration some low risk 
borrowers if they are not screened (we will anyway show that lenders do not find it 
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optimal to mix screening with rationing i. e. cat > 0, lr2t = 1). Finally, if a screened 
borrower is found to be high-risk, he is denied credit. 
Since we assume that lenders earn zero economic profit on each contract, they 
will select those Rit, Rit, q7 , qLV 7rLtI Q't that maximize the expected utility of the 
low risk type subject to their own zero profit condition, the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the high risk type and the feasibility constraint on the amount of the 
loan (in the states with and without screening). Similarly to before, we assume 
that the participation constraints for the two types of borrowers and the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the low risk borrowers are not binding and thus are being 
ignored. To save on space we only give these constraints in the Appendix where we 
also verify that there are not binding for the equilibrium contract terms. 
So, the problem for an L type borrower is: 
Maximize 
EPL (CL) = (irLtpL (RPt+i - Rit) 9Lt + (1 - Lt) QL)'ý"(1 - 0) PL 
(Q/ýt+l 
- RLt) 4Lt 
subject to 
OlrLtPL9LtRL + (1 - 0) PLQLtRL = 07rLt4LtQept{-1 + 
(1 
- 0) qLt 
(1 + _Y) QePt+l 
7rHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) QHt % 07itPH 
(QPt+1 
- RLt) qLt 
Sit _< 'mot 
4it < wt - 4%t'Y 
Notice that since the screening cost is defined as a resource cost y proportional 
to the amount lent, it is not added as an extra cost on the right hand side of the zero 
profit condition of the lender but is embodied in the amount of the loan. The maxi- 
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mization problem is solved similarly to the way described for the rationing contract 
and is given in detail in the Appendix (see Proof 3). We find that as long as (2.7) 
holds, the screening contract is: 




PH PL cPL \PH PL 1 +'Y 
The interpretation of the above findings is straightforward. In equilibrium the 
high risk borrower still gets his first-best contract CH, but the low-risk borrower gets 
a contract which involves some level of screening. The low-risk borrowers are screened 
with a positive probability in which case the amount of the loan is less the screening 
cost. The interest rate in the case of screening is RLt =0 which implies that the 
burden of interest rate payment is shifted to the non-screening state. As explained in 
the proof, none of the interest rates appear in the simplified version of the objective 
function (after substituting the zero profit condition in the objective function) but Rit 
appears (negatively) on the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint 
of the high-risk borrower. So, the lender should set RL as high as possible in order 
to deter an H type borrower from applying for a CL contract. It is obvious from 
the zero-profit condition that this implies that Ri should be set as low as possible. 
Moreover, the interest rate in the non-screening state had to be higher under the 
rationing in order to make up for expected losses. Finally, we show that the incentive 
compatibility constraint is still binding for the H type borrower. 
Note that the screening contract implies the funding of a greater number of low- 
risk projects relative to the rationing contract since iL (1 -q)+ it 5> iL or 1> 
ie 
PL . 
Moreover, because q5 > 7r' (see Proof 9) the probability of screening (1 - Q0) is 
less than the probability of rationing, (1 - irk). Recall that under screening only the 
non-screened projects are fully funded whereas under a rationing regime all funded 
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projects are fully funded. The intuition is that under the screening regime not only 
are more low-risk projects funded but more low-risk projects get full funding. 
The rationing and the screening contracts are summarized in Proposition 2.1. 
Proposition 2.1 1. If ß* < ßL, then in equilibrium lenders offer the contract CL 
2. If ß* > ßL, then in equilibrium lenders offer the contract CL 
3. If ß* = ßL, then in equilibrium lenders are indifferent between offering CL or 
CL' 
where ß* = i' QPt+iwt. 
Proof See Proof 3 
Proposition 2.1 implies that whether the screening or the rationing contract pre- 
vails depends on the marginal product of capital pt+l and labour rate wt. For high 
Pt+i and wt, the returns from investing are large, rationing is costly and thus screen- 
ing dominates. Similarly, screening is more attractive the higher Q or PL are and the 
lower the screening cost y is. 
2.4 Imperfect screening 
Section 2.3 determined the equilibrium contracts which the lenders offer under perfect 
information and reproduced the Bose-Cothren asymmetric information model. In 
order to induce self-selection the lenders can ration or screen the borrowers. The 
screening was assumed to be perfect in that the lender could identify the true type 
of the borrower with certainty. 
However, in reality, screening technologies are arguably imperfect, the current 
credit crunch consisting of an obvious proof of that idea. Usually, the lender is able 
to draw only an imperfect inference about a borrower's type rather than identify the 
true type. For example, only some of the credit scoring techniques used to screen 
the creditworthiness of borrowers can directly estimate the probability of default. 
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However, despite much research from academics and industry, no single technique 
has been proven superior for predicting default in all circumstances. 
The literature on informational asymmetries assumes that imperfect screening 
is particularly relevant for the screening of the high-risk borrowers. So, the bad- 
type agents are often and incorrectly identified as good ones but good-type agents 
are identified with certainty. 6 The idea behind this approach is that all borrowers 
appear to be of a low risk type, based on e. g. the disclosure to lenders of information 
about their type or information which lenders gather from active screening, until 
some information is obtained that points to the opposite. 
In order to capture this idea we extend the above analysis by allowing for imperfect 
inference in the screening process of the high-risk borrowers. Specifically, we assume 
that if a borrower is the H type, the lender will only be able to draw an imperfect 
inference about his true type whereas if a borrower is the L type the lender identifies 
him as such with certainty. We use d to identify the quality of the screening process i. e. 
how successfully a lender can obtain or interpret the information needed to decipher 
that a potential borrower is a high risk type. The screening quality is exogenous and 
SE [0,1]. 7 
Similarly to BC, we assume that the screening cost is defined as a resource cost c 
proportional to the amount lent i. e. if q, "t is the amount of the loan then the screening 
cost is cglt. The screening cost is exogenous and cE [0,00). 8 
It is worth noting that the Bose-Cothren model of perfect screening can be seen 
as a special case of our model since for S=1, the lender can identify the type of 
the potential borrower with certainty. For any other value of S the lender draws an 
imperfect inference about the type of the borrower. 
Let j=h, l denote the lender's inference about the type of the borrower. If the 
"See e. g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) who use this information structure for firms wishing 
to raise external finance from venture capitalists or small investors in the IPO market. 
'Another approach will be to endogenise the screening effort and solve for the optimum level of 
6. In this case the model will be a two stage game. We do not address this question. In section 7 
we give a brief discussion of the effect of changes in b. 
'The relationship between the quality of screening and the screening cost is not modeled. However, 
there is some discussion provided in Proof 5. 
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borrower is high risk, but pretends to be low-risk, the lender will identify him as H 
type (j = h) with probability 8 and as L type (j = 1) with probability (1 - 8). The 
lender can identify with certainty the type of a low-risk borrower. We define the 
conditional probabilities of inference given the true type of a borrower as: 
p (11L) =1 
p (h/L) =0 
p (1/H) =(1-ö) 
p (h/H) =S 
The conditional probabilities with respect to the true type of the borrower add 
up to one: p (l/L) +p (h/L) =1 and p (l/H) +p (h/H) = 1. 
Similarly to the case of perfect screening, the borrowers who declare themselves to 
be of type H never get screened. There are no considerations of self-selection since a 
low-risk borrower has no incentive to be considered as high-risk. Moreover, the costly 
screening cannot further improve their expected payoff since they are being offered 
their first best contract. Thus, in an environment where lenders have the option of 
screening the borrowers, even if the screening process is imperfect, the contract offered 
to the H type borrowers will not change i. e. the borrowers that declare themselves to 
be of type H are offered their first-best contract CH. However, since in a rationing 
regime the low-risk borrowers face a positive probability of being rationed, we will 
show that if screening results in a net gain for the low-risk borrowers, then there will 
exist a separating equilibrium where the rationing contract CL will be replaced by a 
screening contract of type C, ' Rit, qti, irit) ; ((1 - Ot) , 
Rlt, qit, irit)} (note that 
the subscripts of the quantity of the credit and the interest rate are now lower case 
letters i. e. the lender allocates a contract according to his imperfect inference about 
the type of the borrower rather than the true type). Thus, when a borrower denotes 
himself as an L type borrower and the inference of the lender is 1, the borrower is 
offered the contract Cf. However, if the inference is h, the borrower is punished by 
being denied a loan, similarly to BC. Figure 4 summarizes the different scenarios. 9 
'An alternative approach would be for the lender, acknowledging the imperfect nature of his 
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Declares himself L 
\ 
Signal h Denied a 
Figure 4 
To simplify the analysis we focus on an economic environment where screening 
is compulsory for the borrowers who declare themselves as low risk. In other words, 
the probability of a borrower not being screened ct is now exogenous and equal 
to zero. So, the contract terms are simplified to Cl' = (Rit, q1t, it t)" Notice the 
differences with the case of the perfect screening which we showed to be CL = 
[(Ot+ Rit, qLt, ýLt) -fit) Rite qit)] First, the screening variable Ot is dropped 
from the contract terms, since all borrowers who apply for a low risk type contract 
are now screened. Second, rationing is now probable when screening takes place. 
Since the inference l does not warrant that the borrower is definitely the L type, it 
is uncertain whether all borrowers who declare themselves as low-risk get funded i. e. 
the rationing variable lrl't might not be unity. 
Since competition leads lenders to offer the best break-even contract for each 
type, both types of borrowers will be offered the maximal contracts for them i. e. 
the best Rit, qit and 7rit among the set of contracts that satisfy the constraints of 
the model. So, similarly to the perfect screening case, the H type borrowers receive 
inference, to grant a loan but with "less preferential" terms to those borrowers whom he thinks are 
just mimicking the L type. However, this case is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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their first-best contract CH but L type borrowers get a second-best contract. More 
specifically, lenders, who earn zero economic profit on each contract, will select those 
R&'t, 4it, mit that maximize the expected utility of the low risk type subject to their 
own zero profit condition, the incentive compatibility constraint of the high risk type 
and the feasibility constraint on the amount of the loan. As before, we assume that 
the participation constraints for the two types of borrowers and the incentive com- 
patibility constraint of the low risk borrowers are not binding and thus can be ignored 
during the maximization process. To save on space we only give these constraints in 
the Appendix where we also verify that there are not binding for the contract terms 





wt > 7r'tt (1 - 5) Rte ' 2.16 QPt+ý - (QPt+1 -) qtt C) PH 
ýitgitRiPL = iricgia (1 + c) QePe+i (2.17) 
4t't !5 wt - 4itc (2.18) 
The incentive compatibility constraint of the high risk type (2.16) shows that 
although there is no difference to the expected payoff when he is truth-telling, his 
expected payoff is affected by the quality of screening when he mimics a low-risk 
borrower. Expression (2.17) has the following interpretation. The left hand side 
gives the interest income the lender will receive by granting a loan in the case where 
his screening inference is 1. Of course, the probability of yielding the return depends 
on the real entrepreneurial ability pL. The expected payoff of the lender should be 
equal to the opportunity cost of the loan. In other words, the expected return of 
the amount qqt (1 + c) should be the same as the safe return he would otherwise get. 
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Finally, expression (2.18) shows that the amount of the loan q, "t is restricted by the 
lenders' wage after accounting for the screening cost. 
We find that as long as (2.7) holds, two new and mutually exclusive screening 
contracts Cl"' and CC 2 emerge: 




Ct 2= (RI 2 q82 I It ý ßiä) 
Wt 
PL 7 (1 -+C)) 
1 
We give the detailed maximization in the Appendix (see Proof 4) but the dual 
screening contract must be discussed here. A common formula for the non-rationing 
probability lies behind the contracts C, "' and C1 2. 1 
\1 - 
pH' (1 + c) 
7rtt = (2.19) 
(1-b)(1- 1+ýE1 
PL J 
The RHS of (2.19) cannot be uniquely signed. Furthermore, it is possible that it 
takes values outside the range zero to one for some values of the parameters. The 
two screening contracts are defined as follows. For Cf' the RHS of (2.19) takes any 
value in the range (0,1) but is equal to one for C. This implies that Cis' and 
Cý 2 differ at the screening quality d and/or the relevant screening cost c (since we 
assume that e, pH and PL are the same under all regimes i. e. they don't vary within 
a country, across countries and over time). We make a further assumption that the 
two screening contracts C11 and C 12 share the same level of screening costs but have 
different screening qualities, specifically J81 < 532 (see Proof 5). This assumption is 
very intuitive. Recall that the screening contract CC' has a positive probability of 
rationing whereas there is no rationing in C, 82 . Hence, it is reasonable that if the 
screening cost is the same under Cl"' and C1', the lower quality of screening 5 leads 
lenders to ration more borrowers. 
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Hence, for the different values 7rjt (as given by (2.19)), the equilibrium contracts 
are described by Proposition 2.2: 
Proposition 2.2 
"Developed" Economy (PL > (1 + c) E) 
Conditions Equilibrium Contract 
_1t=0 (Qr>QL) CL 
0<7rit<1 ß31 <QL CL 
ß8' > OL CC 1 
091 = OL Indifferent between C, 8 1, CL 
lrlt =1 ß52 < OL CL 
ß32>pL CI2 
, 
Q'' = AL Indifferent between C! ', Cr 
Ott >1 (ar >f L> 
CL 
"Undeveloped" Economy (PL < (1 + c) e) 
Irrt <0 (QT > QL) CL 
)31 '= QPt+1wt (PL - E) 




where sz _iE-E PLPx PL-E Q- QPt+lwt 
(l+c 
+ 




Irit P (1+C )C 
PL 
Proof See Proof 4 
Proposition 2.2 makes apparent that the assumption PL (1 + c) e is crucial and 
thus it should be further discussed. To understand possible economic interpretations 
of that expression we first need to discuss each of the parameters involved. To 
interpret e it should be recalled that an investment project converts one unit of 
output to Q units of kt+l (with probability p; ) whereas home technology converts 
one unit of output to Qe units of kt+l where eE (0,1). Hence, e can be perceived 
as the ratio of the safe to the risky rate of return (if e1 the home technology 
output is similar to the investment project output). A reasonable interpretation 
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of the safe rate is the rate of a governmental bond. In that case many economic 
and sociopolitical variables might affect its value. Similarly, the values of investors' 
probability of success PL and the screening cost c might be influenced by e. g. the 
general infrastructure of an economy, the institutions, the rule of law etc. Bearing 
such interpretations in mind we can define the case PL > (1 + c) e as describing a 
"developed" economy. So, in a "developed" country the screening cost is relatively 
small or the investment projects are to a substantial extent more appealing than 
home technology (i. e. PL » e) or lenders' home technology's output is relatively 
low (e is small). Similarly, if PL < (1 + c) e then the economy under question is an 
"undeveloped" one. 10 
It is reasonable to expect that a developed economy will be characterized by a 
developed financial market. Similarly, it is more probable that the financial market 
will be less developed in an undeveloped economy. So, we will be using the two terms, 
economy and financial markets, interchangeably. 
The variables ßi are the switching or indifference points for the borrowers between 
two different contracts. So, ßs' gives the indifference point between C1' and CL, 082 
gives the indifference point between and CL and or defines the indifference point 
between CL and home technology. Proof 4 also shows that they can be ranked as 
081 < 082 < Qr. 
The main predictions of our model can be outlined as follows. When screening is 
imperfect, H type borrowers always get their first-best contract but L type borrowers 
get a second-best contract. The contract offered to L type borrowers differ according 
to the level of development of the economy. More specifically, we find that in an 
undeveloped economy the screening regime is not an option for the low risk borrowers 
i. e. the lenders never offer a screening contract (remember that it is the borrowers who 
decide whether the rationing or the screening contract is optimal for them according 
'°One could argue that the screening cost is relatively high in developed countries due to the size of 
the firms, the complexity of the corporate form, the degree of sophistication of accounting methods 
etc. However, big firms and conglomerates can raise capital through other means such as issuing 
bonds. Thus, they cannot be seen as the typical case of firms whose financing problem is addressed 
in this paper. 
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to their expected payoff but the terms of the contract should satisfy the zero profit 
condition of the lenders). In a developed economy things are more complicated. A 
lender can offer three different contracts to L type borrowers, the rationing contract 
CL or one of the two screening contracts Cl' or Cll. The two screening contracts 
differ by the probability of non-rationing (alt or iii) which in turn differs by the 
quality of screening lenders have used in the screening process (b'1 or S"). So, 
summarizing, when lrit <0 or lrit >1 the rationing contract is the only contract 
offered to low-risk borrowers whereas when 0< Ira <1 the lenders might offer the 
rationing or a screening contract. In conclusion, allowing screening to be imperfect 
leads to substantially different results than the perfect screening hypothesis of BC 
who reached a strong result where first, the contracts offered are invariant to the 
level of development of the economy and second, there is a unique screening contract 
offered to the low risk borrowers. 
It is worth noting that OL is the critical parameter concerning the participation or 
not of the borrowers. In other words, ßL is a measure of the minimum rents that must 
be offered to induce L type borrowers to participate. A reasonable interpretation of 
these minimum rents is the wage an entrepreneur can get if does not materialize his 
investment project. A high outside wage might lead to market collapse for low risk 
borrowers (a possibility precluded by the assumptions of our model) whereas a low 
outside wage leads to certain participation. Moreover, how ßL compares to ß'1, /382 
is critical for defining whether the expected payoff from screening is higher than the 
expected payoff from rationing in both developed and undeveloped economies and 
thus for defining whether the rationing or the screening contract is offered by the 
lenders. 
Similarly to the perfect screening case, the form of equilibrium contract depends 
on the marginal product of capital pt+l and the labour rate of return wt. For large 
values of wt and pt+l, the returns from investing are large, rationing is costly and 
thus screening dominates. Similarly, screening prevails for high quality of screening 
b'1 and low screening cost c. 
In what follows we compare the equilibrium contracts under imperfect screening 
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with the ones under a rationing regime CL or perfect screening Q. The interest rate, 
when screening is imperfect and compulsory for the borrowers that claim to be low 
risk, is higher than under a rationing regime. So, both R, ' and R1 2 are higher than 
RLt for any non zero screening cost ((1+`)Q`p`+' > 
Qf l ). However, R, 1 and R12 Pt PL 
QEPe i 
are higher than RLt for a high screening cost only ((l+cP)QLepe+t > PLC 
Note that since screening entails the expense of positive resources and is now 
compulsory, none of the low-risk projects gets full funding. Recall that this is not the 
case under rationing or perfect screening since all non rationed and all non screened 
low-risk borrowers respectively get full funding. 
We next look at the rationing probability. Lenders find it optimal to mix screening 
with rationing when they offer the C1'1, contrary to the case of perfect screening. So, 
when screening is imperfect, fewer low-risk projects are funded than if screening were 
perfect (7rL (1 - 0) + 7rLq5 > it =1>a 1+C E 
). Finally, for the contract 
C1'' it is easy to see that ßiä = mit > ii and in Proof 6 we show that irit > it . 
A final discussion point can be added about the comparative statics of the quality 
of screening and more specifically the critical value of 8 which tips an economy from 
screening into rationing. An interesting result emerges from the case of 7rIt = 1. 
The appendix shows that the critical value of ö does not anymore depend on the 
screening cost c or alternatively that the critical value of c which tips an economy 
from screening into rationing is independent of b (see Proof 7). The implication of 
such finding is that there are cases where the model presented in this study can be 
possibly simplified by dropping c or b. Further research is needed to check whether 
one of the two parameters and which one drives the results when the imperfect and 
compulsory screening is matched with certainty of granting of a loan. 
2.5 The dynamic path of capital 
Recall that the economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period-lived overlap- 
ping generations. All cohorts are assumed to be of equal size. Half of each cohort's 
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agents are borrowers and half are lenders. All agents are endowed with one unit of 
labour at the first period of their lives and all wish to consume in the second period. 
Young lenders offer their labour to the competitive market, earning the wage wt, and 
then decide whether to give their proceedings as a loan to a borrower or use them 
according to their home production technology. Young borrowers use their labour 
endowment to run their investment project if they get a loan or to run their home 
technology if they are denied a loan. At the second period all borrowers become 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can hire labour from the young lenders at wage wt+l 
and capital from the old lenders at rate pt+l. It is worth reminding that there are 
two ways to produce time t+1 capital: first, according to the firm production func- 
tion where one unit of time t output is converted to Q units of time t+1 capital 
and second, according to the home production of the lenders where one unit of time 
t output is converted to Qe units of time t+1 capital. Finally, we assume that 
the firms produce time t+1 output according to the exogenous growth function 
yt+i =k +iLi+i 
There is complete factor mobility and hence in equilibrium all firms employ an 
equal amount of labour. Since all borrowers become firm operators the number of 
firms per capita is 0.5. The per capita supply of labour is restricted to the number 
of those agents called lenders i. e. 0.5 (since borrowers who are denied credit are 
excluded from selling their labour from the timing of events). Hence, at each time 
period employees per firm are labour/firm =_ Lt = 1. 
Since the consumption of both the lenders and the borrowers in the second period 
depends on the capital accumulation realized in the first period, it is important to 
describe the capital accumulation process in detail. To derive the general equilib- 
rium, we have to look at the growth path and steady states of the economy under 
the different rationing and screening regimes. There are five pairs of equilibrium 
contracts: the high risk borrowers always get their first best contract (the perfect 
information contract CH) but the contract of the low risk borrowers differs. In what 
follows, we derive the capital accumulation paths for these five pairs of equilibrium 
contracts and express them in the form kt+l = ake. The section concludes with a 
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number of propositions which describe how the resulting capital paths compare to 
each other. 
Case 1: (CH, CL) 
None of the borrowers is screened. All high-risk borrowers obtain loans, but some 
low-risk borrowers are rationed. The capital stock at the second period comes from 
the successful high-risk borrowers, the low-risk borrowers who were not rationed but 
were successful and from those lenders that converted their wages into capital after 
rationing some low-risk borrowers. The aggregate capital stock is: 
Ki+i = 0.5APxQwt + 0.5 (1 - X) PtýiQwt + 0.5 (1 - A) (1 - ii) QEwt 
_ (APH + (1 - A)PL1rr + (1 - A) (1 - 7rL) e) 0.5Qwt 
It is apparent that we assume full depreciation of the capital each period (if capital 
depreciates only partially, there would be another term on the right hand side of the 
above equation reflecting the fraction of the un-depreciated capital from period t 
and an additional market would be needed to allow the un-depreciated capital to be 
traded between generations). 
Since there are 0.5 firms per capita, the per firm capital stock is: 
kt+1 
- 
(APH + (1 - A) PL7L + (1 - A) (1 - Irk) E) Qwt (2.20) 
The wage rate at time t is: 
eyt 
8Lt =wt =(1-0)keLt0 
Since Lt =1 then 
wt = (1 - 9) kt (2.21) 
Substituting (2.21) into (2.20) we get: 
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- 7rk) e) 
Q (1 
- 0) KB 
Ako (2.22) 
where A=(. \pH + (1 - A) pL7rr + (1 - A) (1 - Irr) E) Q (1 - 0). Equation (2.22) 
describes the dynamic path of capital. At the steady state kt+l = kt and so from 
(2.22) the steady state quantity of capital is: 
k88 = All('-0) (2.23) 
Note that (PL - e)) Q (1 - 0) > 0, which implies that a decrease . Lt 
in credit rationing shifts the capital accumulation curve up and thus leads the econ- 
omy to a higher steady-state capital stock. 
Case 2: (CH, CL) 
All low-risk and high-risk borrowers obtain loans and a fraction of low-risk bor- 
rowers is screened. The capital stock at t+1 comes from the high-risk borrowers 
that were successful in running their investment project, from the low-risk borrowers 
who where screened and were successful in their investment and from the low-risk 
borrowers who where not screened and were successful in their investment. Thus, 
the per firm capital stock is: 
kt'+i=Q(1-9)ke 
(APH 
+ (1- A)pL 
i+ o) 
=Bk (2.24) 
where B=Q (1 - 0) 
(APH + (1 - A) PL 
1 ). Equation (2.24) describes the dy- 
namic path of capital. The steady state quantity of capital is given by: 
keJ = (2.25) 
Note that F<0, which implies that a decrease in the screening cost shifts 
the capital accumulation curve up. Moreover, 67, >0 and thus an increase in the 
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probability of screening (1 - q5) leads the economy to a lower k, ',. 11 
A comparison of (2.22), (2.23), (2.24) and (2.25) shows that the screening and the 
rationing contracts lead to different capital accumulation paths and steady states. 
The distinction between the two paths is described by Proposition 2.3. 
Case 3: (CH, Cl 1 
The capital stock in the second period comes from the successful high-risk bor- 
rowers, from the low-risk borrowers who where screened, not rationed and successful 
in their investment. Moreover, there are some lenders that converted their wages into 
capital after rationing some low-risk borrowers. Note that this last implies a dead- 
weight loss 0.5 (1 - A) (1 - 7rlt) Qwtc which was not present in the case of perfect 
screening. Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
kt+1=Q(1-6)ke(APx+(1-a)PL7itl+c+(1-A)(1-7rIt)e1+c) =Dkýe 
(2.26) 
where D =Q(1-0)(APH+(1-A)PL4'th+(1-A)(1-7r, t)e1+h). Equa- 
tion (2.26) describes the dynamic path of capital. At the steady state kt+l = kt and 
so the steady state quantity of capital is: 
k, " (2.27) 
An increase in the screening cost can have positive or negative impact on kt+l. 
This result emerges from the fact that ki+1 depends both negatively and directly on 
c but also positively and indirectly through altl. In other words, a higher screening 
cost implies more resources spent but a higher probability of granting a loan. This 
trade-off was not present in the case of perfect screening (or for (CH, Cr2)) since in 
that case low risk borrowers get funded with certainty. Finally, >0 and thus an 
increase in the quality of screening shifts the capital accumulation curve up. 
"The analytical derivation of the dynamic paths of all the cases as well as the relevant derivatives 
for the comparative statics analysis for all the cases are given in Proof 7. 
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Case 4: (CH, CI 
The capital stock in the second period comes from the successful high-risk bor- 
rowers 0.5APH and from the low-risk borrowers who where screened and successful in 
their investment. Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
k t+i =Q (1 - 8) ke 
(APH 
+ (1- A) PL (1 + c)) = 
Fke (2.28) 
where F=Q (1 - 0) 
(APH + (1 - a) PL 1+7C 
). Equation (2.28) describes the 
dynamic path of capital. At the steady state kt+1 = kt and so the steady state 
quantity of capital is: 
L. 89 = Fil(1 ° (2.29) 
Consistently with the above cases, we find that 8F 8F <0 and > 0, implying 
that a decrease of the screening cost or an increase in the quality of screening shifts 
the capital accumulation curve up. 
Case 5: (CH, Home Technology) 
There is no screening contract offered to low risk borrowers. The capital stock 
at the second period comes from the successful high-risk borrowers and from the 
lenders that converted their wages into capital after rationing all low-risk borrowers. 
We assume that the lenders can foresee that for the given 5 there is no 7rit that 
satisfies the constraints of the model and thus no screening takes place. Thus, the 
per firm capital stock is: 
kt'+1=Q(1-0)ke('PH+(1-A)e)=Gke (2.30) 
where G=Q (1 - 0) (APH + (1 - A) E). Equation (2.30) describes the dynamic 
path of capital. We find that =0 which implies that the level of the screening 
cost is irrelevant to whether the economy will move to a higher capital accumulation 
path. At the steady state k99 = kt and so the steady state quantity of capital is: 
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Proposition 2.3 When screening is perfect, the screening contract yields a higher 
capital accumulation path and steady-state level of capital per firm than the rationing 
contract. That is, for a given kt, kt+l > kt+l and hence k, ', > kas. 
Proof See Proof 9 
Proposition 2.4 When screening is imperfect and some low-risk borrowers are ra- 
tioned, the screening contract might yield a lower or higher capital accumulation path 
and steady-state level of capital per firm than the rationing contract. That is, for a 
given kt, kt+1 > kt+l and hence k89 > k89 or kt+l < kt+l and hence k, "; < k; 3. 
Proof See Proof 10 
Proposition 2.5 When screening is imperfect and no low-risk borrowers are ra- 
tioned, the screening contract yields a higher capital accumulation path and steady- 
state level of capital per firm than the rationing contract. That is, for a given kt, 
b82 -t+1 > ki+1 and hence k82 > k' ss* 
Proof See Proof 11 
Proposition 2.6 When screening is imperfect, the screening contract where some 
low-risk borrowers are rationed yields a lower capital accumulation path and steady- 
state level of capital per firm than the screening contract where no low-risk borrowers 
are rationed. That is, for a given kt, k82 t+1 > kc+i and hence keJ > k, 'e. 
Proof See Proof 12 
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Proposition 2.7 When screening is imperfect and all low-risk borrowers are ra- 
tioned, the screening contract yields a lower capital accumulation path and steady- 
state level of capital per firm than the rationing contract. That is, for a given kt, 
kt+1 > ki+i and hence k88 > k;,. 
Proof See Proof 13 
Proposition 2.3 summarizes the results of BC i. e. the case of perfect screening. 
Figure 5 depicts the dynamic capital paths where Path r corresponds to the pair 






When screening is assumed to be imperfect, the picture is more complicated. Path 
sl corresponds to the pair (CH, Cl 1), Path s2 corresponds to the pair (CH, CC') and 
Path s3 corresponds to the pair (CH, Home Technology). Propositions 2.4 to 2.7 
show that Path 32 is always the highest dynamic path, Path 83 is always the lowest 
but there are two possible rankings depending on the relative position of Path sl and 
Path r. The two cases are depicted by Figures 6 and 7.12 
'2We refrain from comparing the perfect screening dynamic path to the imperfect screening ones 
since the focal point of our analysis is the comparison of the different paths under imperfect screening. 
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2.6 Equilibrium contracts and capital dynamics 
We have seen that although in an undeveloped economy only rationing can be used 
to separate borrowers, the picture is more complicated in developed economies as 
screening can also be used to separate borrowers. So, we need to understand which 
regime prevails at equilibrium in a developed country. 
Proposition 2.2 shows that whether CE or C11 or C1' prevails in a developed 
economy depends on , Q'1 and ß82 which in turn depend on the marginal products of 
capital and labour i. e. on pt+l and wt. In other words, the contract's form depends on 
kt and kt+l. However, the time t+1 capital stock kt+l and thus its marginal product 
Pt+1 depend on which contract was offered at time t. Hence, it is obvious that there 
is a mutual dependency between the equilibrium capital stock and contracting regime 
in developed economies. 
To address the joint evolution of the equilibrium capital stock and contracting 
regime in developed economies, we need to calculate the marginal product of kt+i 
under the three different contracts. Note that there is not going to be any reference 
to the regime where no screening contract is offered to low risk borrowers (Dynamic 
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UNIVERSITY 
path kt+l) as it is always dominated by the rationing contract (see Proof 4). Thus, 
if the time t equilibrium contract is CL, CI `, CC 2 then the marginal product of kt+i 
is respectively: 
re 1-B 
Pt+l - äkty+l 
a ýkaktr+l Lt+l 
_g (kt+1)e =B 












t+l) (2.31b) Pt+leý 
t-}-1 t+l 
B -1 _ 
ai 
_a 
(ki+le Lt+e e2 32)0 Pt+l = Ok32 Ok82 - e'kt+1= 0 Fkt+l (2.31c) 
t+l t+1 
It is also necessary to estimate the value of the switching points between rationing 
and screening at the equilibrium values of the marginal products of capital and labour. 
We define: 
681 (PL - (1 + c) e) (PL - E) 01% = Qpt+iwt 
C (PL - ae'E) + 681 (PL - C) 
(2.32a) 
18; 1 
b'1 (PL - (1 + c) e) (PL - E) (2.32b) 
eý = 
QPt+i wt 
C (PL - 691 E) + 6°1 (PL - E) 
+r1E6) PLPH(PL - E) Qrz = QPt+1wt +----1 (2.32c) 
(Ti 
+ C) PH PL E (PL - PH) 
Qs = Qpt, +z iwt 
1+e-e-1 PLPH (PL - E) (2.32d) 
(1 + c) PH PL e (PL - PH) 
which are the expressions for ß" and , 3'' from Proposition 2.2. Substituting the 
values wt, pt+l, pt+l and pt+l from (2.21), (2.31a - d) into (2.32a - d) we obtain: 
681 (PL - (1 + c) e) (PL - ¬)Q (1 - 0) Bke'AB-1 (2.33a) 
Qr1 =c (PL 
- Gele) +ö 
(PL 
- 6) 












PLPH (PL - E) Q (1 - 0) Bke'AB-1 (2.33c) (1+C) PH PL 6(PL-PH) 
Qä, -1+-e-1 
PLPH (PL - E) Q (1 - 0) Bke'F0-1 (2.33d) - 
((1 
+ C) PH PL C (PL - PH) 
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Propositions 2.4 to 2.7 have shown that there are two possible rankings of the 
dynamic paths depending on the relative position of kt+l and kt+l. So, in order to 
understand which regime prevails at equilibrium in a developed country, we examine 
the two cases separately. 
2.6.1 Path sl < Path r 
The production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital and thus pi+1 > 





increasing functions of kt and (0 - 1) <0 
we obtain that ß<ß; l as 
A>D and ß>Q; ý as 
A<F. Moreover, (3,1 < Q8, 
(see Proof 12). Thus, the ranking of the /3* functions is f< 3*, < , 3* < 3, *2. In 
Figure 8 we plot the 3* functions of (2.33a - d) and an arbitrary ßL. Depending on 
how the /3* functions compare to ßL there is a different equilibrium pair of contracts. 
It is worth reminding that since the Paths sl and s2 depend on the exogenous value 
of the quality of screening, there is no switching between the two screening regimes 
and we only consider switching from each screening path to the rationing path. Thus, 







Figure 8: ß* functions 
49 
kl k'7 k" M' 
Case 1: Dynamic paths s2 and r 
1.1: 13L > ßT2 the lenders offer the pair (CH, CL). 
1.2: ßL < ß; z the 
lenders offer the pair (CH, Cr'). 
1.3: , 3* > OL > )0'82 there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Lenders randomize 
between (CH, CL) and (CH, C82). 
Case 2: Dynamic paths sl and r 
2.1: OL > ßel the lenders offer the pair(CH, CL). 
2.2: OL < ß, '. 1 the 
lenders offer the pair (CH, Cis' ). 
2.3: ßr1 > ßL > 0, `1 there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The lenders will 
randomize between the pairs (CH, CL) and (CH, Cr). 
Proof See Proof 15 
The final step is to define the levels of capital at which switching from each 
screening path to the rationing path occurs. In other words, we need to calculate the 
capital stock levels which correspond to the intersection points of the 0* functions 
and ßL in Figure 8. We define k''l, k8', k''2 and k32 as the levels of capital stock that 
solve the equations ß= QL, 8a, = ßL, ßr2 = QL and ß2- ßL respectively. If we 
re-arrange (2.33a - d), we obtain the threshold levels of capital: 
ri 
e /bal (PL - 





k at -1 








PH PL - 
1) 
E (pL - PH) 
Q (1 - 0) BA -I (2.36) 
 PLPH 






E(pL - PH) / 
These four levels of capital stock are depicted in Figure 9. Given ßr1 < 0; 1 








The following Proposition summarizes the above results about the prevailing 
regime in a developed economy by combining the findings about the relationship 
between the four different values of /3` to ßL and the respective threshold levels of 
the capital stock: 
Proposition 2.8 Case 1: Dynamic paths s2 and r 
1.1: OL > ßr2, or equivalently kt < k""2, rationing prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, CL) 
1.2: ß2> ßL > , ß, z, or equivalently 
k'2 < kt < k82, there is a mixed equilibrium 
where lenders offer (CH, CL) and (CH, C32). 
ßL < , Q; z, or equivalently 
k82 < kt, screening prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, C2) 
Case 2: Dynamic paths sl and r 
2.1: ßL > 0; 1, or equivalently 
kt < k81, rationing prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, L)- 
2.2: , ß; l > 
Qt > Qrl, or equivalently k"1 < kt < k", there is a mixed equilibrium 
where lenders offer (CH, CL) and (CH, Cl 1) 
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2.3: OL < ßr,, or equivalently k''1 < kt, screening prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, Cis') 
" 
We now discuss the findings and explain the implications for the general equilib- 
rium of the economy. The first and most obvious point is that the pair of contracts 
(CH, Cr2) leads to the highest dynamic path and thus convergence to Path s2 is best 
for the economy. 
Inspection of the expressions which define the steady state levels of capital ((2.23), 
(2.27), (2.29)) and the levels of capital at which lenders switch between regimes 
(2.33a, b) show that it is not possible to rank them. Thus we will look at them case 
by case. 
If we assume that the initial capital stock is less than all threshold and steady 
state capital levels, then initially the contracting regime is the rationing one and the 
economy grows along Path r. 
When k''2 < k32 < k8, < k8J ( k8' < k''1 < k;; < k;, ) the contracting regime 
changes to a mix of rationing and screening at the level of capital kr2 (01). The 
capital accumulation path lies between Path r and Path sl (s2) and the economy 
grows along the path joining k''2 and k82 (k''1 and k"). However, once the capital 
stock reaches k82 (k"), the equilibrium regime is screening and capital accumulates 
along Path sl (s2). The economy converges to the screening steady state kä9 (käs). 
The convergence from Path r to Path s2 is a typical upward movement to a higher 
dynamic path and higher steady state level of capital. However, the switch from 
Path r to Path sl is more peculiar in the sense that Path sl is lower than the 
rationing Path r and thus leads the economy to a relatively low steady state for the 
capital stock. So, if the policy makers cannot enforce the use of S" over J'1 (e. g. by 
setting regulations and laws about the quality of the screening technology used by 
the lenders), the economy runs the risk of converging to the lowest steady state as 
the economy switches from the rationing to the screening regime. This situation is 
depicted in Figure 9. 
However, when k;, < k''2 < k82 < k88 the economy converges to the low steady 
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state k;, before it gets to a point where switching to the screening regime would 
occur and hence the switch never happens. In other words, if the threshold level of 
capital at which the economy changes from rationing to screening is relatively high 
then the rationing regime prevails at all times. This case is depicted in Figure 10. 







There is a peculiar situation, that of k, 88 < k81 < k'' < k;, where there will be 
no steady state equilibrium in the economy. The economy will experience periods of 
high and low capital stocks and growth. 13 Moreover, a mix of rationing and screening 
will always prevail. To see this remember that for any level of capital lower than krl, 
capital accumulates along Path r. In the interval [01, k"] the capital accumulation 
path lies between Path r to Path sl. When capital accumulates further and exceeds 
k''' it will tend to start accumulating along Path sl. However, since the steady state 
level of capital k;; is smaller than k' 1 there will be movement to the left. The decrease 
of capital will terminate when capital reaches the level k'1. Then, the above cyclical 
effect continues. This situation is depicted in Figure 11. 











Finally, when k89 < k8, < k°1 < k'', the economy converges to the rationing 
steady state kä,. 
2.6.2 Path sl > Path r 
The production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital and thus pt+1 > 
81 i>P +1. Since ßr1, ß; l, 
ßT% and ß8z are increasing functions of kt and (0 - 1) <0 pt+ 
we obtain that now 0T1 > ß; l as 
A<D and ß*2 > ß8z as A<F. Moreover, ß, l < 
ß82 
(see Proof 14). Thus, the ranking of the ß' functions becomes ß; l < 
ßT, < ß;, < ß*2 
and thus k''2 < k82 < k''1 < 01. In Figure 12 we plot the ß" functions of (2.33a - d) 
and an arbitrary ßL. The analysis is similar to the previous section. Depending on 
how the , ß` 










Case 1: Dynamic paths s2 and r 
1.1: OL > Q, z 
the rationing contract pair (CH, CL) is the only equilibrium pair 
at time t. 
1.2: ßL <0 82 the 
lenders offer the pair (CH, C 2). 
1.3: Qr, > ßL > ße, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Lenders randomize 
between (CH, CL) and (CH, C82). 
Case 2: Dynamic paths sl and r 
2.1: ßL > ßT1 the rationing contract pair (CH, CL) is the only equilibrium pair at 
time t. 
2.3: ßL < ßel the lenders offer the pair (CH) Cý 1) .. 
2.2: ßT1 > ßL > ß; t there 
is no pure strategy equilibrium. Lenders randomize 
. between 
(CH, CL) and (CH, C, "') 
Proof See Proof 15 
Given ß, '1 < ßr1 < 1612 < 
ß, 'z, we now obtain that k''2 < k8 < k''1 < k"1. 
Figure 13 depicts these switching levels of capital and Proposition 2.11 summarizes 
the above results about the prevailing regime in a developed economy when Path sl 
is higher than Path r. 
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Proposition 2.9 Case 1: Dynamic paths s2 and r 
1.1: OL > , QTZ, or equivalently 
kt < kr2, rationing prevails and lenders offer 
(CH) CL) 
1.2: ß2> OL > ß9z, or equivalently kT < kt < k'2, there is a mixed equilibrium 
where lenders offer (CH, CL) and (CH, Cr2) . 
1.3: ßL < Qä2, or equivalently k82 < kt, screening prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, Cie 
Case 2: Dynamic paths sl and r 




2.2: ßT1 > ßL > ß, 1, or equivalently 
k" < kt < 01, there is a mixed equilibrium 
where lenders offer (CH, CL) and (CH, CC'). 
2.3: ßL < ßel, or equivalently k'1 < kt, screening prevails and lenders offer 
(CH, C! ' ) 
Similarly to the previous case, the pair of contracts (CH, Cý ýý leads to the highest 
dynamic path and convergence to Path 82 is best for the economy. Both screening 
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paths lie above the rationing path and thus the screening contract is always preferred 
for the economy. We now look at the possible rankings of the steady state levels of 
capital ((2.23), (2.27), (2.29)) and the levels of capital at which lenders switch between 
regimes (2.33a - d). 
If we assume that the initial capital stock is less than all threshold and steady 
state capital levels, then initially the contracting regime is the rationing one and 
economy grows along Path r. 
When kr2 < k52 < k;, (k''1 < k81 < k;, ) the contracting regime changes to a mix 
of rationing and screening at the level of capital k''2 (kri ). The capital accumulation 
path lies between Path r and s2 (sl) and the economy grows along the path joining 
kr2 and k82 ( k''1 and 01). However, once the capital stock reaches k32 (01), the 
equilibrium regime is screening and capital accumulates along Path s2 (Si). The 
economy converges to the higher steady state level of capital k;; (k. "'). This situation 
is depicted in Figure 12. 
However, if k88 < kr2 < k8 < k;; ( k;, < k''1 < k°1 < k;; ) the economy 
converges to the low steady state k;, before it gets to a point where switching to 
the screening regime could occur. In other words, if the level of capital at which 
the economy switches from the rationing to the screening regime is relatively high, 
then the rationing regime prevails at all times. This case is depicted by Figure 14. 
Obviously, the same holds for the case k; 3 < k, '; < kr2 < k82 








Notice that the capital dynamics described in this section are similar to the ones 
found by BC with the two paths being the rationing Path r and one of Path sl or 
Path s2 describing the perfect screening path. 
Summarizing the findings up to now we see that the lending regime is endoge- 
nously determined. So, although first, the expected payoff of the borrowers defines 
whether the screening or the rationing regime prevails and second, the exogenous 
choice of 6'1 or de' defines which screening contract is going to be offered by the 
lenders, it is the economic environment (or the relative positioning of the rationing 
and screening capital dynamic paths) which defines the steady state equilibrium. So, 
when both Path sl and Path s2 lie above Path r, the screening regime leads to a 
higher dynamic path and a higher steady state of capital compared to the rationing 
regime, similar to the predictions of BC. However, our model shows that the frame- 
work of BC describes just one of the cases that can be observed in an economy where 
screening is available as a means of separating borrowers by type. Once we introduce 
a more realistic assumption about the screening technology, that of imperfect screen- 
ing methods, more scenarios emerge as potential general equilibrium states. The 
screening regime is often but not always the best method of separating borrowers nor 
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is it a panacea for developed and undeveloped economies. More specifically, when 
Path sl lies below Path r, switching from the rationing regime to screening might 
imply convergence to a lower dynamic path and steady state for capital. Moreover, 
the relative positioning of the threshold levels of capital and the steady state levels 
of capital is crucial in defining the steady state of the economy. This impact varies 
both across the different pairs of contracts (CH, Cj') and (CH, Cr2) as well as across 
the relative position of the capital accumulation paths. 
2.7 More on capital dynamics 
From the point of view of policy makers it is of interest to know how a change in 
a policy instrument will affect the steady state of the economy at each situation. 
The policy instruments of our model are the quality of screening and the level of the 
screening cost. In BC a decrease in the cost of screening is seen as an increase in 
the degree of financial sophistication. However, in our model such an improvement 
can be reflected in the same implicit way i. e. a decrease in the cost of screening or, 
explicitly, by an increase of the quality of screening. A policy that would facilitate 
the implicit increase in the degree of financial sophistication is a decrease to the cost 
of screening through direct subsidization of the screening cost. As for an explicit 
increase in the degree of financial sophistication, policy makers can set regulations 
and laws about the quality of the screening technology used by the lenders e. g. set 
sound accounting auditing and disclosure regulations. Moreover, giving incentives 
to institutions that provide information about borrowers can indirectly improve the 
informational infrastructure in the financial sector. For example, our model shows 
that an economy would reach a higher steady state of capital if lenders choose S" 
over S'1 i. e. if they offer C1' instead or Cj", but similar reasoning can be used to 
asses the importance of higher values of the exogenous S'1 or S" given the choice of 
C1' or Cj". However, there are some special cases which we now consider in detail. 
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Case 1: (CH, CL) and (CH, CC') 
In Section 5 we saw that an increase in the quality of screening or a decrease in 
the screening cost shifts the capital dynamic Path 82 up. However, it is possible that 
an economy can still get trapped in the lower steady state k83. More specifically, when 
k88 < k''2 < k92 < k82 we have seen that the economy converges to the low steady 
state of capital k; 3 before getting to the point where switching to the screening regime 
would occur. In that case a change of c or 582 will have no effect on the economy. 
However, the economy can avoid getting trapped at the low steady state by adopting 
a policy which will force the switching level of capital kr2 to "shift" to the left of 
k88. Remember that k3e is independent of both c and 582 but k''2 is an increasing 
function of c and a decreasing function of S" (see Proof 16). Thus, a decrease of c or 
an increase of S" will allow the economy to get to the point where switching to the 
higher Path s2 would occur before converging to the low steady state k8,. In other 
words, there is a threshold cost of information which needs to be reached before c can 
affect the economy's growth path and steady state, similarly to BC. Such a result is 
naturally extended in our model and also holds for the quality of screening. 
Case 2: (CH, CL) and (CH, CC 1) 
As we showed in Section 5, an increase in the quality of screening shifts the capital 
dynamic Path sl up but a decrease in the cost of screening might shift Path sl up 
or down due to the trade-off between the resources spent and the probability of a 
borrower getting a loan and thus running the project. Regardless of an upward or 
downward shift, there are cases where a threshold level of c or d'1 is needed before a 
policy change can affect an economy's growth path and steady state. When Path sl 
lies above Path r, a country might get trapped in a low level of development when 
k' < k''1 < k81 < k;;. Since k88 is independent of both c and b'1 but eý`-' >0 as 
and Okri <0 (see Proof 17), c needs to fall below or ö'' need to increase above a 
threshold level before any change in the policy instruments can affect the economy's 
growth path and steady state. 
However, when Path sl lies below Path r, a country might get trapped in a 
situation where the economy experiences alternating periods of high and low capital 
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stocks and growth if k;; < k8' < k' 1< k',. In this case, the investigation of the 
effects is more complicated than before since both k;; and k'1 depend on c and 
aD 8D <0 and > 0. Since k'; = D""'-el it follows b''. In Proof 8 we show that 
0 and 81cB1 > 0. Moreover, in Proof 18 we show that e>0 but also that 25, - 
a0 14 Thus, it is obvious that we cannot generalize on the impact of a change 
in a policy instrument as it is the relative change of k;; and k5' which will define the 
outcome. 
2.8 Conclusion 
It has long been suggested that modeling informational imperfections is crucial for a 
better understanding of financial markets' impact on economic growth. This paper 
models the loan markets in a more realistic manner in the sense that the technology 
used to obtain information about potential borrowers is allowed to be imperfect. 
We show that although credit rationing can be used by any country as a mech- 
anism of separating borrowers, this does not hold true for screening, contrary to 
earlier findings. More specifically, we find that in undeveloped countries rationing 
is the only equilibrium way of separating borrowers and the screening cost needs to 
decrease, or the difference in the rates of return between the home technology and 
an investment project to increase above a threshold, for the screening contract to 
become relevant. In developed economies, lenders can separate borrowers by deny- 
ing credit to a fraction of them at low levels of capital accumulation whereas they 
start using a screening technology to obtain information about potential borrowers 
as capital accumulates. Such a transition from rationing to screening may imply a 
lower or higher dynamic path and steady state for the capital stock. The economic 
environment can change the equilibrium contract terms within each regime but can 
14 The last result is counter intuitive since we would expect the quality of screening to have a 
negative relation with the threshold level. 
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also change the equilibrium regime itself. Moreover, we find that a screening regime 
does not always dominate a rationing regime in the sense of delivering higher dynamic 
capital paths and steady state level for capital, contrary to preexisting models. 
Finally, our model verifies earlier findings about the "threshold effect" of the 
screening cost and predicts that the quality of screening should also be above a 
threshold level before it can affect an economy's growth path and the steady-state of 
capital. 
An interesting extension of our model would be to endogenise the screening cost. 
This can be done by a two stage game solved by backward induction where the lenders 
choose to use the quality of screening which maximizes their expected payoff, given 
the contract terms which maximize the expected payoff of the borrowers. Another 
direction would be to allow the screening cost to depend on the quality of screening 
and allow learning to have a beneficial effect on the quality of the screening or its cost. 
Obviously, another natural extension of our work would be to allow for imperfections 
in the screening process of both types of borrowers. 
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2.9 Appendix 
Proof. 1: Derivation of Cl 
Given CH = (RHt, qHt, lrHt) _ 
(Q ept LL , wt, 1), the lender finds the optimal CL 
by maximizing the following program: Select (lrLt, QLt) to 
Maximize EPL (GL) = lrLtPL 
(QPt+l 
- RLt) 9Lt + 
(1 
- 7rLt) SQL 
(2.38) 
subject to 
7rLt9Lt (PLRL - QEPt+l) =0 
9Lt <_ Wt 
Q< 7f Lt <1 
7rHtPH (QPt+I - RHt) 4Ht >_ 7rLtPH (QPt+i - Rtt) QLt (2.39) 
or, if we substitute the equilibrium values irxt = 1,4Ht = wt and Ryt =QP PH 
into the incentive compatibility constraint of the high-risk borrower (2.39) and take 
it as equality, it becomes: 
qLt = 
(1 - E/PH) wt (2.40) 
(1 - E/PL) IrLt 
However, the above maximization can be simplified. The feasibility constraint 




If we substitute (2.40) in the objective function (2.38) and maximize it with 
respect to 7rLt we see that, given CH, Ut and RLt, the expected payoff for the low- 
risk borrower is strictly decreasing to 7rLt since 
BEPL (CL) 
_ _QL < a1Lt 
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Thus, the lender will offer the smallest 1rLt i. e. 7rLt = 
1-""" So, finally the equilib- 1-c pL ' 
rium contract terms for CL are: 
= 
QEPt+i 1- E/pH CL = (RLtr QLte ýLt) -\ PL 
Wt, 1- EIPL 
Participation Constraints 
During the maximization procedure it has been assumed that the participation 
constraints for the low and high risk borrowers are not binding. We need to verify 
that this assumption is true for the equilibrium contract terms. The participation 
constraints for the low risk borrowers is given by (2.12) and is rewritten below for 
convenience: 
IrLtPL (RPt+l - RLt) 4Lt + (1 - irLt) OL ý QL (2.42) 
For 7rLt (2.8) implies that it is not binding. Similarly, the participation -E pL 
constraints for the high risk borrowers is given by (2.13) and is rewritten below for 
convenience: 
IrHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) 9Ht ý 0 
For iHt = 1, (2.8) implies that it is not binding (remember we have assumed that 
ßH = o). 
For future reference we would like to define the point at which a low risk bor- 
rower is indifferent between the rationing contract and his home technology. Thus, 
substituting the equilibrium contract terms of C in the participation constraint of 
the low risk borrower, we define: 
Or = QPt+i (PL - E) Wt > OL (2.43) 
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Proof. 2: The ICH constraint binds and the ICL constraint does not 
bind 
Case 1: The ICH constraint binds and the ICL constraint does not bind 
If we substitute the equilibrium values qxt = Wt, lrxt = 1, RHt =Q, 7rLt = 
1-C PH 
1-e pL , qLt = 
wt and RLt =Qp1 in the left hand side of the ICH given by (2.39) 
we obtain 
QPt+iwt (PH - 6) 
But from the right hand side of (2.39) we obtain 
QPt+iwt (PH - E) 
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint for the H type borrower indeed holds 
with equality in the equilibrium. 
Similarly, if we substitute above equilibrium values in the left hand side of ICL 
given by (2.14): 
(QPt+i 
-4pP y+ý) PLWt + 
(1 
- 1-f ný 
J OL > PL 
(QPt+i 
- 
mu-' ) Wt 
Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint for the L type borrower indeed holds 
with strict inequality in the equilibrium. 
Case 2: The ICL binds and the ICH does not bind 
If we assume that the ICL is binding but the ICH is not binding then the maxi- 
mization problem for the L type borrower is: 
Maximize EPL (CL) _ 7rLtPL 
(QPt+1 
- RLt) QLt + 
(1 
- 7rLt) ßL 
subject to 
Q-'pt+i RLt = PL 
qLt '51 Wt 
Q<7rLt S1 
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So, as long as (2.8) holds, the expected payoff for type L borrowers is strictly 
increasing at both control variables and thus maximized by the corner solution. 
Thus, the low-risk borrower is offered his first-best contract CL = (RLt, 9Lt, 7Ttt) _ 
(Q- 
wt, i) PG + 
The maximization problem for the H type borrower is: 
Maximize EPH (CH) _ IrHtPH (QPt+i - RHt) 4xt (2.44) 
subject to 
7rLtPL (QPt+l - RLt) QLt + (1 - 7rLt) ßL ý 
IrHtPL (QPt+I - RHt) QHt + 




4Ht <_ wt and 0< 7rHt <1 
or, if we substitute the equilibrium values it j=1, qLt = wt and RU = 
Q` 
PL 
into the incentive compatibility constraint of the low-risk borrower and take it as 




(PL - 6) Wt - (1 - lrHt) ßL) (2.46) 
QPt+17rHtPL 
(PH - E) 
However, above maximization can be simplified. The feasibility constraint qHt < 
wt implies that (2.46) should satisfy: 
'ýtQPt+1PH (PL - E) - PHQL (2.47) ýHt 
_ WtQPt+1PL (PH - E) - PHQL 
If we substitute RHt and (2.46) into the maximand, the problem changes to 
maximizing: 
EPH (CH) = 
PH (QPt+l (PL - e) Wt - (1 - WHO ßL) (2.48) 
subject to the restrictions 1> irru and (2.47). Since S 
Hi = PHBL/PL > 0, the ex- 
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petted payoff is strictly increasing in lrHt and thus the lender will offer the maximum 
non-rationing probability i. e. IrHt = 1. From (2.46) we find that 
QHt 
PH (PL - E) Wt 
= 
PL (PH -0 
Thus, we find that the equilibrium contract is 
QEPt+i PH (PL - 6) Wt CH = (RHt, 9Ht, IrHt) = 
PH ' PL (PH - E) ,1 
The interpretation of these results is straightforward. If the ICL constraint binds 
and the ICH constraint does not bind then the low-risk borrower gets his first-best 
contract but the high-risk borrower is offered a second-best contract. If we take the 
ICL as equality and we substitute the terms of CC and CL then we find that the 
ICL is binding. 
Substituting the terms of CH and CL in (2.39), we find that the ICH is also 
binding. This contradicts the original assumption. Thus, Case 2 cannot be true.   
Proof. 3: Derivation of Proposition 2.1 
The participation constraints, which ensure that the type L and type H respec- 
tively borrowers will prefer to take the loan offered to them rather than use their 
home technology are 





- RLt) 9Lt + 
(1 
- irLt) / LI ý 
OL 
and 
IrHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) 4Ht ý0 
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The incentive compatibility constraint for type L and type H respectively are: 
[7rLtpL (Qpt+1 
- RL2) q+ 
(1 
- 7rLt) ßLI + 
(1 - 0) 
[7LtpL (QPt+1 
- RLt) 9Lt + (1 - IrLt) ßLI 
ý IrHtPL (QPt+i - RHt) QHt + (1 - 7rHt) QL 
and 
lrHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) QHt % 07rLtPH 
(QPt+l 
- RLt) qLt 
To derive the optimal contract, it is assumed that the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the high risk borrower is binding and the one for the low risk type is 
non binding. Similarly, both participation constraints are assumed to be non binding 
and thus are being ignored during the maximization procedure. After deriving the 
equilibrium contracts it is verified that both assumptions are true. 
Substituting the zero profit condition (2.52) in the objective function (2.50) we 
obtain: 
EPL (CL) = 07rLt 
(PLQPt}1QLt 
- ßL - gLtQEPt-F1) + c5ßL 
+ (1 - 0) (pLQitQPt+l - 4it (1 +'Y) QEPt+1) (2.49) 
Given that a high risk borrower gets his first best contract 
l 
CH = (RHt, qHt, 7rHt)= 
QPCPpit wtJ/ 
a lender solves the following program to determine the optimal CL : 11 
Select RLt, RLt, 4it, 4Lt, 1rLt, Ot to maximize the expected utility of low risk type: 
EPL (CL) = Öý 
(7rLtpL (42Pt+1 - Rit) qLt + 
(1 
- 7rLt) 8L)+(1 - 0)PL 
(QPt+1 
- RLt) qLt 
(2.50) 
subject to the constraints of the model: 
t; 
? ýH (Q+I - 
QP t+l wt > 07LLPH (QPt+1 - RLt) 9Lt (2.51) 
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Notice that (2.51) is the incentive compatibility constraint for type H where we 
have substituted the contract terms of CH. 
Above maximization problem can be simplified: 
Claim 1: qs t=w 
Since qit does not appear in the ICH, the lender can increase the return of type 
L borrower by pushing qLt to its upper limit. 
Claim 2: RL =0 
None of the interest rates appears in the simplified version of the objective func- 
tion but Rit appears (negatively) on the right hand side of the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the high-risk borrower. So, the lender should set Ri as high as possible 
in order to deter an H type borrower from applying for a CL contract. It is obvi- 
ous from the zero-profit condition that this implies that RL should be set as low as 
possible. 
Substituting the expressions for qLt and Ri in the zero profit condition (2.52): 
RL = 
(OlrLtgLt + (1 - 0) Wt) cEPt+i (2.53) 
07rLtpLQLt 
If we assume that the ICH given by (2.51) is binding and substitute (2.53) we 
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can solve for qit: 




qLt =\ (2.54) 
lh7fLý1-pL J 
Then, the feasibility constraint implies that: 





ýIZ- ph J 
Substituting qit and q' given by (2.54) in (2.49) we get: 
EPL (CL) = PLQPt+l 
ý1--L 1 
wt + 
(1 - 0) ZUtE 1- 07rLtOL 






Because ýn = -ýß fJ 
< 0, the expected payoff for the low-risk borrower L 
is (at equilibrium) decreasing to iri and thus (2.55) holds with equality. Thus, the 
equilibrium value of Tr' is 
ýL _ PH) 
+ 1Pý £) 
(2.57) 
0(1-PL) 
However, iri <1 which implies that 
1-E+E< (2.58) 
PH PL 
In order to calculate whether the expected payoff for the low risk borrower is 
greater under rationing or screening, we need to calculate the derivative of (2.56) 
with respect to 0. So, if we substitute the equilibrium value of lrn in (2.56) we 
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obtain: 
1-+ 1-ý 1 -L- Ex nc PL (CL) = QPt+i 
\ \1 -e pH/ 
wt + 
wtepL ) 









00 TAL-EQL-QPt+11+ ypL 
So, if 




then OEPt(CL < 0. In this case, the expected payoff of the low risk borrower is 
(at equilibrium) strictly decreasing to OL and thus (2.58) holds with equality i. e. 
screening dominates. So, for /t =1- Py +A, (2.57) yields 7rL = 1, (2.54) yields 




(PL - 6) QPt+l 
wt 
1 +, y 
OL 
then eEP`0CL >0 and the expected payoff of the low risk borrower is (at equilibrium) 
strictly increasing to O t. So, the non screening probability takes its maximum value 
i. e. Q4 =1 and there is no screening. Moreover, (2.57) yields iL =1p, (2.54) 
PL 
yields q't = wt and (2.53) yields RL =Qi. e. the equilibrium contracts terms of 
the rationing regime occur i. e. rationing dominates. 
Participation Constraints 
The high risk borrowers get the rationing contract. In Proof 1 we have already 
shown that the participation constraint of the high risk borrower is not binding in 
this case. 
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The participation constraint for the low risk borrowers if we substitute the equi- 
librium contract terms but 0 and do some algebraic manipulation becomes: 
PL -6 (Q5PL-E)'Y 
1+y 
QPt+lwt + QPt+1 wt 1+yý 
ßL 
Since 1 1, 
C Qpt+lwt > OL and (cPL - e) = pL pH-E > 0, the participation con- 
straint for the low risk borrowers is not binding. 
Incentive Compatibility Constraints 
We want to show that the ICH constraint binds and the ICL constraint does not 
bind. If we substitute the equilibrium contract terms in the incentive compatibility 
constraint for the type L we obtain: 
(Pe 
H PL) 1+1 y>0 
i. e. the incentive compatibility constraint for the type L is not binding. Similarly, 
we find that the incentive compatibility constraint for type H holds with equality for 
the equilibrium contract terms. 
Derivation of the switching point between the screening and the ra- 
tioning regime 
A different way to verify that ß* =1 Qpt+lwt is the value for which the lender 
is indifferent between offering the rationing or the screening contract to the low risk 
borrowers, is to compare the expected payoff from the screening contract (given by 
(2.50)) to the expected payoff from the rationing contract (given by (2.38)) after 
substituting the equilibrium value of 0. We find that EPL (CL) > EPL (C}, ) when 
(PL - e) QPt+i i> 
ßL indeed.   
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Proof. 4: Derivation of Proposition 2.2 
The participation constraints, which ensure that the type L and type H respec- 
tively borrowers will prefer to take the loan offered to them rather than use their 
home technology are: 
7ritp (1I L) PL (QPt+1 - RI) 9lt + (1 - irIt) p (l/L) QL ý QL 
IrHtPH (Qpt+l - RHt) 9Ht ý 0 
The incentive compatibility constraints for type L and type H respectively are: 
lritp (l/L) PL (QPt+i - Ri) 9ü + (1 - 7rü) P (1/L) Qt 
(2.59) IrHtPL (QPt+i -Ritt) 4itt + (1 - 7Ht) QL 
7rHtPH (QPt+i - RH' t) 9[ßt ý ýt'tP (1/H) PH 
(QPt+i 
- Ri) 4it (2.60) 
Expression (2.59) has the following interpretation. With probability irl't the lender 
gives out a loan of amount qit charging the borrower Rf . Of course, the probability 
of yielding the return depends on the real entrepreneurial ability of the borrower PL. 
If the borrower is rationed, he produces according to his home production technology 
and gets QL. In order for a low-risk borrower to reveal his type, this expected 
payoff should be at least as high as the expected payoff if he conceals his type. The 
expression (2.60) can be interpreted similarly. 
Given that a high risk borrower gets his first-best contract CH = (RHt, qHt, lrHt) = 
(Q- P '-, wt, 1), a lender solves the following program to determine the optimal Cf = 
(Rt't, qit, ir4t): Select Rlt, qj"t and 7r' to maximize the expected utility of the low risk 
type i. e.: 
Maximize EPA (Ci) = 7r4tPL (QPt+i - RIB) 4it + (1 - Irlat) ßL (2.61) 
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subject to the constraints of the model: 
(Qpt+l - 
QEPt+i 
wt > pit (1 - S) (QPt+i - Ri) 4it (2.62) PH 
) 
7rt'tgitRIPL = irügit (1 + c) QEPt+i (2.63) 
0 <R! t 
0< 9'ic t (2.64) 
0< lrjt <1 (2.65) 
Notice that (2.62) is the incentive compatibility constraints for type H after 
substituting the conditional probabilities and the equilibrium terms of CH. We derive 
the equilibrium contracts by ignoring the non binding participation constraints and 
at the end we check that they are not binding. Similarly, we assume that the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the high risk borrowers (whose contract is not affected by 
considerations of self-selection) is binding. It follows that the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the low risk borrowers is not binding. So, we derive the equilibrium 
contracts by ignoring the non binding incentive compatibility constraint of the L 
type borrowers and at the end we check that the condition holds. 
If we solve (2.63) for Rl' we find that: 
R` _ 
(1 + c) Q¬pt+1 (2.66) 
PL 
If we assume that the incentive compatibility of the high-risk borrower is binding, 
substitute (2.66) and solve (2.62) for q we obtain: 
PH) Wt 
Sit =(1 (2.67) 
mit (1 - 6) 1-1: LrEl PL J 
for alt 0 0,8 l and 2+c) 1. 
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The feasibility constraint (2.64) implies that: 
(1--L)(1+C) 
mit , l+c c 
(2.68) 
(1 - b) 
(1 
--) 
If we substitute the zero profit condition (2.63) and expression (2.67) into the 
objective function (2.61), we obtain: 




QPt+l (PL - (1 + C) E) + (I - 7rlt) QL (2.69) 
At equilibrium, (2.69) is strictly decreasing to 7r, 't since 
8Eý C_- BL < 0. So, 
rt 
(2.68) holds with equality i. e. 
(1- e)(1+c) 
7rýt = PH (2.70) 
(1-ö)(1- l ) 
PL L 
However, we need to check that (2.70) satisfies the assumption 0< irst < 1. Since 
the numerator of the right hand side of (2.70) is positive and 5<1, we need to look 





Case 1: Developed Economy (pL > (1 + c) e) 
In PL > (1 + c) e, the right hand side of (2.70) is always non negative. However, 
there are the following cases: 
(1. i) If the right hand side of (2.70) is equal to zero then (2.67) implies that the 
quantity offered becomes undefinable. However, since rationing is certain, the lender 
can offer any amount of credit if there is no probability of granting the loan. Hence, 
the feasibility condition (2.64) is not relevant anymore and thus the restriction (2.68) 
can be relaxed. There is no screening contract that satisfies the constraints of the 
problem. 
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(1. ii) Another scenario for a developed economy is that 0< n7t < 1. Assuming 
that the right hand side of (2.70) is between zero and one is equivalent to: 
<_C<PH(PL-8)(1-Sal)-PL(PH-Eý (2.71) 
(PL (PH -E) +EpH 
(1 
- 6'1)) 
We also need to take into consideration the definition of the developed economy 
i. e. pL > (1 + c) e or 
c< 
pL 
-1 (2.72) e 
If we compare (2.71) and (2.72) we find that (2.71) is the most restrictive con- 
straint. Thus, the constraint 0< 7rit <1 implies that screening cost's range of values 
is cE [0, c), where c is: 
&_PH(PL-e)(1-ö8)-PL(PH-E) (2.73) 
(PL(PH-e)+EPH(1-b°')) 
The right hand side of the last inequality has to be positive since c>0. In other 
words, since the denominator is always positive, we need: 
0< 58, < 
(PL - PH) ' (2.74) 
(PL - E) PH 
Notice that (2.74) is binding since the RHS is smaller than one. 
If Ri', irrt, qit are the equilibrium values of the non-rationing probability and the 
amount of loan, then we obtain their values from (2.66), (2.70) and (2.68) respectively. 
Thus, when cE [0, c) and (2.74) holds, the equilibrium contract offered is: 
(1 + c) QEPt+i wt 
(1 
- PH) (1 + c) 
81 C1"' = (R, a1) 9lt1,7rlt i+- e PL 1+c (1Pý) 
Obviously, if cV [0, c) or (2.74) does not hold, there are no Rif, q, t, 7r which 
satisfy 7rýt <1 if PL > (1 + c) e. 
(l. iii) The next scenario for a developed economy is that the right hand side of 
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+ c) 1- 6-2 1- l+c e () PL I 
and substituting (2.75) in (2.67) we find that: 
Wt 
Sit- ýl+c) 




((1+c)QPt+i Wt C112 = Rt 2, 
/ 
Ott , alt PL ' (1 + c)' 
1 
(1. iv) Lastly, when the right hand side of (2.70)is greater than one, the assump- 
tion (2.65) is violated. There is no screening contract that satisfies the constraints of 
the problem 
Case 2: Undeveloped Economy (PL < (1 + c) s) 
In this case the right hand side of (2.70) is always negative. The assumption 
(2.65) is violated (and the amount of loan given by (2.67) becomes negative). There 
is no screening contract that satisfies the constraints of the problem. 
Participation Constraints 
In the model of BC, (2.8) implies that the participation constraints for the low 
risk borrowers holds with strict inequality under both the rationing and the screen- 
ing regime. However, in our model, (2.8) is a sufficient condition under the rationing 
regime only. The reason for this is that screening is now compulsory. To understand 
the difference we need to recall that BC showed that when screening is not compul- 
sory, the optimal screening probability is positive (0' > 0) i. e. 0>0 is preferred to 
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0=0. In other words, entailing the screening cost is optimal. Since in our model 
screening is compulsory, assuming that the expected payoff from a loan is increasing 
to the non-rationing probability and the quantity of the loan i. e. (2.8) and (2.9) hold, 
is not sufficient anymore (although (2.8) is still valid). 
Case 1: Developed Economy (PL > (1 + c) e) 
(l. i)To solve for the low risk borrower's expected payoff we substitute (2.66) in 
(2.61): 





PI+l 14ýt + (1 - ir7) Qt 
and since rationing is certain then irrt 
/= 
0. So, the expected payoff for L type 
borrowers is: 
EPZ (Ci 3) = 8L 
i. e. the low-risk borrowers are indifferent between accepting the loan (which is 
offered to them with zero probability) or using their home technology. However, 
we assume that the borrowers prefer the contract over their home technology (in a 
manner similar to the assumption that if a borrower is indifferent between two types 
of contracts, he chooses the contract designed for his type) which implies that the 
participation constraint is not binding. 
(1. ii) The participation constraint is: 
Ir'tPL (QPt+i - Ri) 4it + (1 - 7rt't) QL ý ßL or PL (QPt+l - Ri) qtt ? ßL. However, 
(2.8) implies that the last constraint holds with strong inequality. 
(1. iii) This case is identical to (1. ii). 
(1. iv) This case is identical to (1. i). 
For future reference we would like to define the point at which a low risk borrower 
is indifferent between one of the two screening contract and his home technology. If we 
substitute the contract terms of Ct' or Ct' we see that low risk borrowers always pre- 





OL Thus, we define: 
0*9 = 
(1PL+C- 
6) QPt lWt>RL 
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Case 2: Undeveloped Economy (PL < (1 + c) e) 
This case is identical to (l. i). 
Incentive Compatibility Constraints 
The screening contract CC' 
If we substitute the contract terms of C, " in the left hand side of the ICL given 
by (2.16) we obtain: 













since >1 and 0<<1 j. 1 (1-ael) 1- +c). 
PL 
i. e. the ICL is indeed non-binding. 
If we substitute the contract terms of CC 1 in the girth hand side of the ICH given 










i. e. the ICH is binding 
The screening contract Cl"' 
If we substitute the contract terms of C1' in the left hand side of the ICL given 




- PL l+c 
But using (2.75), the last expression becomes 
1-pte 
PLQPt+l ßt 1_ s2 
4P 




i. e. the ICL is indeed non-binding. 
If we substitute the contract terms of CC' in the right hand side of the ICH given 
by (2.62) we obtain: 





But using (2.75) 
= QPt+l i+ý 
(1 






i. e. the ICH is binding 
Derivation of the switching points between the screening and the ra- 
tioning regimes 
Case 1: Developed Economy (PL > (1 + c) e) 
(l. i) Rationing is certain when lenders offer a screening contract to low risk 
borrowers. The borrower's expected payoff is higher under CL compared to Ci 3 
when: 
1-C H (QPt+l - 
Q£ 
I wt + (1 - 
1-c ni 




(QPt+i L) Wt > OL 
which is (2.8) for the contract terms of C. Thus, the low risk borrower always 
prefer the contract CL to CC 3. 
(1. ii) The borrower's expected payoff is higher under Cl" compared to CE when 
EP1 (Cl"') > EPL (CL) or, after some algebraic manipulation,: 
Q" = QPt+i'wt 
6411 (PL -(1 + C) ä) (pL - E) > OL 
C(PL-bae)+a (PL - 
Of course, cE [0, c) and (2.74) should hold. However, above condition is not 
enough to say that CC 1 is the equilibrium contract. It is necessary for the borrower 
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to accept the contract in the first place i. e. to prefer CC' to his home technology. In 
other words, the participation constraint of (1. ii) should hold. 
From a technical point of view, we need to know how ß8' compares with ß" and 
Or. We see that ß$l < , ß' when 
6'1 L- 1-}-c e pL-e L-c 1+c 
c pL, - 'le +b"1 pL-e 1+c 
or 
(581-1)<0 
which is always true. Similarly, ß' < , B' when 
1+. - e) 
< (PL - e) 
which is always true. 
Summarizing, the equilibrium contracts are CC' when OL < , 8'1 and CL when 
Dal <, 8L < ßr" 
(l. iii) The borrower's expected payoff is higher for C'2 compared to CL when 
EPA (Cj 2) > EPL (CL). After some algebraic manipulation we find that this is 
equivalent to 
/'ý I PLFH(PL-C) +E L- H- LH L-E 1 Qpt+lwt ( 
1-ýC E pL-PH E PL-PH 
) ßL 
So, the expected payoff from Cris higher than CL when 
1EE PLPH (PL - Eý 082=RPt+lwt +----1 >QL ý1 + Cý PH PL E (PL - PH) 
The last inequality implies that when the screening contract is preferred by the 
low risk borrowers, the screening cost has to be small (since for high values of c, ßS2 
is negative). 
However, it is a necessary condition that the participation constraints for both 
CI '82 and CL contracts hold. Technically speaking, we need to know how $32 compares 
with /3° and ß' . We see that 




< Owhich is always true. Since, we have already shown 
PH PL 
that 0' < /3? we can summarize that the equilibrium contracts are Ci' when OL < (3" 




This case is identical to(l. i). 
Case 2: Undeveloped Economy (PL < (1 + c) e) 
This case is identical to (1. i)   
Proof. 5: The quality of screening for C, 2 is higher than for Cf' 
The contracts C, " and C, 2 are based on the value of the right hand side of (2.70). 
Up to now, we have been assuming that e, PH and PL are the same under all regimes 
(they don't vary within a country, across countries and over time). So, what can 
differ between C' and C4 ', are the exogenous screening effort and the screening 
cost. 
The simplest approach is to assume that the two screening contracts entail the 
same level of screening cost. Thus, for a given level of screening cost c the screening 
quality is 8'' and 8" for the contracts Cl' and C1112 respectively. Then, since the 
RHS of (2.70) has to lie between zero and one for CC' but has to equal one for C, 2, 
then ir"i < wie when 582 > J"'. This result is intuitive. Since the screening contract 
CC' has a positive probability of rationing whereas there is no rationing in Ci', it is 
reasonable to expect that if the screening cost is assumed to be the same under both 
Cl l and C1' contracts, the higher quality of screening ö"' allows the lenders to never 
ration the borrowers that approach them. 
However, if we assume that the two screening contracts entail same level of 
screening quality, results are counter-intuitive. Specifically, for a given level of Ö 
the screening cost for the contracts Cl" and CC 2 is c"1 and C32 respectively. In that 
case, ir'i < alt when c'1 < c32. However, there is no reason to believe that giving 
more loans should lead to higher proportional screening cost. Furthermore, if the 
two screening contracts entail different screening cost and quality of screening, then 
7r "< 7r82 when ý 
+c°1 a° s< 1+°°2(612)) which is not ver It It (1-6" )PL- l+c 11E ý1ý PL- l+c°9 1EY 
intuitive   
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Proof. 6: The non-rationing probability for C, ' is greater than for CL 
'ri' -'pit 
- 
1_ - (1+c) 1-- - 
( sl) 1}c c 1-b 1- 
PL PL 
1-- (1+c) 1-Pt - 1-PC (1-ast) 1- 
lPcc 





1)(1 1PL `)) 




H-e PL aal L-e +C L-a°1e >U 
1- '1 PL- 1-Fc e PH PL-e 
Proof. 7. Comparative statics of the critical value of 6 which tips an 
economy from screening into rationing when mit =1 
When mit = 1, (2.70) can be re-arranged as follows: 1_° ,= i+c " Sub- 
stituting this expression in Eli (Cl") = EPL (CL) i. e. the condition of indiffer- 










critical level of the quality of screening from the level of the screening cost. It is easy 
to show that the this is equivalent to the independence of the critical value of c which 
tips an economy from screening into rationing from Ö.   
Proof. 8: Derivation of dynamic paths and their comparative statics 
Case 2: (CH, CL) 
The capital stock at t+ 1 comes from the high-risk borrowers that were successful 
in running their investment project 0.5ApH, from the low-risk borrowers who where 
screened and were successful in their investment 0.5 (1 - ))PL (1 - 0) and from the 
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low-risk borrowers who where not screened and were successful in their investment 
0.5 (1 - A) PLO. Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
Kt+i = 0.5APHQwt + 0.5 (1- A) PL (1 - 0) Q1+ -Y 
+ 0.5 (1 - A) PLOQwt 
= 0.5Qwt 1 APH + (1 -, \)PL0 + (1 - k) 1 -1 7PL 
(1 - 0)) 
Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
kt+i =Qwt Aj1N+(1-A)PLb+(1-A) 1 
1ypL(1-ýý 
or after substituting for the equilibrium wt: 




=Q(i-e) (i - a)pL0-1 <0 
=Q(1-B)(1-A)PL >0 a'g Dz 1 +, y 
Case 3: (CH9 Ct 1 
The capital stock at the second period comes from the successful high-risk bor- 
rowers 0.5 ApH, from the low-risk borrowers who where screened, not rationed and 
successful in their investment 0.5 (1 - A) pL7r1t. Moreover, there are some lenders that 
converted their wages into capital after rationing some low-risk borrowers 0.5 (1 - A) 
(1 - 7r W). Note that this last imply a dead-weight loss 0.5 (1 - A) 
(1 
- 7r7i) Qwtc 
which was not present in the case of perfect screening. The value of the capital stock 
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in t+1 is: 
K+1 = 0.5ApHQWt+0.5(1-A)PL7ritQ1+c+0.5(1-a)(1-7rii)QE1+c 
= 0.5Qwt(APH+(1-A)PLýlt l+c+(1-ý)(1-ýitýEl+c) 
Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
1 
i+i=Qwt1 \Ptr+(1-ý)PLýIt -1+ 
c+(1-A)(1-1rit) 
E1+c) 
or after substituting for the equilibrium wt = (1 - 0) kt : 
ke+i =R (1 - B) ke 
(PH+ 
(1 - A) PLýit -f +c+ 
(1 - A) (1 - lrIt') E. + c) 
Dke 
where D=Q(1-0)(APH+(1-A)PL1r 1+ý+(1-A)(1-7rü)eth) 
Comparative Statics 
OD 1 PH 
(1_ä"m pL 
ä =R(1-0)(1-A)i+ý(Pr, -E)>0 
1-g, PL 
vý'` 1- 1 (PL-(1+c) 
>0 
Finally, we want to calculate the derivative of lit+l with respect to the screening 
cost. It is worth noting that since the derivation of the contract terms of C, " is based 
on the assumption that 0< ir, t < 1, c and S'1 should not be considered independent 
for the purpose of comparative static analysis. In other words, we want to calculate 
the effect of a change in 8"I on kt+1, conditional on c satisfying the requirement for 
0< Irlt <1 throughout. The derivative is: 
8D 
- /1 -B 
/1 






(1-6-1) APL (1+c)3 j0 
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To show that the last derivative takes both positive and negative values is equal 
to proving that the last parentheses of the above expression takes both positive and 
negative values or f (c) 0, where: 




- E) PL 
E2l + CZ 
(EPL+ E) pL 
_ 
2l 
PH (1 d) / PH 
+ 
(PH - c) (PL - E) PL 
- (PL - E)2 PH(1-d) 
The two roots are given by: 
- 
\ýEpL 






H-f PL-f L- E2 
PH 1- 
J 
6PL + H-f 




PH 1- /1 PH(1) 2=/ 
PH Ei L-f PL 
- E2/ 
Since the coefficient of c2 can take positive or negative values, f (c) can be concave 
or convex. It follows that , PL < 2E and y-E 
Pý-E L -E. 2 <0 when f (c) is concave py 
and PL > 2e and H-` PL-` -`)PL -E2 >0 when f (6) is convex. Moreover, the constant PH l- ' 
of f (b) is negative due to (2.74). Finally, given c>0, the following two cases are 
possible: 
Case 1: If e. g. cl <0< c2 < c, then is negative when cE (0, c2) and positive 
when cE (c2) c). 
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Case 2: If e. g. c2 <c< cl, then 9 is negative when cE (0) c2) and positive 
when cE (c21 c). 
We now use a numerical example to show that an increase of the screening cost 
might shift the dynamic path kt+l up or down. We use the values PL = 0.5, pH = 
0.4, e=0.3,5 = 0.2 which satisfy (2.71)and (2.74). The range of the screening cost 
and the quality of screening as given from (2.71) and (2.74), i. e. the values which c 
and 6" can take in order to satisfy the condition 0< ir, t < 1, are cE [0,0.096) and 
581 E [0,0.375). For the suggested values it is PL < 2e and H-` pL-C pL - e2) <0 PH (I-6) 
thus f (c) is concave. We find that c2 = 0.05 and Cl = 3.058. Thus <0 when 
cE (0, cl) but OD> 0 when cE (cl, c). 
Case 4: (CH, CI') 
The capital stock at the second period comes from the successful high-risk bor- 
rowers 0.5'\pH and from the low-risk borrowers who where screened and successful in 
their investment 0.5 (1 - A) PL. The value of the capital stock in t+1 is: 
Kt+ 82 w i=0.5APHQWt + 0.5 (1 - A) PLQ (1 + C) 
= 0.5QWt I APH+(1 - A)PL(1 +C)) 
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Thus, the per firm capital stock is 
11 ki+i =Qwt APH+(1-A)PL(1+c)/ 
or after substituting for the equilibrium wt = (1 - 0) ke: 
kt+i=Q(1-B)ke(APH + (1 - A) PL (1+c)) =Fkt 
where F=Q(1-9)(APH+(1-A)pL 1+ý) 
Comparative statics 
Since the derivation of the contract terms of CC 2 is based on ir, t = 1, c and &2 
should not be considered independent for the purpose of comparative statics analysis. 
For a given level of quality of screening, the screening cost has to take a precise value 
in order to satisfy the requirement that there is no rationing. In other words, we 
want to calculate the effect of a change in d'' on k, +l, conditional on c satisfying 
the requirement for jrit =1 throughout. 
The generic form of the dynamic capital of the screening regime for ir7 E [0,1] is: 
kt'+i =Q (APHWt + (1 - A) PLýitgit + (1 - A) (1- 7rit) eqü) (2.76) 
Notice that (2.76) is equal to (2.28) for the contract terms of the pair (CH, C 2), 
equal to (2.26) for the contract terms of the pair (CH, Ci') and equal to (2.30) for 
the contract terms of (CH, Home Technology). If we substitute (2.21), q, "t with qit 
but 7t with its general form given by (2.70), we obtain a general expression for ki+1: 
kt+ý=41(1-e)e apH+(1-a) 
ý1 
Pý(l+c) 1 (pý-E)+(1-a)E 1 (1 - 552) (1 _ 1+` `1 1+c1+c PG / 
(2.77) 
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Since 7rit = 1, we solve for c: 
6 82) (PL-E)PH-PL(PH-C) 
(2.78) 
(1 - 532 EPH + PL (PH - E) 







Thus, the derivative of kt+1 with respect to 582 is: 
äkt1=Q(1-0)ke(1-A) (PH aý)PL >0 0682 (1-b )2PH 
So, we find that as the quality of screening increases, the economy moves to a higher 
capital accumulation path conditional on the screening cost satisfying the requirement 
that the no rationing probability is equal to one. 
Obviously, if we solve mit =1 for b°' and substitute in (2.77)we obtain the same 
expression as (2.28). The derivative of kt+1 with respect to the screening cost is: 
kt+92 1 1_ 
-Q (1- 0) ke (1 - A) PL (1 + c)2 
<0 
ac 
The interpretation is similar. As the screening cost increases, the economy moves to 
a lower capital accumulation path conditional on the quality of screening satisfying 
the requirement that the no rationing probability is equal to one. 
e Finally, it is obvious from (2.29) that 4>0 and e<0. 
Case 5: (CH, Home Technology) 
There is no screening contract offered to low risk borrowers. The capital stock at 
the second period comes from the successful high-risk borrowers 0.5APH and from the 
lenders that converted their wages into capital after rationing all low-risk borrowers 
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0.5 (1 - A). We assume that the lenders can foresee that for the given 6 there is no 
7r, t that satisfies the constraints of the model and thus no screening takes place. 
The 
value of the capital stock in t+1 is: 
Kt+j = 0.5ApHQwt + 0.5 (1 - A) Qewt 
= 0.5Qwt (APH + (1 - A) 6) 
Thus, the per firm capital stock is: 
t+i =Q'ýt(KPH+(1-A)e) 
or after substituting for the equilibrium wt = (1 - 0) ke: 
t+l =Q(1-0)ke(APH+(1-A)e) =Gke 
  
Proof. 9: Proof of Proposition 2.3 
Recall that the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-risk borrower binds 
in both screening and rationing regimes i. e. 
7rHtPH (QPt+i - RH' t) qrt = 7LtPH 
(QPt+l 
- RU) 4it 
7rHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) qHt = 
L7rLtPH (QPt+l 
- Rit) qLt] 
Moreover, under both regimes the high risk borrower obtains the same contract 
(his first-best contract). So, it follows that his expected payoff should be the same 
in the two regimes: 
7rL PH (QPt+l - RLt) QLt = c5 
(rLtpH (QPt+l 
- RLtý 4Lt) 
Lt and RLt we obtain: Substituting the equilibrium values of zrit, 4Lt, it, R* 
L PL PL 




If we use (2.22) and (2.24) we can show that kt+l > kt+lwhen: 
PL 11+ y 
or since e= KpL: 
Finally, using (2.79) we obtain: 
i+7 >0 or 1>0 which is true   
Proof. 10: Proof of Proposition 2.4 
If we compare (2.22) to (2.26) and do some algebraic manipulation we find that 
ki+i > kä+i when: 
f (c) = (k: 1- kt+i) - c2 + cý + (2.80) 
is positive, where 
((PL-b"1£)PL(PH-£)(£PH+PL(PH-e))-(PL-£)(1-&1 )) < 
67, -1 
(PL-e)ö'1PL(PH-f)(ePH +PL LH-f >0 Sf 1- "1 
The roots of f (c) are: 
--v'2-4c 
- 
-ý + Vfý -4 
2 C2 2 
Notice that these roots should lie inside the range of possible values of c that 
satisfy the constraint 0< ir1t <1i. e. cE [0, c). 
In order for cl, c2 to exist we need ý2 - 4( >0 or 
((PL - 531 E) PL (PH - E) 
(EPH +PL (PH - E)) - (PL - E) (1 - 5a1))2 
-4(PL-E)a'1PL(PH-E)(EPH+PL(PH-E))E(1-881) 
>0 (2.81) (E (1 - Sal ))2 
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Since c>0 and S>0 the only possible scenario is that both roots are positive. 
The below figure shows that for cl <c< c2 it is ki+l < kt+l but for 0<c< cl and 
c> c2 it is kt+l > kt+l. 
k`nv k'',, 
., 
For cl >0 we need ý<- 4( which is possible only if 6<0 or 
(PL - SPI6) PL (PH - E) (EPH + PL (PH - 0) - (PL - E) (1 - 6"') <0 (2.82) 
So, since in -ý >- 4( both sides are positive, raising them at the power of 
two will not change the direction of the inequality. So: 
(-e)2 > ý2 -4( 
=4(>0 
which holds. 
Lastly, c2 >0 when < VF: -:: 4( which is obviously true since £<0. 
Summarizing, as long as (2.82) holds then both roots are positive. Moreover, we 
need to make sure that (2.71), (2.74), (2.81)and (2.82) are compatible (PL > (1 + c) e 
is automatically satisfied when (2.71) is satisfied). In what follows we give a numerical 
example showing that kt+l can be bigger or smaller than . +', +l for a set of parameter 
values. 
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For PL = 0.5, PH = 0.4, e=0.3 and 8°' = 0.2, (2.71), (2.74), (2.81)and (2.82) are 
satisfied as well as e< pH < PL. From (2.71) we find that the possible range of values 
for the screening cost is cE [0,0.096). We obtain that f (c) = c2 - 0.651 c+0.001 
and thus the roots are cl = 0.002 and c2 = 0.649. So, we find that: 
ki+l - kt+, >O for 0<c<0.002 
kt+l - kt+l <0 for 0.002 <c<0.096   
Proof. 11: Proof of Proposition 2.5 
Recall that the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-risk borrower binds 
in both screening and rationing regimes i. e. 
IrHtPH (QPt+l - RHt) qHt ='rLtPH (Qpt+l - RLt) 4Lt 
r R' )*- 7r8' (1 - 532) PH 
(QPt+1 
- Ri2) 4'8 7rHtPH (QPt+l - Ht qHt - lt 
Moreover, under both regimes the high risk borrower obtains the same contract 
(his first-best contract). So, it follows that his expected payoff should be the same 








1+c (2.83) ýLt= (1 
PO 
If we assume that kt+l is bigger than kt+l then by comparing (2.22) to (2.28) we 
obtain: 
, +c7 > 
(PL - E) 7CL +E 
or, by substituting (2.83): 
PL >s(1+c) 
which is true since it is the original definition of developed markets   
Proof. 12: Proof of Proposition 2.6 
By comparing (2.28) to (2.26) we find that kt+1 > kt+1 when PL > pL7r4' + 
(1 - it )E or when PL >e which 
is always true.   
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Proof. 13: Proof of Proposition 2.7 
If we assume that kt+l is smaller than kt+l then by comparing (2.22) to (2.30) 
we obtain pL7rL + (1 - -7rk) e>e or (PL - e) iL >0 which is obviously true   
Proof. 14: Comparison of , Q'1 and ß'' 
Notice that in the following proof we assume that the screening cost c is the same 
for C1 and Ci' but corresponds to different screening quality P1 and 632. 
We know that Q" gives the indifference point between Cl "I and CL. So, if we 
equate the expected payoff for the low risk borrowers from these two contracts and 
solve for ßL we obtain: 
Il 1+C E1EI 
PLQwPt+lwt 
(alt (1 
- PL 1+c - 
ýT Lt 1-py , 71F .. r- 
OL 
Similarly, ß" gives the indifference point between CIS 2 and CL. So, if we equate 
the expected payoff for the low risk borrowers from these two contracts and solve for 






1+C - ýLt PL 1-nit 
OL 
Comparing the last two expressions we find that (3°1 < /332   
Proof. 15: Derivation of the equilibrium pairs of contracts 
Case 1: Dynamic paths 82 and r 
Qr2 
If for a given kt, above inequality holds, then the rationing contract pair (CH, CL) 
is the only equilibrium pair at time t. To see that this is the unique equilibrium, 
suppose that lenders are instead offering the pair 
(CH, Cj') . From Proposition 2.1 
we see that since OL > ß' lenders find it optimal to offer the rationing contract and 
will thus deviate. Therefore, 
(CH, Cl') cannot be an equilibrium. 
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1.2: aL<ß2 
The lenders offer the pair (CH, CC'). To see that this is the unique equilibrium, 
suppose that lenders are instead offering the pair (CH, Ct ). From Proposition 2.1 we 
see that since ßL < 0, ', lenders find it optimal to offer the screening contract and 
will thus deviate. Therefore, (CH, Cl) cannot be an equilibrium. 
1.3: 6 
, 
*2 > OL > 087 
If the above relation holds, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Lenders 
randomize between two different contracts. More specifically, the lenders will offer 
the pair (CH, CL) with probability µ since OL > ß, `z and the pair (CH, Cr2) with 
probability (1 - µ) since ßL < ßr2. In what follows we show that a unique µ' E (0,1) 
exists that characterizes the unique equilibrium at time t where lenders offer the pair 
(CH, CL) with probability µ* and the pair (CH, C12) with probability (1 - µ*). The 
equilibrium stock of capital will be k+1 = µ*kt+1 + (1 - µ*) kt 12 
We define ßµ = Qc +lwt 
(1+C + pH - PL - 1) £ 
PL_LH ` which is the expres- 
sion for Q'z when pt+l = pt+l i. e. the marginal product of capital when lenders 
offer the pair (CH, CL) with probability µ* and the pair 
(CH, CI '2) with proba- 
i9V =ek 
ekc+I t+1 
=0 (k +1)B-1 = bility (1 - µ*). Obviously, pt+l =e 
B (µ*kt+l (1 - µ*) kt+1)B-1. Substituting wt and pt+l we get 
sT* 82 
0-1 1fE PLPH(PL-C 8' = QB (µ ke+l + (1 - µ) kt+i) wt 1+7C + PH - PL -1 PL-PH 
Re- 
member that the mixed strategy is an equilibrium strategy if and only if ß2 = (3µ. 
We see that for µ=1 we get ßµ = ß12, for µ=0 we get ßµ = 0.2 and since 
ßrz > flr. > , 
B** there exists a unique µ* yielding f''? = ßL. For this µ*, the de- 
scribed scenario is an equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies. 
Case 2: Dynamic paths sl and r 
2.1: ßL > ß81 
If for a given kt, above inequality holds, then the rationing contract pair (CH, CL) 
is the only equilibrium pair at time t. To see that this is the unique equilibrium, 
suppose that lenders are instead offering the pair 
(CH, Cj"'). From Proposition 2.1 
we see that since ßL >0 ;,, lenders find it optimal to offer the rationing contract and 
will thus deviate. Therefore, 
(CH, CC 1) cannot be an equilibrium. 
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2.3: ßL < ßT1 
If for a given kt, above inequality holds, then the screening contract pair (CH, Cj' 
is offered. To see that this is the unique equilibrium, suppose that lenders are instead 
offering the pair (CH, CT). From Proposition 2.1 we see that since 13L< /3 , lenders 
find it optimal to offer the screening contract and will thus deviate. Therefore, 
(CH, CT) cannot be an equilibrium. 
2.2: ßr>ßL>ß 
If the above relation holds, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The 
lenders will randomize between offering the pair (CH, CL) with probability w since 
OL > 8, *1 and the pair (CH, Cl`) with probability (1 - w) since OL < ßr1. Similarly 
to before, it can be proved that a unique w* E (0,1) exists that characterizes the 
unique equilibrium at time t where lenders offer the pair (CH, CL) with probability 
w* and the pair (CH, Ci 1) with probability (1 - w*). The equilibrium stock of capital 
will be ki+i = w*ki+i + (1 - w*) ke+i" 
The cases of section 6.2. can be proved in a similar way.   
Proof. 16: Conditions for avoiding a poverty trap when k;, < kr2 < 
k< kää 
We can calculate the derivatives of k''2 with respect to the policy instruments 
with similar reasoning to Proof 8. If we substitute (2.78) in 
(2.36), we obtain: 
E V2 = ßL \\ 
(PH E) +_ il PLPH 
(PL - E) Q (1 - 0) BAe-il 
07 
(1 - 682) PH PH 
J6 (PL - PH) 
J 
and thus 
'2 1a 6-117 
\ 
(PH - E) 6- 1l 
PLPH (PL - e) (1 
- 0) J 
BAB-1l 
e -1 
/f (PL - PH) 
- 
ÖS'ý e2 L\ (1 - 
5°2 )1)H PH 
PLPH (PL - e) Q (1 - 0) OAB-1 
(PH - E) <0 




pH + -A - 1) >0 or J82 (pH - e) >0 which holds. 
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Finally, we use (2.36) to calculate: 
ök 
_11se 
PLPH (PL - ý) B1e1 




PLpH (PL - E)Q (1 
- 0) BAO-1 
1>0 
e(pL - PH) (l+c)2 
since we have assumed that /382 > QL which implies that 
(r + pH - p, - i) > 0. 
Notice that there is no need to substitute for A as it does not depend on the 
screening cost or the quality of screening.   
Proof. 17 : Conditions for avoiding a poverty trap when k;, < k" < 
kai < ksaai 
Since k'1 depends on A which does not depend on b, c, there is no need to sub- 
stitute for it. Thus, the derivatives of interest are: 
t akrl 
= QL Q (i - e) OA'-1 
BS 1Ö 
(PL - (1 + C) E) (PL - E) -- 
aC 
)1 
B2ý c (pL - 531 E) 






(_ 11 /5dß (PL - il + c) E) (PL 
- QL 
(nw 
l )BAB-) T671- ` e2 J CPL + bel (PL - E) 
J 
PLC (PL - (1 + c) 0) (PL - e) <0 
(C (PL 






Proof. 18 : Conditions for avoiding a poverty trap when k, '; < k81 < 
k'1 < kr as 
In order to examine the capital dynamics and the effects of changes on c and 
6"1, apart from the restrictions on c and 5' ((2.71) and (2.74)) coming from the 
condition 0< irlt < 1, an extra restriction should be taken into to consideration. 
More specifically, we need to control for the fact that Path sl lies below Path r i. e. 
kt+l < ki+l or (2.80) is negative. 
In Proof 8 we show that OD 8D 0 and Dwri- > 0. Since k, ", ' = D'10-ei it follows that 
a o0 and 
f>0. But how does the relevant threshold level of capital change 
for a given change of the screening cost or the quality of screening? Calculating the 
derivative of k8' with respect to c we find that: 
1-B 
1 (1 A)(1-P)(PL-e) (i-a)E a gl _1 _1 3B =B (Q (1 - e)) a QL 2 APH ac ()( l+c el +1C 1-b'1 1- J PL 
b81 (PL - (1 + c) E) (PL - ý) Bs CClt'L-5"e)+581 (PL-ý)/ 
PL(PL - E) 
(C(PL-6916)+'691 (PL-6))(PL-(l+C)E) 







(1-ö 1)(PL-(1+C)e) (1 
The first two lines of the above expression are always positive. However, the sign of 
the last parenthesis is not immediately obvious. We use simulations and taking into 
consideration the range of values of all the parameters and the constraints outlined 
above we find that it always takes positive values (see Figure 15). Thus, 
e 
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Figure 15 
The derivative of k'1 with respect to 681 is: 
aOk"I ber = 
QL e-j7-2 (Q (1 
1-9 1 






ss1 (PL - (1 + C) E) (PL - 8)1 B -1 (PL - (1 + C) 6) (PL - e) 
c (PL - 
581 e) + 691 (PL - E)) C 
(PL 
- 
681 e) + 6'1 (PL - E) 
(PL-f) 1-p`- (1-a) 1-a f 





d"1(1-B)(PL-e) 1-_8_ (1-A) 
(1-awl )9 1- l±L c 
PL 
Notice that the first three lines of the above expression are always positive. We use 
simulations and taking into consideration the range of values of all the parameters and 
the constraints outlined above we find that the last parenthesis takes both positive 
0. and negative values (see Figure 16). Thus, 
e Virl- 5; 
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Financial development, openness 
and competition in the Euro 
Area and the US 
i 
3.1 Introduction 
Various factors have been suggested to influence the degree of competition in different 
industries across countries. Barriers to entry, product differentiation, the number of 
firms in a market and the degree of concentration are examples of industry specific 
determinants of competition. Government subsidies, the strictness and enforcement 
of competition policy, openness to trade and financial development are some of the 
potential country specific factors. 
Since product market competition is a complex and multi-dimensional process, 
few broad and aggregate indicators can characterise the degree or intensity of com- 
'This paper is largely my own work. However, it is part of a bigger project with Rebekka 
Christopoulou and Philip Vermeulen to who the author of the current paper is highly indebted for 
providing her with their data. 
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petition in different markets, and no single indicator can do so. Thus, a broad range 
of indicators is required, each capturing one element of competition. This paper uses 
the mark-up of product prices over marginal costs as a measure of a possible manifes- 
tation of imperfect competition. A markup ratio bigger than one implies that prices 
exceed marginal costs and are, thus, evidence of market power in a sector. 
The relation of markups to macroeconomic variables is interesting from the stand- 
point of competition regulators. Policy-makers need to know whether certain policies 
are conducive to competition and analysts of trade policy and the financial sector 
need to understand their effects on competition. 
This study focuses on the relation between competition and country-specific fac- 
tors and it is part of the research effort attempting to bring the above predictions to 
the data. In particular, it investigates the relationship between the degree of com- 
petition and the financial environment or trade openness. The empirical estimations 
are for 50 sectors for 8 Eurozone member states and U. S. over 1981-2004. 
We use the Solow residual, a growth accounting methodology which measures 
the growth rate of productivity, and try to identify the extent at which financial 
development or trade openness of a country influences competition. Furthermore, we 
look into whether such a link is stronger for specific industries. More specifically, we 
investigate the relation between financial depth or the degree of banking liberalization 
and industry competition. For example, financial depth may be associated with 
greater ease of entry and thus increased competition. Then, we control for the case 
of financial depth having a greater effect on competition in sectors where firms are 
relatively more dependent on external finance, drawing on the central idea of Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). The relation between trade openness and competition is then 
investigated. In response to greater foreign competition and increased imports, the 
market share for domestic producers falls and markups should decline. This relation 
might be stronger for those industries for which the relative volume of international 
trade is greater. 
The findings of this paper suggest that financial development may have induced 
lower markups in the Eurozone and US over the period 1981-2004. Moreover, there 
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is evidence that financial depth has a greater effect on competition in sectors where 
firms are unusually dependent on external finance. These findings are not present 
across all specifications, nor robust to the different financial development measures 
or external dependence measures considered. Still, their occasional presence suggests 
pro-competitive effects. The relation is more potent over the period 1995-2004. Fur- 
thermore, there is strong evidence that increased trade openness is linked with higher 
competition and thus lower markups. This relation appears to be more robust for 
industries with a higher degree of tradedness. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two explains the methodology 
and the theoretical underpinnings of the various specifications to be estimated. Sec- 
tion three outlines the data. Section four presents and discusses the results. Section 
five concludes. 
3.2 Methodology and Theoretical Underpinnings 
3.2.1 Solow Residual 
Growth accounting is central to the attempt of analyzing the fundament determinants 
of economic growth. It is an empirical methodology for the decomposition of the 
observed growth of GDP into changes in factor inputs and in production technology. 
Since it is not possible to measure technological progress directly, it is measured as 
"residual growth" i. e. as the part of growth of GDP which cannot be accounted for by 
the growth of the observable inputs. The pioneering work is Solow (1957) who showed 
that the difference between output growth and the sum of input growth, weighted 
by the relative contributions of each of the factors to GDP, is equal to technological 
change. Solow's analysis assumes constant returns to scale, perfect competition and 
Hicks neutral technological change. It relies on the growth rates of the quantities of 
inputs and is often called the primal approach. 
Hall (1988) shows that by relaxing the assumption of perfect competition, the 
Solow residual measures the weighted sum of technological change and the growth 
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rate of the output-capital ratio rather than the rate of technological change alone. 






where /Qt is output growth, I Nt is labour input growth, A Mt is intermediate 
input growth, OKt is capital input growth, aNt, amt are the labour and cap- 
ital shares in revenue, tit the price-cost markup and Ot the rate of technological 
change. 2 The left hand side of (3.1) is the definition of the traditional Solow resid- 
ual (SRt -1Qt - aNtiNt - aMtLMt - (1 - alvt - amt) OKt). Notice that in the 
case of perfect competition, the markup is equal to one and thus the Solow residual 
is equal to technological change Bt. 
Roeger (1995) uses Hall (1988) to develop a "dual" Solow residual which is com- 
puted from growth rates of factors prices, rather than factor quantities. This dual 
equation is: 
Apt - aNtLWt - aMttnzt - (1 - aNt - aalt) Ort 
_ (1 -c / 
(Apt - Ort) + µt 
Bt (3.2) 
P 
where Opt is the output price change, Owt is the wage change, Amt is the in- 
termediate input price change and Art is the user cost change. The left hand 
side is now defined to be the (negative of) price-based Solow residual (-SRPt =_ 
Apt - aNtAwt - aMtAmt - (1 - aNt - amt) Art). 
Roeger shows that after subtracting the traditional Solow residual SRt from the 
dual Solow residual SRPt, technological growth drops out and the subsequent ex- 
pression contains only nominal observable variables. Thus adding (3.1)and (3.2) and 
2A derivation of this equation can be found in Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), for example. 
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rearranging: 
(APt + OQt) - aNt (AWt + ONt) - amt (Amt + iMt) 
-(1-aNt-amt) (Art +zKt) 
= (1 -1I ((Apt +'Qt) - (Art + AKt)) (3.3) At / 
where (Opt + OQt) denotes the nominal output growth, (Owt + ONt) denotes the 
nominal wage bill, (Amt + OMt) denotes the growth in intermediate input costs and 
(Ort + OKt) denotes growth in capital costs. In other words, subtracting the price 
based Solow residual from the quantity based Solow residual one gets a "nominal" 
Solow residual which is a function of the markup and the difference between nominal 
output growth and nominal capital cost growth. 
The "nominal" Solow residual can be used to estimate markups by the following 
simple regression: 
yt = fixt + Et (3.4) 
where yt = SRt - SRPt = (Apt + AQt) - aNt (Aßt + ONt) - aNn (amt + OMt) - 
(1 - aNt - amt) (Art + AKt), Xt = (Opt + AQt) - (Ort + AKt) and ß= 
(1 
- µ). 
Notice that the markup y is assumed to be constant over time. A simple OLS 
regression can be used to derive an estimate of the markup which is simply 
_1 IL 1-ß 
Whenever there is some degree of monopoly power, the estimated markup should be 
greater than one i. e. 0 is expected to be positive. 
The method by Roeger (1995) has been used in various studies to estimate in- 
dustry markups. Roeger (1995), Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), Oliveira Martins and 
Scarpetta (1999) and Badinger (2007a) use industry level data to estimate markups 
and Konings et al. 2005, Konings and Vandenbussche 2005, Gorg and Warzynski 
2006 use firm level data. More important, Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) esti- 
mate markups for 50 industries in each of the eight Eurozone countries (Italy, Spain, 
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Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Belgium) and the USA for the pe- 
riod 1981-2004. This paper builds on their estimates. In what follows, there is a 
detailed presentation of the questions addressed. 
3.2.2 Specification I 
There have been numerous studies on the link between financial development and 
product market competition. The main question of interest is whether financial 
intermediation or financial depth have any implications for the extent of product 
market competition. More specifically, one can look into how markups are affected 
by financial depth or the degree of banking liberalization. For example, financial 
depth may be associated with greater ease of entry, and hence greater competition. 
There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature on financial development and 
entry and thus competition. From a theoretical standpoint, Lloyd-Ellis and Bern- 
hardt (2000) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) suggest that credit constraints leads 
to lower entry of potentially good entrepreneurs compared with wealthier but less 
talented ones. Similarly, Cabral and Mata (2003) showed that financing constraints 
can to some extent explain the positive skewness in the size distribution in young 
cohorts of firms, whom distribution only moves towards the right-hand side as firms 
age. Hence, as financial markets develop, access to external finance improves thus 
making younger firms more likely to enter, and therefore contributing the average firm 
size to be, all else constant, smaller. Cestone and White (2003) presented a model 
where more credit market competition spurs more product market competition. The 
empirical literature agrees with the theoretical predictions. Haber (1997) used histor- 
ical data and showed that Mexico's textile industry started out larger and relatively 
more competitive compared to Brazil's. However, since Mexico's financial markets 
remained underdeveloped, the textile industry had less opportunities for entry and 
ended up smaller and more concentrated than Brazil's, whom liberalized finance. 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) find that financial development enhances the 
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probability an individual starts his own business, favors entry, increases competi- 
tion, and promotes growth of firms in Italy. Similarly, Cetorelli (2004) showed that 
deregulation in EU banking markets in the early 1990s has resulted in non-financial 
sectors's markets characterized by lower average firm size and Cetorelli and Strahan 
(2006) find that more vigorous banking competition in local U. S. banking markets is 
associated with higher number of firms in operation and with a smaller average firm 
size. More recently, Aghion et al. (2007) look on the effects of financial development 
on the entry of new firms in 16 industrialized and emerging economies and find that 
access to finance matters most for the entry of small firms but has either no effect or 
a negative effect on entry by large firms. 
However, none to our knowledge has used the Solow residual to explore the re- 
lation between financial development and competition. In order to control for the 
impact of the financial environment, the right hand side of the expression for the 
nominal Solow residual (3.3) is interacted with the measure of financial development. 
Thus, the regression to be estimated is: 
SRt - SRPt = (, Qb +, 31 FINt) ((Opt - 'Qt) - (Ort + OKt)) + et (3.5) 
where FINS is the variable which describes the financial development of the economy. 
We are interested in whether 01 is negative and significantly different from zero so 
that higher financial development indicates lower markups. Finally, the markup will 
be: 
1 
1- (ß0 + Q1FIN) 
The markup will be equal to one if the industry is competitive and will be greater 
than one if there is some degree of monopolistic power. Thus, (, Qo +Q1FIN) should 
be positive. 
As a robustness check we implement a "two-stage" approach. We use the esti- 
mates of markups of Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) as the dependent variable 
and check the explanatory power of financial development. We also control for other 
country-specific or industry-specific characteristics. We thus estimate the following 
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regression: 
markups =a+ QFINt +E ryxt + Et (3.6) 
where zt is any variable that describe country-specific or industry-specific character- 
istics. 
3.2.3 Specification II 
The level of financial development is broadly similar among the developed countries, 
even more for west European countries and USA. Since the implementation of the 
Single European Act in 1986, which had as a core element the creation of a single 
market within the EU, up to the introduction of the Euro on January 1999, the 
economies of the Euro area have been subject to a gradual deregulation. So, al- 
though there have been financial reforms during the sample period 1981-2004 which 
may possibly give interesting results, the variation of financial depth/ banking lib- 
eralization might give results of limited interest or imprecise estimates. So, we will 
also check whether financial depth is differently important across sectors. The theo- 
retical underpinning of our test is Rajan and Zingales (1998). This paper shows that 
the industrial sectors which are relatively more in need of external finance develop 
faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Moreover, the growth in 
the number of new establishments is significantly higher in industries dependent on 
external finance when the economy is financially developed. Similarly, Aghion et al. 
(2007) use harmonized firm-level data for 16 industrialized and emerging economies 
and find that access to finance matters most for the entry of small firms and in sectors 
that are more dependent upon external finance. 
We use this idea by adjusting it as follows. Financial depth might have a greater 
effect on competition in sectors where firms are unusually dependent on external 
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finance. In order to capture this idea, (3.3) changes to: 
SRt - SRPt = (00 + 01FINt + 62EXDEP + Q3FINt * EXDEP) 
((apt - LQt) - (Art + AKt)) + et (3.7) 
where EXDEP is the variable which describes the external financial dependence of 
an industry. The financial development variable is interacted with each industry's 
dependence on external finance and the constitutive terms of the interaction term are 
also included separately. Of course, the three variables are interacted with xt. We 
are interested in whether 01 and ß3 are negative and significantly different from zero 
and whether the derivative of the markup with respect to financial depth is negative. 
The markup is now given by: 
1 
µ1- (ß0 + ß1FINt + 02EXDEP + ß3FINt * EXDEP) 
and the derivative of the markup with respect to FIN is: 
8markup 
_ 
ß1 + ß3EXTDEP; 
OFIN (1 - (ß0 + ß1FINt + 02EXDEP + ß3FINt * EXDEP))2 
Similarly to before, a robustness check via a "two-stage" approach will also be 
carried out. 
3.2.4 Specification III 
The next question this paper looks into is whether the trade openness of a country 
has an impact on the extent of competition within various industries. In response to 
exposure to international competition and increased imports, the market share for 
domestic producers falls and markups should decline. Empirical studies have found 
that the link is validated by data. Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994) and Hoekman 
et al. (2004) are all studies that find support for the hypothesis that imports are 
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a source of discipline on domestic firm pricing behavior. Badinger (2007b) finds 
that trade (import penetration) has pro-competitive effects. Chen, Imbs and Scott 
(2009) using disaggregated data for EU manufacturing over the period 1989-1999 
found short run evidence that trade openness exerts a competitive effect although 
the long run effects are more ambiguous. Harrison et al. (2006) find that the different 
product market reforms carried out by the European Union under the Single Market 
Program, a large project by the then members of the European Union to reduce 
internal non-tariff barriers to trade and other barriers to the free movement and 
factors of production across borders, have increased competition as reflected by a 
reduction in markups. Similarly, Badinger (2007a) suggests that the EU's Single 
Market Programme led to mark-up reductions for aggregate manufacturing and also 
for construction although mark-ups have gone up in most service industries since the 
early 1990s. 
The openness of all the countries of our sample has increased over the period of 
interest. For the Eurozone member states this trend is naturally enhanced by the 
introduction of the Euro, which resulted in an increased volume of internal trade, 
a prerequisite as much as a positive outcome of a common currency area. And 
although one would expect that the common trade policies adopted by the members 
of EU would not allow for differences in their openness, the data show that the level 
of openness differs substantially across Euro area countries. So, for the European 
countries in the sample, Spain exhibits the minimum openness (averaged over time) 
in the sample (0.37) whereas the maximum openness is found for Belgium (1.23). 
USA is the least open country of the sample (0.18), where openness is measured by 
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
To control for the effect of trade openness on product market competition a similar 
approach to Specification I can be used: 
SRt - SRPt = (ßo + 010PENt) ((Opt - OQt) - (Ort + OKt)) + et (3.8) 
where OPEN is the variable which measures the trade openness of an economy. We 
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are interested in whether ß1 is negative and significantly different from zero, so that 
higher openness is consistent with lower markups. In this case the markup will be 
1 
1- (Qo + Q1OPEN) 
We will also control whether financial depth has greater explanatory power on com- 
petition in these industries which have high relative volume of international trade. 
Finally, a robustness check via a "two stage" approach will also be carried out. 
3.2.5 Specification IV 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) showed that trade openness is correlated with financial 
market development. Hence, the natural last step is to control simultaneously for 
the impact of the financial development and trade openness on competition. The 
regression used is: 
SRt-SRPt = (, 30 + /31FINt + o320PENt) 
((Apt - OQt) - (art + AKt))+et (3.9) 
The markup is given by: 
_1 1- (Qo + /31FIN + 02OPEN) 
3.3 Data and summary statistics 
Our paper draws heavily on the estimations in Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). 
The sample consists of data on 50 industries in each of the eight Eurozone countries 
(Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Belgium) and the 
USA for the period 1981-2004. Thus, the data have three dimensions i. e. time, 
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industry and country. Data availability does not allow the inclusion of the remaining 
Eurozone members of the time. 3 
3.3.1 Data on industries 
The data on the left and right hand side of the "nominal" Solow residual, y and x 
respectively, as well as the estimates of markups used in the "two-stage" approach 
are from Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). For the calculations they use the 
EU KLEMS data base (March 2007 Release) apart from the user cost of capital for 
which data are from the AMECO database. The output and input data are at the 
two digit level (NACE, Rev. 1.1). More details are provided in their paper. 
For the tradability of different industries various measures have been suggested. 
We follow the approach of De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) which defines 
an industry as "tradable" if more than 10 percent of total production is exported. 
They use data for 14 OECD countries over 1970-1985 and find that agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing and transportation are "tradable" whereas services other than 
transportation are "nontradable". 
3.3.2 Data on Countries 
Data on Gross Domestic Product are obtained from the OECD (in constant prices 
and PPP's). 
To measure openness we use the ratio of nominal exports plus imports to nominal 
GDP, using data in current US dollars from the World Development Indicators (June 
2009). 
'According to Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), the included countries account for over 90% 
of the 12 member states output of the time. 
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3.3.3 Measures of Financial Development 
We use the following financial measures: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP (llgdp): This equals currency plus demand and 
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. 
It is a measure of absolute size based on liabilities and is often used to measure 
financial depth (see e. g. King and Levine (1993) in their seminal paper on finance 
and growth or Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000)). 
Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP (prib): This equals claims 
on the private sector by deposit money banks, divided by GDP. It is a measure of one 
of the main activities of deposit money banks: the channeling of savings to investors. 
This measure isolates credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued 
to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by the 
central bank. This indicator has been used by Levine and Zervos (1998), among 
others. 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to 
GDP (pribof): This equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. Similar to prib, it is a measure of 
activity of financial intermediaries and isolates credit issued to the private sector. 
This indicator has been used by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). Data for the above 
three measures are from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000). 
Financial freedom (bankfreed): This is a measure of banking security as well as 
a measure of banks' independence from government control. It is a composite index 
of the extent of government regulation of financial services, the extent of state inter- 
vention in banks and other financial services, the difficulty of opening and operating 
financial services firms and government influence on the allocation of credit. The 
authors determine the financial climate and assign an overall score on a scale of 0 
to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. Data 
are available from the Heritage Foundation for only a subperiod, namely 1995-2004. 
We expect this measure to have higher explanatory power compared to the other 
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three since it focuses on the banking industry. The banking industry is the core and 
most important component in the non Anglo-Saxon financial systems. Although 
EU member states have adopted Banking Directives4, which compel them to harmo- 
nize their banking sectors, the implementation dates vary across countries (see e. g. 
Romero-Avila, 2007). 
3.3.4 Measures of External Dependence 
Data on the actual use of external financing of different industries, either across 
countries or over time, are rarely available. Various proxies have been suggested 
in the literature for the dependence of industries on security markets, banks and 
investments by other stakeholders. 
extdepR_ Z: This is the pioneering measure of the dependence on external finance 
introduced in Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is defined as capital expenditures minus 
cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures and is based on data from 
U. S. firms. The authors argue that since capital markets in the U. S. are among the 
most advanced in the world, the frictions in accessing external finance are minimal. 
Thus, the amount of external finance used by large firms is likely to be a good measure 
of their actual demand for external finance rather than just an equilibrium between 
the demand and (rationed) supply of such funds. They believe that the dependence 
of US firms is a good proxy for dependence in other countries, since differences in 
the degree of dependence of the various industries are due to technological reasons 
which apply across countries. Data are averaged over the 1980s and are confined to 
manufacturing industries. The Appendix provides more details. 
extdepM G: Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007) suggest the following 
proxy for dependence: 
4Directives have the character of binding laws and require EU member states to achieve a partic- 
ular result without dictating the means of achieving that result, as opposed to EU regulations which 
are self-executing. 
114 
(non current liabilities)+(current liabilities: loans) 
total assets)-(current liabilities: creditors)-(other current liabilities 
Data are averages over 1993-2003 and cover 48 of the 50 industries in our sample. 
The benchmark country is the United Kingdom on similar reasoning as for the use 
of U. S. A. for Rajan and Zingales (1998). Moreover, they find that the degree of 
financial development of U. K. is closer to that of the USA than to the average of the 
EU-15 and thus is a good proxy for dependence in the countries in the sample for 
the reasons outlined for the Rajan-Zingales measure. The Appendix provides more 
details. One can claim that the Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure is not a 
measure of external financial dependence but a measure of dependence to the credit 
markets as external equity finance (new equity issues) is not taken into account. 
Inklaar and Koetter (2008) also suggest the use of debt in total assets as a measure 
of financial dependence. 
Bank Dependence (bankdep): This measure tries to isolate the dependence of in- 
dustries on banks rather than other intermediaries. Carlin and Mayer (2003) suggest 
the use of the proportion of net physical investment financed by bank loans. They 
provide estimates for 16 of the industries in our sample. Japan is the benchmark 
country and data are averages for the years 1981-1990. The argument is similar to 
the "minimal frictions in raising external finance" argument used by the above two 
papers, in the sense that Japan has one of the highest bank credit to GDP ratios and 
an unusually high level of bank financing of industry (see e. g. Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1997). We expect this measure to have higher explanatory power compared to the 
other two for reasons similar to the ones explained in the case of bankfreed. 
3.3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table A presents the descriptive statistics. A special note should be made for the 
data on markups. Real Estate Activities (sector 70) is an outllier. The markup ratio 
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for the whole period is 9.2 in Italy and around 3 in the rest countries. Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen (2008) attribute this to possible statistical specificities leading to large 
measurement errors which imply upward bias of the markup. Their paper provides 
detail. 
Table A 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Oev Min Max 
y 10213 000 0.05 -084 080 
x 10290 -002 0.17 -1.66 179 
markup 447 1.35 0.55 0.94 920 
markup 93-04 447 1.37 053 0 89 8 62 
gap 216 1514463 2325521 81925 10600000 
openness 216 0.67 0 37 0.17 1.66 
Ilpdp 206 0.70 0.19 0.41 1.74 
prlb 206 075 0.28 0.26 218 
pribof 208 0 89 0 43 026 3.45 
banktreed 87 6747 13.91 5000 9000 
extdepM G 48 043 011 016 071 
extdepR Z 22 0.36 0.39 -045 106 
bankdep 16 0.42 1.14 -3 41 1 78 
Note: A description of the data is given in the main text. 
The cross correlation coefficients of the variables which vary across countries and 
time but not across industries are given in Table B. An interesting result is the 
negative and statistically significant correlation between GDP and trade openness. 
The result is driven by the U. S. More specifically, the U. S. is a relatively closed 
economy and has higher level of GDP compared to the other countries of the sample. 
The explanation is similar for the negative correlation between GDP and financial 
development when the later is measured by llgdp and prib. The correlation among the 
three measures of financial development (llgdp, prib, pribof) is high and statistically 
significant. However, the correlation between each of these measures and the measure 
of banking freedom (bankfreed) is lower although still statistically significant. 
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Table B 
gdp openness llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
gdp 1 
openness -0.52* 1 
llgdp -0.04 0.26* 1 
prib -0.24* 0.15* 0.80* 1 
pribof 0.39 0.00 0.76* 0.67* 1 
bankfreed 0.19 0.29* 0.38* 0.28* 0.53* 1 
Note: desrciption of the data is given in the main text. 
Table C presents the correlation coefficients of the different measures of external 
dependence i.. e those variables which vary only across industries. The correlation is 
low and insignificant in all cases. This might be due to the different industries for 
which data are available for each of the three measures (see appendix for details). 
Table C 
extdepR_Z extdepM_G bankdep 
extdepR_Z 1 
extdepM_G -0.28 1 
bankdep 0.01 -0.12 1 
Note: desrciption of the data is given in the main text. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Specification I: Financial Development and Competition 
Results from industry-country specific estimations 
Equation (3.5) is estimated for 50 industries in the 8 Eurozone member states and the 
USA for the period 1981-2004. So, we estimate the following cross-sectional equation 
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for 450 industries: 
yt = Qoxt + ßixtFINt + et (3.10) 
where t= 1981,1982, ..., 2004. The significance of financial development for compe- 
tition, for the different measures used for FIN, is modest in these 450 regressions. 
The estimated coefficient ß1 is significant for 91,97 and 106 of the regressions for 
llgdp, prib and pribof respectively at the 10% significance level. 5 This is more than 
would be expected by chance, but it is clear that a null of zero cannot be rejected in 
the majority of cases. 
Estimations at industry level 
It may be reasonable to assume that industries have the same characteristics across 
different countries. Thus, markups are homogeneous across countries. In that case 
we are treating the parameters as the same across countries and thus pool the data 
over time. So, (3.5) can be estimated by industry. The estimation model is: 
Ytk = QOxtk + 01XtkFINtk + Etk (3.11) 
where k is the country index. Equation (3.11) is estimated for 50 industries and 
for the four measures of financial depth. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are used. The errors might be correlated within groups and so we also cluster by 
country. Clustering does not affect the point estimates but only modifies the variance- 
covariance matrix. If the within-cluster correlations are meaningful, ignoring them 
leads to inconsistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. Table 1 shows 
the results. The estimated coefficient ßl often has the "correct sign" but is only 
significant for 12,0,3 and 7 sectors for llgdp, prib, pribof and bankfreed respectively 
(10% significance level). If within-cluster correlations are assumed to be negligible, 
"The measure bankfreed is not used due to the small number of observations (each regression 
would have only ten observations in this case). 
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financial development appears significant for more industries but the evidence is still 
weak. 
Hylleberg and Jorgensen (1998) have argued that if the markups are not constant 
over the period of estimation then a constant term should be added to the regression. 
We now take this a step further and allow for different intercepts across time and 
across country. Hence, time and country dummy variables are included as additional 
explanatory variables. The data set is a panel and the fixed effects model is: 
Ytk = 00--tk + ßlxtkFINtk + Dt + Dk + Eik (3.12) 
where Dt are 24 dummy variables (10 when bankfreed is used) indicating the year and 
Dk are 9 dummy variables indicating the country. Table 2 shows that the significance 
of FIN is slightly higher. More specifically, the estimated coefficient 31 often has the 
"correct" sign but is significant for only 13,3,2 and 6 sectors for 11gdp, prib, pribof 
and bankfneed respectively (10% significance level). Similar to before, no clustering 
implies greater significance. 
Finally, we can also allow for differences in slopes across countries. In that case 
Xtk is interacted with Dk and the fixed effects model is: 
Ytk = ßixtkFINtk + Dt + Dk + ß2xtkDk + eik (3.13) 
Notice we drop Xtk since this term is collinear with xtkDk. Table 3 shows that 
the significance of FIN is low even though Q1 often has the "correct" sign. Financial 
depth is significant for for 4,6,9 and 14 industries for llgdp, prib, pribof and bankfreed 
respectively (10% significance level). No clustering implies greater significance. 
No particular industries are repeatedly found to exhibit a sensitive relationship 
between competition and financial development across the three models of the section 
and the four measures of financial development. However, there is a looser kind of 
consistency; Across the three specifications: Electricity and Gas (sector 40) when 
FIN is measured by llgdp (5% significance level), Sewage and refuse disposal, etc 
(sector 90) when FIN is measured by bankfneed (10% significance level) and across 
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the four measures of FIN: Activities related to financial intermediation (sector 67) 
for the third model (10% significance level). 
Robustness test via a "two-stage" approach 
A further way to check the robustness of the results is to use a two-stage approach. 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) have estimated markups for the current sample. 
We use their estimates as the dependent variable and control for the extent of financial 
development. The logarithm of GDP is used as an additional explanatory variable 
to capture country specific characteristics. The intercepts are allowed to differ across 
sectors but not across countries (country dummies would be collinear with both 
FIN and GDP) and thus industry dummies (Di) are included. The data on FIN 
and GDP are averaged over time since markups are also constant over time, by 
construction. In the case of bankfrced we assume that the markup of the period 
1981-2004 is a proxy for the markup of the period 1995-2004.6 Since, data now vary 
across industry and country but not over time the data set is cross-sectional and the 
estimation model is: 
markupik = Di + ß1FINk +)32 In GDPk + F; k (3.14) 
where i is the industry identifier. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
Table 4 shows that the findings of the above specifications are reproduced by this 
model. Financial development has only weak explanatory power for the extent of 
competition, unless it is assumed that the within-cluster correlations are negligible, 
in which case higher financial development implies lower markups. 
Summarizing the findings of Specification I, financial development appears to 
promote competition but the estimates of this effect are often imprecise. The evidence 
sSuch an assumption is not unreasonable. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) have found that 
there is no systematic change in markups from 1981-1992 to 1993-2004. A robustness check is carried 
out later on by repeating the estimation using the markup of 1993-2004. 
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is relatively stronger if the within-cluster correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Among the four measures, bankfreed has higher explanatory power, which matches 
prior expectations given the particular sample. 
3.4.2 Specification II: Financial Dependence and Competition 
Results from pooled and panel data estimations 
The data for the three measures of dependence on external finance are obtained 
from a country-benchmark. Some country-specific characteristics relating to financial 
markets shall indicate whether the external dependence observed is the best possible 
proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries. So, the first two measures 
of financial dependence use the USA or the UK as the benchmark country, as these 
economies are among the most financially advanced and frictions in accessing funds 
should be minimal. On the other hand, the Carlin-Mayer measure of dependence on 
banking finance uses Japan since it has the highest ratio of bank credit to GDP and 
an unusually high level of bank financing of industry. 
The data on external dependence is industry-specific and time-invariant. The es- 
timation of the varying effect of financial depth-amended Solow residual per industry 
per country or per industry is impossible (the two variables relating to the external 
dependence, EXDEP and xtFINt * EXDEP, cannot be included since the former 
is constant and the later is collinear with xtFINt). 
One approach to check whether financial depth has a greater effect on competition 
in sectors where firms are unusually dependent on external finance would be to assume 
that markups are constant across industries and thus estimate (3.7) per country. 
However, such an assumption is not very intuitive. An alternative approach is to 
treat the parameters as the same across units and pool the data of all countries and 
industries. Table 5 shows the results of the estimation. Financial development and 
the interaction with external dependence are never significant and the null of joint 
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insignificance cannot be rejected for any combination of the different measures. The 
explanatory power of financial development is not much stronger either if within- 
cluster errors are assumed to be uncorrelated, apart from the case when the measure 
of financial depth is bankfreed and the Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure of 
external finance is used. 
If the intercepts and slopes for the various industries and countries are allowed 
to differ we find the following three specifications of particular interest. 
Ytik = Dk + Dt + Dt + xtikDk + xtikDi 
+Q1xtikFINkt +, ß2xtikFINkt * EXDEP; + etik (3.15) 
Ytik = Dk + DiDt + XtikDk + XtikDi 
+OlxtikFINkt + 82xtikFINkt * EXDEPT +£tik (3.16) 
Ytik = Di + DkDt + xtikDk + xtikDi 
+ ßlxtikFINkt + ß2xtikFINkt * EXDEPi + etik (3.17) 
Notice that the inclusion of country or industry dummies transforms the data set 
to panel and the equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17)are fixed effects models. The 
component xttikEXDEPP cannot be included in these specifications as this term will 
be collinear with xtikDi. The number of industry dummies D; reflects the number 
of industries for which data on each of the three measures of external dependence 
are available and the number of time dummies Dt reflects the number of years that 
each of the three measures of financial development cover. These three specifications 
are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and within or without 
within-cluster correlations. However, it is now more sensible to assume that the 
cluster is each industry in each country rather than a country. Thus, there are now 
450 clusters instead of 9 and the blocks with the nonzero elements on the diagonal 
of the block-diagonal variance-covariance matrix are "smaller". 
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The results for regression (3.15) are shown in Tables 6i-6iii, for regression (3.16) 
are shown in Tables 6iv-6vi and for regression (3.17) are shown in Tables 6vii-6ix. 
To summarize the findings, we see that models (3.15) and (3.16) provide evidence 
that financial depth has a greater effect on competition in sectors where firms are 
relatively more dependent on external finance only if FIN is measured by bank- 
freed. 7 However, specification (3.17) gives more interesting results. When external 
dependence (EXDEP) is measured by bankdep, our hypothesis is verified for all 
four measures of financial development (FIN). This result is robust to clustering by 
industry-country. 
A "two-stage" approach 
The hypothesis that financial depth has a greater effect on competition in sectors 
where firms are unusually dependent on external finance can also be tested by a 
"two-stage approach", similar to the one we used in the previous section. The depen- 
dent variable is the markup and the explanatory variables are the interaction term 
between financial development and external dependence, the constitutive terms of 
the interaction term and, of course, GDP. However, similar to Specification I, in- 
dustry dummies are also included in order to capture industry characteristics and 
thus EXTDEP drops out. The data on FIN and InGDP are averages over time. 
Thus, data is transformed into cross-sectional since there is only industry and country 
variation but no time variation. So, the model to be estimated is: 
markopak = Di + ß1FINk * EXTDEPj + Q2 In GDPk + 03FINk + eik (3.18) 
Table 7 gives the results with or without clustering. The estimates of ß1 or 02 
are significant when the Rajan-Zingales measure of external finance is used. This 
7 We have tested the regressions (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) for the joint insignificance of the country 
dummies or the industry dummies in the case without clustering by industry-country. The null that 
the industry dummies have zero coefficients cannot be rejected for specification (3.15). Estimating 
the model without them does not change the results. 
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result is robust whether we cluster or not by country but not when external finance 
is measured by extdepM C or bankdep. 
Table 8 shows the calculations for the derivative e"IN for the four measures 
of financial depth. Industries are ranked according to extdepR_ Z. It is apparent that 
the higher the external dependence, the higher (in absolute terms) the impact on the 
markup. Specifically, the hypothesis that greater financial depth is associated with 
greater competition is verified for the industries with high external dependence when 
llgdp and pribof are used, though the derivative is positive for the industries with 
low dependence. The derivative is negative for all industries with positive external 
dependence when prib is used and close to zero when bankfreed is used. The interaction 
term is significant when external dependence is measured by extdepR_ Z. In this 
specification it is akin to a second derivative since 
_ 
02markup 
'61 OFIN 4EXTDEP 
It shows by how much the marginal influence of external dependence on the markup 
changes in response to a marginal change in financial depth. In order to get a sense of 
its magnitude we next take an example using the 25th and 75th percentiles of financial 
depth and external dependence. According to the Rajan-Zingales measure of external 
finance, the industry at the 25th percentile of dependence is Beverages while the 
75th percentile corresponds to Machinery. The country at the 25th percentile of 
financial depth, as measured by llgdp, is Rance and at the 75th percentile is Spain. 
If Beverages moves from France to Spain's level of financial depth then the markup 
changes by: 
new old {' 
, Q3(FINS ) Beverages - N'Beveragea = pain - 
FINFrance 
+/ (FINSpainEXTDEPBeverages) - ý1(FINFranceEXTDEPBeverages) 
If Machinery moves from France to Spain's level of financial depth then the markup 
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changes by: 
new old AMachinery -A Machinery - Q3(FINSpain - FI NFrance) 
+01(FINSpainEXTDEPMachinery) - Q1(FINFraneeEXTDEPMaehinery) 
The differential effect is calculated by 
/ new old O "Beverages old li=Machinery - /'Machinery) - ("Beverages - I'Beveragea) = 
, Q1(FINgpain - 
FINFrance)(EXTDEPMaChinery - EXTDEPBeverages) = -0.02 
The interpretation of this number is as follows. Given a move from France's level 
of financial depth to Spain's, the Machinery markup should decrease 2 percent more 
than the Beverages markup. 
In summary, this section shows that there is evidence that financial depth has 
a greater effect on competition in sectors where firms are unusually dependent on 
external finance. However, the results are not robust to different measures of external 
dependence. There is some evidence that banking freedom has higher explanatory 
power compared to other measures of financial depth. 
3.4.3 Specification III: Openness and Competition 
Results from industry-country specific estimations 
Equation (3.8) can be used to estimate the relation between competition and trade 
openness for each of the 50 industries in the 8 Eurozone member states and the USA 
for the period 1981-2004. The cross-sectional equation for each of the 450 industries 
has the following form: 
yt = , ß0xt + ß1OPENtxt + et (3.19) 
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The empirical estimation gives weak evidence that a higher degree of trade open- 
ness decreases markups. The estimated coefficient 01 is significant for 107 out of 450 
regressions (10% significance level). 
Although the evidence that openness leads to lower markups is weak, it is inter- 
esting to check whether the industries for which openness has significant explanatory 
power share a common characteristic, that of high tradedness. De Gregorio, Giovan- 
nini and Wolf (1994) define agriculture, mining, manufacturing and transportation 
as "tradable" whereas services other than transportation are "nontradable". Inter- 
estingly enough, we find that the industries where openness has a significant impact 
on their competitiveness are mostly the "tradable" ones (57%). 
Estimations at industry level 
A more restrictive approach in examining the effect of trade openness on competition 
is to assume that the markup is industry specific. So, if markups are homogeneous 
across countries then (3.8) can be estimated per industry. The estimation model is: 
Yik = ßoxtk + ßlXtkOPENtk + Et (3.20) 
and is estimated by simple pooled OLS for 50 industries. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are used. The estimated coefficient ß1 often has the correct sign but 
is significant for only 11 of the 50 regressions (10% significance level). However, if 
within-cluster correlations are assumed to be negligible, this number doubles. 
Similar to section 3.1.2 on financial development, we use panel data to control for 
differences in intercepts. Adding time and country dummy variables as explanatory 
variables does not change the results much. 
The same is true if time and country 
dummy variables plus an interaction term between Xtk and country variables are 
added. Table 9 shows the results of this section. 
It is worth noting that the findings of this section support the hypothesis that 
openness has a stronger effect on the competitiveness of tradable industries. More 
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specifically, for the three specifications of this section, 63%, 71% and 89% of the 
regressions for which openness is significant are for tradabale industries (clustering 
by country). 
Tobacco (sector 16), Manufacturing (sector 36), Other inland transportation (sec- 
tor 60) and Other service activities (sector 93) are the industries which are found to 
exhibit a sensitive relationship between competition and openness in all three speci- 
fications of this section. 
Pooled Data 
If the data from different industries and countries are pooled, the results suggest that 
openness has a negative and significant impact on markups. The finding is robust 
to clustering by country, controlling for industry-specific effects as well as allowing 
tradable and nontradable industries to have different intercepts (see table 10). 
A "two-stage" approach 
The familiar robustness check in the form of a "two-stage" approach is the next step. 
The estimated markup from (3.4) is the dependent variable and the control variables 
are trade openness and the logarithm of GDP (both time averaged) and industry 
dummies. Since there is no time variation, data is cross-sectional. Table 11 shows 
that openness has strong explanatory power for markups. Again, the result is robust 
to clustering by country, as well as dummies for the tradedness of the sectors. 
The empirical investigation of the relation between trade openness and product 
market competition supports the hypothesis that greater trade openness is linked 
with smaller markups. The data suggest that this relation is stronger for industries 
characterized by a higher degree of tradedness. Furthermore, comparing the results 
with the findings of the previous two sections, the degree of openness of a country 
might be more important for lower markups than financial development. The natural 
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next step is to control simultaneously for trade openness and financial development 
and their impact on competition. 
3.4.4 Specification IV: Financial Development and Openness To- 
gether 
Results from industry-country specific estimations 
To control simultaneously for the significance of financial development and trade 
openness on competition, specification (3.9) is estimated for the 50 sectors of the 9 
countries. Table 12 presents the results of the estimation of the 450 cross-sectional 
equations. Both control variables are often insignificant. However, trade openness 
seem to have some explanatory power for more industries than does financial devel- 
8 opment. 
Estimations at industry level 
For the estimations of this section the markups of an industry are assumed to be 
homogeneous across the 9 countries of the sample. Treating the parameters as the 
same across countries we pool the data over time and estimate (3.9) per industry. 
The findings do not provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the financial 
development or the trade openness of a country have some explanatory power on the 
competition of industries. However, trade openness appears again to be significant 
for more regressions than financial development (see Table 13). 
It is interesting to note that the three of the four industries that were repeatedly 
found to exhibit a sensitive relationship between competition and the explanatory 
variables in section 3.4.3 (Tobacco, Manufacturing and Other service activities) are 
8Similarly to section 3.4.1., the measure bankfreed is not used due to the small number of 
observations. 
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included in the industries that for which openness has explanatory power over com- 
petition when any of the four measures of financial development is used (the rest are 
Food and Beverages (15), Fabricated Metal (28) and Research & Development (73). 
Pooled Data 
If the data are pooled (industry and country parameters are assumed to be the same) 
the evidence becomes clearer. Although both financial development and trade open- 
ness have a negative relation with markups, financial development is not significant 
for all four measures of FIN. Contrary to that, trade openness is always significant. 
This finding is robust to clustering by country (see Table 14). 
A "two-stage" approach 
We do a robustness check by using the estimates of markups from (3.4) for the 450 
industries as the dependent variable and time-averaged data of financial development, 
trade openness and GDP, the cross -sectional analysis as explanatory variables. We 
also add industry dummies or dummies for tradable industries. The above results are 
verified. Table 15 shows that trade openness has a negative and significant impact 
on markups whereas financial development and GDP do not have much explanatory 
power. 
The overall findings of this section suggest that both financial development and 
trade openness have a negative impact on markups. However, the simultaneous 
inclusion of the two variables as independent variables suggests that trade openness 
has greater explanatory power for the extent of competition. 
3.4.5 Further robustness checks 
From the estimations of Specification I, II and IV, the measure bankfined stands out 
as the measure of financial development with the highest significance. This finding 
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may lead to concerns that bankfreed appears to have explanatory power compared to 
other measures simply due to the shorter time period that the data cover. Hence, the 
above regressions of Specifications I, II and IV were estimated for the shorter period 
1995-2004 (apart from the "per industry per country" specification as there would 
only be 10 observations per regression in that case). It should be noted that for the 
estimations of the "two-stage" approach we use the markups which Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen (2008) have estimated for 1993-2004. These markups are estimated 
using a small number of observations and thus there is the possibility of measurement 
error in our dependent variable. This would lead to a smaller R2 and higher standard 
errors but will not bias our estimates. 
All results are given at the Appendix. Overall, we find that there is stronger 
evidence supporting our hypotheses. We give some indicative examples. Specifica- 
tion I shows that the significance of financial development, measured by llgdp, prib 
and pribof , at 
industry-country level is stronger or stays the same, compared to the 
whole period (see Table 16). Moreover, the evidence in favour of our hypotheses is 
stronger for these three measures of financial depth compared to bankfreed. Similarly, 
evidence appears to be stronger for the hypothesis of Specification II (see Tables 19 
(i-ix). It is interesting to note that this "improvement" in significance is particularly 
skewed towards the explanatory power of banking dependence. Finally, Specification 
IV shows that the relation between financial depth (and trade openness) and com- 
petition is stronger for the subperiod of interest when we estimate the specification 
per industry. 
Summarizing, we interpret these findings as a sign that financial development of 
the countries has been more effective for the decrease of markups in the Eurozone and 
US over the period 1995-2004 compared to 1981-2004. If such a result is driven by the 
8 Eurozone member states it may be related to the various regulations for financial 
markets and the adoption of the Euro (the Euro was introduced as an accounting 
currency on 1 January 1999). 
In the descriptive statistics section it was explained that the US drives the unusual 
correlation between GDP and trade openness. Moreover, the US is different compared 
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to the Eurozone countries in many ways. This might raise concerns that pooling all 
countries together may generate some bias. The regression estimates are not sensitive 
to the inclusion of the US. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper suggests that financial development lead to lower markups in the Euro- 
zone and US over the period 1981-2004. Moreover, there is evidence that financial 
depth has a greater effect on competition in sectors where firms are unusually de- 
pendent on external finance. This relation is stronger over the period 1995-2004, 
perhaps due to the increased implementation of the EU Directives about the finan- 
cial services industry and the adoption of the Euro. However, these results are not 
robust to the use of different measures for financial development or external depen- 
dence. Frthermore, there is strong evidence that the trade openness of countries is 
linked with higher competition and thus lower markups. This finding appears to be 
stronger for industries traditionally defined as tradable. Controlling simultaneously 
for trade openness and financial development shows that trade openness has greater 
explanatory power for the extent of competition compared to financial depth. 
What remains an open question is why openness has explanatory power for the 
extent of competition. Is it because it captures cross-country variation in the sense 
that more open countries have lower markups overall? Or is it due to cross-time 
effects i. e. more opening a country over time leads to smaller markups? Moreover, 
is there some natural clustering and openness has relatively higher significance for 






Specification I: per industry 
"x+ , xFIN+e 
cluster b count No cluster 
10% 5% <0 10% 5% 01<0 
11 d 12 8 28 19 15 28 
prib 0 0 32 8 4 32 
ribof 3 1 29 9 5 29 
bankfreed 7 6 26 14 8 26 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5% level or that 01 is negative. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference 
between nominal output growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of 
financial development: tlgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: 
This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control 
with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
Table 2 
Specification I: per industry 
"x+ , xFIN+D, +D"+a 
cluster by count No cluster 
10% 5% , <0 10% 5% 
K<0 
11 d 13 9 30 19 16 30 
rib 3 2 30 6 3 30 
of 2 1 29 7 4 29 
bankfreed 6 3 25 10 8 25 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5% level or that 01 is negative. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference 
between nominal output growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of 
financial development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: 
This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control 
with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. D, and 
Dk are time and country dummies respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
Table 3 
Specification I: per industry 
y-poxDk+ ixFIN+D, +Dr+e 
cluster by country I No cluster 
10% 5% t<U 10% 5% t<0 
ll d 4 4 29 6 4 29 
rib 6 1 27 5 3 27 
of 9 5 26 5 10 26 
bankfreed 14 6 20 13 6 20 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5% level or that ß, is negative. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference 
between nominal output growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of 
financial development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: 
This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control 
with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. D, and 
Dk are time and country dummies respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. 
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Table 4 
Specification I: "Two-stage" approach 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ingdp 0.025 0.023 0.038 0.024 









Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 
N 447 447 447 447 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP. prib: Private credit by deposit 
money banks relative to GDP. pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to 
GDP. bankfreed: This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from 
government control with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on 
banking freedoms. Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the 
standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
Table 5 
Specification II: Pooled Data 
(51) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof 
bank 
freed 
x 0.113 0.139 0.124 0.130 
(0.024)" (0.024)'" (0.026)'" (0.018)'" (0.021)1* (0.013)'" (0.059)0 (0.052)1* 
xfin 0.041 0.001 0.020 0.000 
(0.041) (0.034) (0.031) (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) 
xextdep 0.061 -0.001 0.016 -0.204 
(0.058) (0.095) (0.079) (0.066) (0.042) (0.049) (0.152) (0.146) 
xfinextdep -0.102 -0.005 -0.027 0.003 
(0.093) (0.119) (0.115) (0.071) (0.054) (0.042) (0.002) (0.002) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R1 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.38 
N 4267 4267 4311 1914 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Rajan and Zingales(1998). Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 
and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ""=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% 
level 
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(5ii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
x 0.019 0.145 0.158 -0.362 
(0.209) (0.119) (0.149) (0.102) (0.116) (0.079)" (0.301) (0.194)" 
On 0.152 -0.037 -0.051 0.007 
(0.302) (0.159) (0.161) (0.106) (0.091) (0.064) (0.005) (0.003)" 
xextdep 0.449 0.173 0.145 1.252 
(0.414) (0.251)' (0.277) (0.221) (0.230) (0.170) (0.664)" (0.418)0" 
xtinextdep -0.364 0.051 0.086 -0.015 
(0.590) (0.339) (0.289) (0.228) (0.165) (0.136) (0.010) (0.006)" 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
le 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.46 
N 9329 9329 9425 4145 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof. Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). Standard errors are clustered by country in 
columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to 
be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "-significant at 5% level, 
*=significant at 10% level 
(5iii) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
H. A. prib pribof bankfreed 
x 0.124 0.156 0.125 0.085 
(0.025)" (0,018)" (0.031)" (0.020)" (0.020)" (0.010)0' (0.046) (0.030)" 
x{in 0.024 -0.022 0.020 0.001 
(0.038) (0.028) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) 
xbankdep 0.042 0.004 0.032 0.027 
(0.022)' (0.018)" (0.034) (0.026) (0.017) (0.010)" (0.022) (0.021) 
xfinbankdep -0.045 0.012 -0.025 -0.000 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.022) (0.015)' (0.000) (0.000) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R= 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 
N 3092 3092 3124 1392 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 
and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% 
level 
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Table 6 i-ix 
Specification II: Pooled Data 
(6i) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
xfin 0.013 0.033 0.016 -0.001 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.022) (0.019)' (0.016) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) 
xfnextdep -0.109 -0.014 -0.024 0.002 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.095) (0.065) (0.052) (0.037) (0.002) (0.001) 
clustered at 
industry- Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R' 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 
N 4267 4267 4311 1914 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Rajan and Zingales(1998). All regressions include country, industry and time 
dummies as well as x"industry dummies and x"country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in 
columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to 
be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% level, 
'=significant at 10% level 
(6ii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib prlbof bankfreed 
On 0.056 0.015 -0.028 0.003 
(0.133) (0.112) (0.120) (0.082) (0.067) (0.048) (0.002) (0.002)' 
xfinextdep -0.192 0.023 0.081 -0.008 
(0.283) (0.245) (0.235) (0.163) (0.131) (0.095) (0.004)' (0.003)" 
clustered at 
industry- Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.62 
N 9329 9329 9425 4145 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include country, industry 
and time dummies as well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry- 
country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are 
assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "-significant at 5% 
level, *=significant at 10% level 
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(6iii) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
xfin -0.037 -0.017 -0.006 -0.002 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.001)' (0.001) 
xfinbankdep -0.041 0.016 -0.022 -0.000 (0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.013)" (0.000) (0.000) 
clustered at 
industry- Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.53 
N 3092 3092 3092 3124 1392 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof. Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include country, industry and time dummies 
as well as x'industry dummies and xacountry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 
1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be 
negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "'=significant at 5% level, 
*=significant at 10% level 
(6iv) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
xfin -0.001 0.032 0.011 -0.001 
(0.035) (0.038) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) 
xflnextdep -0.096 -0.020 -0.026 0.002 
(0.101) (0.096) (0.091) (0.064) (0.054) (0.037) (0.002) (0.001) 
clustered at 
industry-country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R= 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.48 
N 4267 4267 4311 1914 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Rajan and Zingales (1998). All regressions include country dummies, industry 
dummy time dummy as well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
""=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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(6v) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ilgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
inn 0.067 0.012 -0.024 0.003 
(0.131) (0.105) (0.114) (0.079) (0.065) (0.046) (0.002) 0.002) 
xfinextdep -0.218 0.026 0.068 -0.008 
(0.278) (0.229) (0.225) (0.158) (0.129) (0.092) (0.005)0 (0.003) 
clustered at 
Industry-country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
W 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.62 
N 9329 9329 9425 4145 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include country dummies, 
industry dummy*time dummy as well as x*industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns I, 3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
"$=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 







(6) (7) (8) 
bankfreed 
On -0.038 -0.017 -0.010 -0.002 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.001)' (0.001) 
xfinbankdep -0.036 0.022 -0.016 -0.000 
(0.037) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
clustered at 
industry-country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R= 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.53 
N 3092 3092 3124 1392 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, priboE Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include country dummies, industry 
dummy time dummy as well as x"industry dummies and x"country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
-significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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(6vii) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
(8) 
zfin 0.024 0.065 0.010 -0.000 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.034)" (0.028) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) 
: Gnextdep -0.120 -0.039 -0.024 0.001 
(0.084) (0.087) (0.080) (0.054) (0.046) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) 
clustered at 
Industry-country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R= 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.54 
N 4267 4267 4311 1914 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Rajan and Zingales (1998). All regressions include industry dummies, country 
dummytime dummy as well as x"industry dummies and x*country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns I, 3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
""=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
(6viii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
(8) 
ihn 0.015 0.017 -0.047 0.002 
(0.136) (0.117) (0.135) (0.095) (0.075) (0.055) (0.002) (0.002) 
xfinextdep -0.140 0.074 0.106 -0.006 
(0.267) (0.236) (0.221) (0.156) (0.124) (0.092) (0.003) 0.003) 
clustered at 
Industry- Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
Rs 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.65 
N 9329 9329 9425 4145 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include industry dummies, 
country dummy time dummy as well as x*industry dummies and x*country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
-significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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(61x) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
xfin -0.092 -0.062 -0.066 -0.003 
(0.051)' 
(0.049) 
(0.030)" (0.034)' (0.037)' (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) 
xfinbankdep -0.036 0.017 -0.020 -0.000 




Industry-country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.60 
N 3092 3092 3124 1392 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The measure of external 
dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include industry dummies, country 
dummy time dummy as well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
"=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
Table 7 
Specification II: "Two-stage" approach 
(7i) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ilgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
lngdp 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.026 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) 
an 0.007 -0.181 0.097 0.003 
(0.095) (0.107) (0.156) (0.149) (0.101) (0.105) (0.002) (0.002) 
finextdep -0.007 0.206 -0.169 -0.003 
(0.129) (0.119) (0.221) (0.205) (0.159) (0.150) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered 
at country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 
N 144 144 144 144 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). Standard errors are clustered by 
industry-country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
**. significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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Ingdp 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.021 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
fin 0.133 0.012 0.051 0.002 
(0.117) (0.088) (0.099) (0.069) (0.048) (0.035) (0.001) (0.001)" 
finextdep -0.476 -0.306 -0.161 -0.002 (0.100) (0.185)" (0.092)" (0.123) (0.059) (0.070)" (0.002) (0.002) 
industry Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered at 
country Yes No Yes No 
level 
Yes Yes 
Yes No Yes No 
Ri 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
N 198 198 198 198 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used is the one from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Standard errors are clustered by 
country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are 
assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% 
level, *=significant at 10% level 










Ingdp 0.029 0.027 0.042 0.029 
(0.019) (0.013)* (0.020) (0.012)* (0.025) (0.016)" (0.017) (0.013)' 
fin -0.258 -0.266 -0.363 -0.001 
(0.446) (0.375) (0.330) (0.280) (0.206) (0.171)' (0.004) (0.004) 
finextdep 0.196 0.326 0.522 0.001 
(0.767) (0.868) (0.622) (0.649) (0.310) (0.377) (0.008) (0.008) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered 
at country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 429 429 429 429 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: Ilgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used is the one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). Standard errors are 
clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 





extdepR_Z aµ aµaµaµ Rev allgdp a prib a pribof abankfreed 
Tobacco 16 -0.45 0.3472 0.1497 0.1235 0.0029 
Leather, leather and 19 -0.11 0.1854 0.0457 0.0687 0.0022 footwear 
Wearing apparel, 18 0.03 0.1187 0.0028 0462 0 0 0019 dressing and dying of fur . . 
Basic metals 27 0.05 0.1092 -0.0033 0.0430 0.0019 
Food and beverages 15 0.1 0.0854 -0.0186 0.0349 0.0018 
Other non-metallic 26 0.15 0.0616 -0.0339 0.0269 0.0017 mineral 
Textiles 17 0.16 0.0568 -0.0370 0.0252 0.0017 
Pulp, paper and paper 21 0.17 0.0521 -0.0400 0.0236 0.0017 
Coke, refined petroleum 23 0.19 0.0426 -0.0461 0.0204 0.0016 
and nuclear fuel 
Printing, publishing and 22 0.2 0.0378 -0.0492 0.0188 0.0016 
reproduction 
Fabricated metal 28 0.24 0.0188 -0.0614 0.0124 0.0015 
Wood and of wood and 20 0.28 -0.0003 -0.0737 0.0059 0.0014 cork 
Manufacturing nec 36 0.36 -0.0384 -0.0982 -0.0070 0.0013 
Motor vehicles, trailers 34 0.39 -0.0526 -0.1073 -0.0118 0.0012 and semi-trailers 
Other transport 35 0.39 -0.0526 -0.1073 -0.0118 0.0012 
equipment 
Machinery, nec 29 0.45 -0.0812 -0.1257 -0.0215 0.0011 
Rubber and plastics 25 0.69 -0.1954 -0.1991 -0.0601 0.0006 
Electrical machinery and 31 0.77 -0.2335 -0.2236 -0.0730 0.0005 apparatus, nec 
Chemicals and chemical 24 0.86 -0.2764 -0.2512 -0.0875 0.0003 products 
Medical, precision and 33 0.96 -0.3240 -0.2818 -0.1036 0.0001 optical instruments 
Radio, television and 
communication 32 1.04 -0.3620 -0.3062 -0.1164 -0.0001 
equipment 
Office, accounting and 30 1.06 -0.3716 -0.3124 -0.1197 0001 -0 computing machinery . 
Notes: Calculations use 
ßI 
and 
ß2 from equation (16). llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP. prib: Private credit 
by deposit money banks relative to GDP. pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
relative to GDP. bankfreed: This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence 
from government control with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on 
banking freedoms. 
Table 9 
Specification III: per industry 
cluster b count No clustering 
10% 5% 1<0 10% 5"/. <O 
Qx+ , xOPEN+Q 11 9 36 22 19 36 
Qx+ , xOPEN+ 2Dt+ ýDk+Q 14 10 38 22 26 38 
y- , xOPEN+ 2Dt+ 3Dk+ xDk+Q 
9 7 26 13 9 26 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term xOPEN is statistically 
significant at the 10%, 5% level or that ßi is negative. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is 




Specification III: Pooled Data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
X 0.249 0.254 
(0.029)** (0.011)'" (0.027)"" (0.011)" 
xopen -0.059 -0.063 
(0.026)* (0.012)"' (0.024)** (0.012)'" 
tradedness dummy No Yes 
clustered at country level Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.50 0.50 
N 10213 10213 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. Trade openness is the ratio of nominal exports plus imports to nominal GDP. 
Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), the sectors agriculture, mining, manufacturing and transportation 
are "tradable" whereas all other services are "nontradable". Standard errors are clustered by country in columns I and 3. 
Columns 2 and 4 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ""=significant at 5% level, *-significant at 10% 
level 
Table 11 
Specification III: "Two stage" approach 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
open -0.137 -0.137 
(0.060)* (0.044)" (0.057)** (0.065)" 
Ingdp 0.000 -0.000 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) 
tradedness dummy No Yes 
industry dummies Yes No 
clustered at country level Yes No Yes No 
R2 0.95 0.87 
N 447 447 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. Trade openness is the ratio of nominal exports plus imports to 
nominal GDP. Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), the sectors agriculture, mining, manufacturing 
and transportation are "tradable" whereas all other services are "nontradable". Standard errors are clustered by country 
in columns I and 3. Columns 2 and 4 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be 
negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ""=significant at 5% level, 
=significant at 10% level 
Table 12 
Specification IV: per industry per country 
- Qx, + ix, FIN, + =x, OP EN, +Q 
11 ßz 
11 d 77 87 
rib 76 82 
ribof 78 83 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction terms are statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output 
growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: Ilgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. 
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Table 13 
Specification IV: per industry 
,_ Qx+ aFlN + xOPEN&+Q 
cluster b county No cluster 
1 : 
P2 
Ilgdp 12 12 19 23 
_ rib 3 11 11 22 
ribof I 11 6 21 
bankfreed 13 16 16 30 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction terms are statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output 
growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: 
llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof. Private 
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite 
index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score 
on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. 
Table 14 
Specification IV: Pooled Data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
x 0.261 0.263 0.263 0.183 
(0.028)'" (0.023)"" (0.035)" (0.019)** (0.033)11" (0.016)00 (0.064)'" (0.055)'" 
xopen -0.062 -0.061 -0.061 -0.107 
(0.025)'" (0.015)"" (0.026)" (0.013)'" (0.025)"" (0.013)"" (0.033)" (0.024)" 
On -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 0.002 
(0.021) (0.035) (0.030) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)0 
clustered 
at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country 
level 
le 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.43 
N 9729 9729 9829 4319 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a composite index which 
measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an overall score on a scale of 
0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. Trade openness is the ratio of nominal 
exports plus imports to nominal GDP. Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), the sectors agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing and transportation are "tradable" whereas all other services are "nontradable". Standard errors 
are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
""=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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Table 15 











fin -0.069 -0.132 -0.109 0.002 
(0.227) (0.126) (0.130) (0.080)' (0.121) (0.067) (0.002) (0.001) 
open -0.124 -0.131 -0.108 -0.185 
(0.052)** (0.037)** (0.067)* (0.043)** (0.063) (0.041)" (0.076)" (0.050) 
Ingdp 0.003 -0.001 0.016 -0.012 (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes dummies 
clustered 
at country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R' 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 447 447 447 447 
(ii) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
l llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
fin -0.069 -0.131 -0.109 0.002 
(0.215) (0.187) (0.125) (0.121) (0.114) (0.097) (0.002) (0.002) 
open -0.124 -0.131 -0.108 -0.185 
(0.049)" (0,071)* (0.063)' (0.064)"" (0.060) (0.065)' (0.073)** (0.081)'" 
Ingdp 0.002 -0.001 0.016 -0.012 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.015) (0.020) 
tradedness Yes Yes Yes Yes dummies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
N 447 447 447 447 
Notes for tables 15(i) and 15(ii): The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen 
(2008) for 50 NACE industry in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of 
financial development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: 
This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control 
with an overall score on a scale of O to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. Trade 
openness is the ratio of nominal exports plus imports to nominal GDP. Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf 
(1994), the sectors agriculture, mining, manufacturing and transportation are "tradable" whereas all other services are 
"nontradable". Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the 
standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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Table 16 
Specification I: "per industry" 
Sample Period 1995-2004 
Qx+ ixFIN+Q 
cluster b county No cluster 
10% 5% l<o 10°/. 5"/. '<0 
Ilgdp 18 12 36 17 14 36 
_ rib 19 13 35 18 15 35 
ribof 16 13 28 15 11 28 
v-P[lx+Plx IN+ 2Dt+ 3Dk+Q 
cluster b count No cluster 
10% 5°/. 01<0 10% 5°/. <0 
11 d 15 10 35 16 12 35 
rib 16 11 33 17 13 33 
ribof 18 11 28 18 10 28 
, xFIN+ Dt+ 3Dk+ 4xDk+Q 
cluster b county No cluster 
10% 5% 1<0 10% 5% , <0 
11 d 18 11 29 12 9 29 
rib 16 10 30 12 6 30 
ribof 23 16 29 17 10 29 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term is statistically significant at 
the 10%, 5% level or that 01 is negative. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference 
between nominal output growth and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of 
financial development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. Dt and Dk are time 
and country dummies respectively. 
Table 17: Specification I: "Two stage" approach 
Sample Period 1995-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ingdp 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.013 








(0.066) (0.037)0 " 
-0.000 (0.002) (0.001) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 447 447 447 447 447 447 447 k4 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2(08) for 50 NACE industry 
in 9 different countries for 1993-2004. llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP. prib: Private credit by deposit money 
banks relative to GDP. pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. 
bankfreed: This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from 
government control with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on 
banking freedoms. Standard errors are clustered by country in columns I, 3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the 
standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% level, *-significant at 10% level 
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Table 18 (i-iii) 
Specification II: Pooled Data, Period 1995-2004 
(18i) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
x 0.117 0.128 0.116 
(0.029)"' (0.038)0* (0.023)* (0.028)0* (0.019)** (0.023)** 
OR 0.022 0.005 0.017 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) 
xextdep -0.029 -0.042 -0.030 
(0.046) (0.106) (0.043) (0.088) (0.030) (0.068) 
xfnextdep -0.016 0.002 -0.011 
(0.075) (0.117) (0.059) (0.078) (0.026) (0.044) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 
N 1804 1804 1848 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Rajan and Zingales (1998). Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3 and 5. Columns 2,4 and 
6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. "*=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
(18ii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
x -0.073 -0.017 0.019 
(0.203) (0.151) (0.179) (0.131) (0.142) (0.103) 
xfin 0.153 0.064 0.017 
(0.252) (0.164) (0.168) (0.110) (0.095) (0.064) 
xextdep 0.635 0.491 0.396 
(0.391) (0.325)" (0.353) (0.278)" (0.284) (0.219)" 
xfinextdep -0.409 -0.178 -0.053 
(0.509) (0.355) (0.335) (0.231) (0.184) (0.133) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R= 0.43 0.42 0.42 
N 3905 3905 4001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Maudos and Fernandez dc Guevara (2007). Standard errors are clustered by country in columns I, 3 and 5. 
Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ""=significant at 5% level, *-significant at 10% 
level 
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(18iii) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
x 0.133 0.141 0.126 
(0.032)"" (0.025)** (0.028)** (0.019)* (0.023)"" (0.016)** 
An 0.001 -0.009 0.009 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) 
xextdep 0.007 0.005 0.006 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) 
xfinextdep -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R' 0.43 0.43 0.43 
N 1312 1312 1344 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). Standard errors are clustered by country in columns I, 3 and 5. Columns 2,4 and 6 
report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
Table 19 (i-ix) 
Specification II: Pooled Data 
Period 1995-2004 
(19i) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
H. A. prib pribof 
On -0.013 -0.058 -0.010 
(0.038) (0.044) (0.031)" (0.038) (0.015) (0.018) 
xfinextdep -0.082 -0.049 -0.036 
(0.076) (0.062) (0.059) (0.045) (0.032) (0.025) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
R2 0.45 0.45 0.44 
N 1804 1804 1848 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Rajan and Zingales (1998). All regressions include country, industry and time dummies as well as x"industry 
dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 1,3 and 5. Columns 2, 
4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity- 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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(19ii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ilgdp prib pribof 
xfin 0.009 -0.039 -0.033 
(0.099) (0.084) (0.072) (0.061) (0.040) (0.034) 
xfinextdep -0.134 -0.039 0.028 
(0.226) (0.184) (0.159) (0.127) (0.090) (0.076) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry-country level 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 
N 3905 3905 4001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth, FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof. Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include country, industry and time dummies as 
well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 1,3 
and 5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% 
level 





(4) (5) (6) 
pribof 
On -0.077 -0.109 -0.034 
(0.032)** (0.047)0 (0.034)"" (0.044)" (0.013)" (0.019)' 
xfinbankdep 0.004 0.005 0.000 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54 
N 1312 1312 1344 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include country, industry and time dummies as well as x"industry 
dummies and x*country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 1,3 and 5. Columns 2, 
4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity- 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
(19iv) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
xfin -0.022 -0.051 -0.010 
(0.037) (0.041) (0.030)' (0.036) (0.014) (0.016) 
xfinextdep -0.068 -0.041 -0.041 
(0.073) (0.058) (0,058) (0.043) (0.032) (0.024)' 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
g2 0.53 0.53 0.53 
N 1804 1804 1848 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Rajan and Zingales(1998). All regressions include country dummies, industry dummy'time dummy as well 
as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns I, 3 and 
5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "-significant at 5% level, *-significant at 10% 
level 
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(19v) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
zfin 0.038 -0.008 -0.022 
(0.094) (0.077) (0.069) (0.056) (0.038) (0.031) 
zfinextdep -0.187 -0.085 0.005 
(0.214) (0.169) (0.153) (0.116) (0.085) (0.068) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 
N 3905 3905 4001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include country dummies, industry dummy'time 
dummy as well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in 
columns 1,3 and 5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be 
negligible. Hcteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% level, 
'=significant at 10% level 
(19vi) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
xfin -0.074 -0.092 -0.031 
(0.032)" (0.042)' (0.029)" (0.039)" (0.012)" (0.016)' 
xffnbankdep 0.002 0.004 0.002 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 
N 1312 1312 1344 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include country dummies, industry dummy'time dummy as well as 
x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 1,3 and 5. 
Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% 
level 
(19vii) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
11gdp prib pribof 
Ifin 0.005 -0.067 -0.006 
(0.061) (0.070) (0.057) (0.068) (0.029) (0.031) 
xfinextdep -0.109 -0.080 - -0.042 
(0.069) (0.053)" (0.052) (0.038)" (0.030) (0.022)' 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry-country level 
R2 0.50 0.50 0.49 
N 1804 1804 1848 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Rajan and Zingales(1998). All regressions include industry dummies, country dummy'time dummy as well 
as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns I, 3 and 
5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, '=significant at 10% 
level 
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(19viii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
llgdp prib pribof 
xGn -0.095 -0.138 -0.080 
(0.106) (0.096) (0.086) (0.082)' (0.050) (0.041)' 
xfinextdep -0.046 0.019 0.062 
(0.215) (0.169) (0.150) (0.116) (0.084) (0.070) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
industry-country level 
R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 
N 3905 3905 4001 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). All regressions include industry dummies, country dummy'time 
dummy as well as x'industry dummies and x'country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in 
columns I, 3 and 5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be 
negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. "=significant at 5% level, 
*=significant at 10% level 
(19ix) Carlin-Mayer measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ilgdp prib pribof 
If-in -0.188 -0.315 -0.098 
(0.099)" (0.089)" (0.093)1* (0.087)0' (0.037)"" (0.033)00 
iriinbankdep 0.006 0.006 0.001 (0.016) (0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry-country level 
W 0.60 0.60 0.60 
N 1312 1312 1344 
Notes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. EXDEP: The measure of external dependence used is the 
one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). All regressions include industry dummies, country dummy time dummy as well as 
x'industry dummies and x$country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry-country in columns 1,3 and 5. 
Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. 




Specification II: "Two stage" approach 
Period 1995-2004 










Ingdp 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) 
fin -0.021 -0.016 0.024 0.002 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.033) (0.030) (0.038) (0.026) (0.002) (0.024) 
finextdep -0.011 -0.002 -0.013 -0.000 
(0.028) (0.036) (0.023) (0.026) (0.016) (0.023) (0.001) (0.001) 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered 
at country Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
level 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
N 144 144 144 144 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1993-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used is the one from Carlin and Mayer (2003). Standard errors are clustered by 
country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are 
assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **=significant at 5% 
level, *=significant at 10% level 
(20ii) Rajan-Zingales measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bsnkfreed 
Ingdp 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.009 
(0.020) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.017) (0.007) 
fin 0.006 0.018 0.031 0.002 
(0.061) (0.066) (0.046) (0.038) (0.035) (0.031) (0.002) (0.002) 
rinextdep -0.143 -0.148 -0.070 0.000 
(0.095) (0.131) (0.043)*S (0.073)" (0.051) (0.060) (0.004) (0.003) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered 
at country Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Yes No 
level 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
N 198 198 198 198 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1993-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
pribof: Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as 
banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with 
higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used 
is from Rajan and Zingales(1998). Standard errors are clustered by country in 
columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 
2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to 
be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. "*=significant at 5% level, 
*-significant at 10% level 
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(20iii) Maudos-Fernandez de Guevara measure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ilgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
Ingdp 0.013 0.015 0.029 0.019 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)' (0.020) (0.011) 
fin -0.134 -0.076 -0.178 0.001 
(0.318) (0.222) (0.174) (0.139) (0.134) (0.102) (0.005) (0.004) 
fineztdep -0.135 0.003 0.213 -0.002 
(0.519) (0.515) (0.317) (0.323) (0.236) (0.232) (0.009) (0.010) 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R= 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 429 429 429 429 
Notes: The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for 50 NACE 
industries in 9 different countries for 1981-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of financial 
development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, 
priboE Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfreed: This is a 
composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control with an 
overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. EXDEP: The 
measure of external dependence used is from Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007). Standard errors are clustered 
by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the standard errors when within-clusters correlations 
are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. '"=significant at 
5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
Table 21 
Specification IV: Per Industry 
Period 1995-2004 
Qx+ , xFINkt+ xsOPEN& +l7 
cluster b country No cluster 
11 d IS 14 14 19 
rib 17 16 16 18 
ribof 17 17 16 22 
Notes: The above numbers indicate the number of industries for which the interaction term is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output 
growth and nominal capital cost growth FIN denotes one of the 
following measures of financial development: llgdp: 
Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof. Private credit by 













x 0.276 0.276 0.280 
(0.030)"" (0.038)"" (0.028)" (0.032)00 (0.031)" (0.028)0" 
xopen -0.096 -0.097 -0.093 
(0.032)" (0.029)0* (0.032)"" (0.024)0" (0.029)" (0.018)0" 
An -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 
(0.028) (0.059) (0.016) (0.037) (0.006) (0.018) 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R= 0.41 0.41 0.41 
N 4069 4069 4169 
Noes: The dependent variable is the nominal Solow residual and x is the difference between nominal output growth 
and nominal capital cost growth. FIN denotes one of the following measures of financial development: llgdp: Liquid 
liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. Trade openness is the ratio of nominal exports plus 
imports to nominal GDP. Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), the sectors agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and transportation are "tradable" whereas all other services are "nontradable". Standard errors are 
clustered by country in columns 1,3 and 5. Columns 2,4 and 6 report the standard errors when within-clusters 
correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
-"=significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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Table 23 (i-ii) 
Table 231 











fin -0.054 -0.012 -0.034 0.003 
(0.179) (0.100) (0.049) (0.038) (0.070) (0.039) (0.002) (0.001)'" 
open -0.165 -0.187 -0.169 -0.250 
(0.095) (0.054)'" (0.066)" (0.041)" (0.073)" (0.045)'" (0.079)0 " (0.053)'" 
Ingdp -0.022 -0.025 -0.017 -0.036 
(0.032) (0.018) (0.026) (0.016) (0.035) (0.020) (0.024) (0.017)00 
industry Yes Yes Yes Yes dummies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 447 447 447 447 
Table 23ii 
Specification IV: "Two stage" approach 
Period 1995-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
llgdp prib pribof bankfreed 
fin -0.052 -0.010 -0.035 0.003 
(0.170) (0.145) (0.048) (0.063) (0.066) (0.060) (0.002) (0.002) 
open -0.165 -0.188 -0.168 -0.249 
(0.090) (0.090)' (0.062)" (0.071)" (0.070)" (0.071)" (0.075)" (0.079)" 
lngdp -0.023 -0.026 -0.017 -0.037 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021)' 
tradedness Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dummyies 
clustered at Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
country level 
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
N 447 447 447 447 
Notes for tables 23(i) and 23(ii): The dependent variable is the markup estimated by Christopoulou and Vermeulen 
(2008) for 50 NACE industry in 9 different countries for 1993-2004. FIN denotes one of the following four measures of 
financial development: llgdp: Liquid liabilities relative to GDP, prib: Private credit by deposit money banks relative to 
GDP, pribof: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP, and bankfrecd: 
This is a composite index which measures banking security as well as banks' independence from government control 
with an overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values implying fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. Trade 
openness is the ratio of nominal exports plus imports to nominal GDP. Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf 
(1994), the sectors agriculture, mining, manufacturing and transportation are "tradable" whereas all other services are 
"nontradable". Standard errors are clustered by country in columns 1,3,5 and 7. Columns 2,4,6 and 8 report the 
standard errors when within-clusters correlations are assumed to be negligible. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. "-significant at 5% level, *=significant at 10% level 
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Data on External Dependence 
extdepR Z 
The data used are given in Rajan and Zingales (1998) pp. 566-567. Data are given at 
the 3 or 4 digit level. Some explanation must be given about how their data are 
matched with the rest of the data of this paper. In an earlier version of the paper they 
quote: 
Data on value added and gross fixed capital formation for each industry in each 
country are obtained from the Yearbook of Industrial Statistics (vol 1) database put 
together by the United Nations Statistics Division. We checked the data for 
inconsistencies, changes in classification of sectors, and changes in units. The U. N. 
data is classified by International SIC code. In order to obtain the amount of external 
dependence used by the industry in the U. S., we matched ISIC codes with SIC codes. 
(... ) Not all the ISIC sectors for which the Yearbook of Industrial Statistics report data 
on value added are mutually exclusive. For example, drugs (3522) is a subsector of 
other chemicals (352). In these cases, the values of the broader sectors are net of the 
values of the subsectors that are separately reported. We follow this convention... 
The revision of ISIC that Rajan and Zingales (1998) use is not mentioned. However, 
it seems that Revision 2 is being used. Since in the EU KLEMS database used by 
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), data are classified according to NACE code, 
Revision 1.1 there was a problem of correspondence. U. N. does not give an official 
and direct correspondence table between the two. We use an empirical 
correspondence. For the few values that Rajan and Zingales (1998) report at the 4 digit 
level we used unweighted averages of the subsector and the broader sector. We used 
unweighted averages too in the cases that two or more of ISIC codes correspond to a 
single NACE code. The correspondence is presented in the table below. 
IIC, Revision 2 NACE code, 
Revision 1.1 
313 311 15 
314 16 
321 3211 17 
322 18 
323 324 19 
331 20 
341 3411 21 
342 22 
353.354 23 












384 3841 36 
332 390 37 
extdepM_G 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007) use data from Amadeus (Bureau Van 
Dijk), which contains financial and economic information on more than 7 million 
European firms. Data were obtained according to NACE but were converted according 
to ISIC Rev. 3.1. and then aggregated according to ISIC Rev. 3 using U. N. 's 
correspondence table. We reversed the procedure and used an unweighted average in 
the case of imperfect matches. The correspondence is presented in the table below. 
ISIC Rev 3 NACE, Rev 1.1 ISIC, Rev 3 NACE, Rev 1.1 
5 15 32 41 
5 16 33 45 
6 17 34 50 
7 18 35 51 
8 19 36 52 
9 20 37 55 
IO 21 38 60 
11 22 39 61 
12 23 40 62 
13 24 41 63 
14 25 42 64 
15 26 43 65 
16 27 45 67 
17 28 46 70 
18 29 47 71 
19 30 48 72 
21 31 49 73 
22 23,24 32 50,51 74 
25 33 53 80 
27 34 54 85 
28.29 35 55 90 
31 36 55 91 
31 37 55 92 
32 40 55 93 
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Bank Dependence 
The measure is flow measure derived from the sources and uses of funds 
constructed from the aggregate balance sheet data compiled by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
NACE Description NACE, Rev 1.1 Carlin &Mayer 
Food and beverages 15 Food, Beverages 
Tobacco 16 Tobacco 
Textiles 17 Textiles 
Wearing apparel, Dressing and Dying of fur 18 Clothing 
Wood and of wood and cork 20 Wood products 
pulp, paper and paper 21 Paper & Products 
Pnntm , ublishin and reproduction 
22 Pnntin & Publishing 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 Industrial chemicals, Other Chemicals 
Other non-metallic minerals 26 Pottery, China etc, Glass & products, Non- 
metallic products, nee 
Basic metals 27 Iron & steel, Non-ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal 28 Metal products 
Machinery, nec 29 Non-Electrical machinery 
Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 31 Electrical machinery 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 Instruments 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 35 Motor vehicles 
Other transort equipment 36 Shipbuilding & Rairin 
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Chapter 4 
Inequality and growth: Does 
differential fertility really 
matter? 
4.1 Introduction 
Growth's enhancement, usually measured through the change in GDP per capita, 
seems to have been an easy target for the modern world. Inequality, on the other 
hand, is still a distressing, almost embarrassing, fact of the so-called advanced world. 
According to Milanovic (2002) and Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), the group of the 
most developed countries has the lowest Gini coefficient and high inequality seems 
to be a characteristic of less developed countries. ' The income of the developed 
countries accounts for 58 percent of world income and their population accounts for 
16 percent of world's population, but the income of the "Third World" is 29 percent 
and the population share 76 percent. 
'Inequality is calculated from the world distribution for individuals based entirely on household 
survey data from several countries, and adjusted for differences in purchasing power parity between 
the countries. 
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Numerous studies try to identify why is there this relationship and which direction 
the causality runs. Is it inequality that affects growth or growth affects inequality or 
they are jointly caused? Kuznets (1955) first suggested a link running from output to 
income distribution with an inverted U-shaped relation. However, later studies have 
consistently refuted the soundness of the Kuznets hypothesis and have generated 
skepticism about causal links running from economic growth to inequality. 
2 The 
evidence about the empirical link is controversial. The significance of the estimated 
coefficients is not always convincing and the results are often sensitive to changes 
in specification and other robustness tests. Benabou (1996) surveys 23 papers on 
the relationship between growth and inequality. He finds that in ten of these papers 
there is a consistent significant negative relationship. The other thirteen papers 
find effectively no correlation. On the other hand, some recent studies support the 
existence of a positive relation between income inequality and growth. 3 Possible 
reasons for these contradictory results are non-linearities (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003) 
or a more complicated causal mechanism (Lundberg and Squire, 2003). 
The empirical inconclusiveness is not surprising since there are a variety of ways 
in which growth and inequality could be linked. The several suggested mechanisms 
could be classified in four categories: capital market imperfections channels (as in 
Galor and Zeira, 1993 or Banerjee and Newman, 1993 or Aghion and Bolton, 1997), 
political economy (as in Persson and Tabellini 1994 or Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 or 
Chang, 1998), sociopolitical unrest and conflict (as in Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and 
human capital (Galor and Tsiddon, 1996). Differential fertility has been recently 
added to suggested mechanisms and the present paper engages in its relativity. 
De La Croix and Doepke (2003, henceforth DLCD) attempt to resolve this in 
an insightful theoretical and empirical analysis, which builds on the human capital 
theory of Becker and Barro (1998). They note that there are two possible channels 
linking inequality and growth via human capital. First, if there are diminishing 
returns to human capital at the individual level, then greater human capital inequality 
2See, among others, Benabou (1996), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Ravallion and Chen (1997). 
3See, among others, Benhabib and Spiegel (1998), Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000). 
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will lead to lower growth (holding average education levels constant). This can be 
seen by considering the effect of a mean-preserving spread on human capital - the 
loss to the poor (whose marginal product is high) will exceed the gain to the rich 
(whose marginal product is low). The second channel is differential fertility. People 
with lower human capital will not only choose less education for their children but 
also choose a higher number of children. Thus, more weight is put on families who 
provide little education, which reduces future human capital. In their empirical 
result, DLCD use a panel dataset containing 68 countries over the years 1960-1992 
and find that when differential fertility is included in growth regressions, it not only is 
a better explanatory than inequality, but that inequality ceases to matter at all. This 
would have two consequences. First, regarding human capital, inequality is related 
to growth only through the second channel proposed above: diminishing returns are 
not important. Secondly, there would appear to be no residual explanatory power of 
inequality via mechanisms (such as political economy) listed earlier. 
This paper revisits the empirical relationship between inequality and growth 
through differences in fertility rates among individuals that belong to different in- 
come or educational groups. Focusing on the influence of differential fertility, we 
shall contest De La Croix and Doepke's empirical conclusions on two counts. First, 
we discuss some problems with their data. We show that there are particular prob- 
lems with the measure of differential fertility which they use, since it is frequently 
based on very small proportions of different countries' populations and is thus likely 
to contain significant measurement error. We find that the significance of the fertility 
differential in their results is not robust to different measures of differential fertility or 
to other corrections we think are important in the data they use. Finally, we extend 
the econometric techniques used to analyse the relationship, in particular looking at 
the reliability of the instrumental variables and panel data techniques. Second, we 
revise the empirical relation between human capital inequality and growth and we 
suggest an appropriate measure of human capital inequality, which is the relevant 
source of inequality according to the theoretical model of DLCD. We do a robustness 
check with the use of various estimation methods and more general specifications. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the results of DLCD, 
our efforts to replicate them and suggest a different measure of differential fertility. 
Section 2 discusses some problems with the data. Section 3 suggests an appropriate 
measure for human capital inequality and introduces variables related to human 
capital in the regressions estimated by DLCD. Finally, Section 4 concludes.. 
4.2 Problems with Replication 
DLCD treat fertility and education decisions as interdependent and endogenous and 
build a theoretical model, which reflects the common hypothesis of a trade-off between 
the quality and quantity of children. Their framework suggests that an increase 
in human inequality increases the education inequality and the fertility differential 
between the rich and the poor. Since the production function for the human capital 
is concave and poor families who invest little in education will form a large fraction 
of next generation's population, the future average education of the economy will be 
lower, it will accumulate less human capital and therefore grow slower. The dynamic 
behavior of their economy is characterized by a degenerate long-run distribution; 
hence there is no inequality among households along the balanced growth path. 
DLCD mention that the first part of their hypothesis, the link from income in- 
equality to high fertility differentials, has been analyzed by Kremer and Chen (2002) 
who find that the Gini coefficient has a positive relation with fertility differentials. 
To test the second part of their argument, the link from the differential fertility to 
growth, DLCD introduce a differential-fertility variable into a standard growth re- 
gression. 4 The regression equation is estimated for a panel data set for 83 developed 
4The theoretical analysis of DLCD predicts that inequality is transitory in the model and dis- 
appears in the balanced growth path. 
Hence, a change in inequality and therefore in differential 
fertility affects the steady-state level of output but not the long term growth rate. However, the 
empirical analysis focuses on the relation 
between differential fertility and the growth rate of GDP 
per capita instead of the 
level of GDP per capita. This allows for a dynamic relationship between 
GDP and differential fertility. In any case, if the adjustment to the new steady-state position takes 
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and developing countries over the periods 1960-1976 and 1976-1992. (The years and 
the number of countries are mainly constrained by the availability of differential fer- 
tility data). The dependant variable (GR) is the average annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita, continuously compounded and expressed as percentages. Differential fer- 
tility (DTFR) is defined as the difference in the total fertility rate between women 
with the highest and the lowest education level. The remaining independent variables 
are log of initial GDP per capita (GDP), the average ratio of investment to GDP 
(I/GDP), the average ratio of government expenditure to GDP (G/GDP), a dummy 
variable for African countries (AFR), the Gini coefficient for the initial income dis- 
tribution (GINI) and initial total fertility (TFR). They allow the constant to differ 
across periods; Constant A for the first period and Constant B for the second period. 
They employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the regression 
equation and instrument I/GDP, G/GDP, GINI and DTFR to correct for possible 
endogeneity. The instruments used are: constant, log of initial GDP per capita, log 
of initial GDP per capita squared, initial I/GDP ratio, initial G/GDP ratio, initial 
fertility, initial fertility squared, initial life expectancy, initial life expectancy squared, 
Africa dummy, and the tropics and access to the sea variables of Sachs and Warner 
(1997). 5 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics which DLCD provide in their paper whereas 
Table 2 gives their estimation results. The investment rate has a positive and signifi- 
cant effect on growth whereas initial GDP, the government expenditure rate and the 
African dummy have a negative and significant effect (Regression 1). In Regression 
(2) the Gini coefficient is added and income inequality has a negative and significant 
coefficient. When fertility is introduced in the model (Regression 3), income inequal- 
ity has a positive and insignificant effect on growth but fertility has a negative and 
significant effect. Finally, once differential fertility is added as explanatory variable 
a long time-as seems to be true empirically-then the growth effect of a variable lasts for a long 
time. Additionally, DLCD predict that by introducing idiosyncratic ability shocks in the production 
function for human capital, there is inequality among households even in the long run. 
5Detailed description of the data is provided in the published paper of De La Croix and Doepke 
and our appendix. 
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(Regression 4), its negative and significant coefficient rules out any interpreting role 
that inequality and fertility had. Income inequality again has the wrong sign. The 
insignificance of the Gini and fertility is opposing the predictions of the theoretical 
model of DLCD according to which the Gini, total fertility and differential fertility 
should all be negatively linked to growth. 
To corroborate the estimation results and further strengthen their argument about 
differential fertility's significance, the authors employ a quasi Likelihood Ratio test. 
This is the D-test introduced by Newey and West (1987) and is a GMM counterpart 
to the classical LR test. It is defined as the normalized difference of the restricted 
and unrestricted objective functions for the efficient GMM estimator. The weighting 
matrix used in the estimation of both the restricted and the unrestricted estimators is 
computed by the use of the unrestricted estimator, which is consistent under both Hp 
and Hl. It is distributed as X2 with v degrees of freedom, where v is the number of 
restrictions. LR1 tests the absence of differential fertility in the equation. It validates 
DLCD assertions since the null is rejected and DTFR seems to be significant. LR2 
tests the absence of both the Gini and fertility in the equation and its results comes 
in accordance with their individual t-statistics since the null hypothesis of their joint 
insignificance is not rejected. 
DLCD report Hansen's J-test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions. The 
joint null hypothesis is that the included instruments are valid, i. e. uncorrelated with 
the error, and that the specification of the structural equation is valid. The validity 
of the instrument set is verified since the null hypothesis is never rejected at the 5% 
level. The p-value of the test is greatly increased once differential fertility is included 
in the regression. 
De La Croix and Doepke's results are interesting but the important question is 
whether they are robust. The first concern is with their results. A closer look at the 
estimates of the J-tests raises some considerations triggered by the p-values reported 
in brackets. The J-statistic is distributed as X2 with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of overidentifing restrictions (L - K) rather than the total number of 
moment conditions L. The p-values which DLCD mention correspond to 18,17, 
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16 and 15 degrees of freedom for regressions (1) to (4) respectively. This seems 
unreasonable since the instruments they mention are just twelve. These p-values 
correspond to twenty-two instruments. Working out the p-values for 7,6,5 and 4 
degrees of freedom they are 0.013,0.007,0.005 and 0.048. The null hypothesis is thus 
rejected for all equations, suggesting invalidity of the instrument set. 
An additional concern is the use of squared values of the explanatory variables as 
instruments. Using the squares of the RHS variables as instruments is not uncommon 
in applied econometrics since their employment captures any possible non-linear ef- 
fects between the RHS variables and the independent variable and hence the fit of the 
regression improves. However, the correlation between the InGDP and (InGDP)2 is 
0.998 whereas for InTFR and (InTFR)2 it is 0.994, both statistically significant at 
5% level. These correlations are so high that they almost amount to instrumenting 
endogenous variables with themselves. 
We tried to replicate the results of DLCD. The outcome was awkward since we 
had problems in replicating even the descriptive statistics table (Table 3). At their 
descriptive statistics table, they report the minimum average growth rate as -5.75%, 
implying that a country experienced a fall in GDP per capita of 61% between 1960 
and 1976. However, according to Penn World Table 6.1, there is no country which has 
experienced such a fall. Confusingly the data set provided by Pr. De La Croix did 
not have such an observation. Similarly, differences appear in the mean and standard 
deviation of TFR for the first period. Obviously, these differences affect the relevant 
descriptive statistics for the total sample size too. 
We re-estimated the above regressions using De La Croix and Doepke's data 
and the information given in the paper about the exact estimation procedure. Table 
4 exhibits the outcome. The estimates are very similar for regressions (1) and (2) 
with minor deviations of the values but similar signs and significance. However, in 
regression (3) when the problematic TFR is introduced, occasional deviations appear. 
The average ratios of investment to GDP, average ratio of government expenditure to 
GDP and initial total fertility ratio have correct signs but are not significant , contrary 
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to what DLCD mention. 6 Regression (4) is characterized by similar differences. 
The signs of all the variables are consistent but the average ratios of investment to 
GDP, average ratio of government expenditure to GDP and differential fertility, with 
the importance of the latter being the corner stone of De La Croix and Doepke's 
analysis, are not significant. According to the Hansen's J-test, the instruments do 
satisfy the orthogonality conditions required for their employment. The p-value of the 
test improves once total initial fertility is introduced but the inclusion of differential 
fertility doesn't strengthen the validity of the instrument set, contrary to the findings 
of DLCD. LRl and LR2 tests establish the insignificance of TFR, DTFR and Gini, 
symmetrically to individual t-ratios. 
The unreasonable degrees of freedom apparently used for the J-test raised con- 
cerns whether there was an imprecise description of the instruments used in the 
published paper. In that case the different results we got during the replication 
might be explained. Since the reported p-values correspond to twenty-two instru- 
ments we interacted all instruments with the period dummies. We re-estimated the 
regressions of DLCD and the results are now almost identical with the ones presented 
in the published paper (see Table 5). What is of highest importance is that the co- 
efficient of differential fertility is significant. Thus, apparently, the authors allowed 
for a "structural break" in the first stage regression. Although, the ideal number of 
instruments is an "uncharted sea", twenty two instruments would probably be too 
high a number. 
The obvious next step is to check the data they provided us. We compared 
all observations with the original source and recalculated all the average rates. The 
details of the alterations made are left for the documentation appendix but some ma- 
jor comments should be made here. Due to occasional inappropriate correspondence, 
usually in terms of time, of employed data with the declared definition of the vari- 
6The insignificance of I/GDP and G/GDP is not a common fact in growth regressions. Sala-I- 
Martin (1997) identifies "robust" empirical relations in the economic growth literature and classifies 
investment in one of the 22 out of 59 variables that appear to be "significantly" correlated with 
growth, although government spending does not affect growth, at least not in the linear way that he 
specifies. 
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ables, the number of observations falls to 68 from the original 83. The inappropriate 
time correspondence issue mainly refers to Gini observations, which according to the 
authors correspond to the initial year or the closest available year.? Some examples 
are Romania's observation for the period 1960-1976 is from 1989, Ghana's from 1988, 
Jordan's from 1980, Paraguay's from 1983, and Burkina Faso's whose observation for 
the period 1976-1992 seems to come from 1995. Some problems are also detected 
in the dummy for African countries with e. g. Botswana and Sudan not defined as 
African countries as well as with the access to the sea variable with e. g. Botswana 
or Mali not included in the countries that have access to the sea. 8 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables of this new data set 
which largely uses the same sources as DLCD. The values are much alike the ones 
reported in the previous tables with no great deviations for all variables. Table 7 gives 
the estimation results. We use eleven instruments only and we allow for correlation 
in the errors across the two different growth periods and thus we cluster by country. 
Regressions (1) and (2) reproduce similar results with De La Croix and Doepke's 
estimates. However, regression (3) draws a different picture. The introduction of 
total initial fertility doesn't reduce the explanatory power of the Gini coefficient which 
remains significant at 5% level (actually the negative effect of income inequality on 
growth increases). This result opposes the (empirical) findings of DLCD as well 
as Barro (2000) and might signal the absence of significant borrowing constraints 
which would otherwise prevent families with many children from investing in human 
capital. ' The coefficient of the Gini is -0.11, which implies that an increase of one 
standard deviation in the Gini coefficient decreases growth by 1.03 percentage points, 
an economically significant result (the mean growth for 1960-1992 is 1.88). Contrary 
TDe La Croix and Doepke, (2003), p. 1106. 
8The definition of the variable ACCESS from Sachs and Warner (1997), the original source of the 
data, is "Physical access to international waters is measured by our land-locked variable. A country 
that borders the ocean (a "coastal economy") and that has a container port is given a value of 0, 
reflecting complete access to international shipping. A landlocked country without navigable access 
to the sea via rivers is given a value of 1". The ACCESS for Botswana and Mali has a value of 1. 
°The 11 countries we had to drop from the sample compared to De La Croix and Doepke are 
mainly developing ones. Since the absence of significant borrowing constraints is a characteristic 
of developed rather than developing countries, the change of the relative weight of developing and 
developed countries in the sample might explain the different finding. 
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to DLCD results, the log of initial GDP, the dummy for African countries and the 
newly introduced total fertility seem to have no significance. Moreover, fertility is 
positively linked to growth, a finding that violates both the theoretical and empirical 
predictions of DLCD. 
Regression (4) is the important regression since differential fertility variable is 
included. The coefficient of differential fertility is negative and significant, although 
only at the 10% level, which is verified by the LR1 test. An increase of one standard 
deviation in its coefficient lowers growth by 1.6 percentage points. The coefficient of 
the Gini is now smaller and has the correct sign but it is insignificant. Growth is 
significantly and positively related to TFR. However, according to the LR2 test, the 
joint insignificance of the Gini and total fertility cannot be rejected. The reason for 
the change in the significance of inequality and total fertility caused by the inclusion 
of differential fertility in the regression is not clear. It is maybe a case akin to De 
La Croix and Doepke's exegesis for a similar result that total fertility and inequality 
have other effects on growth that are not present in the model, a fact that is altered 
once differential fertility is included. 
DLCD measure Differential Fertility as the difference in the total fertility rate be- 
tween women with the highest and the lowest education level. By doing so the results 
may be unreliable since the percentage of the women belonging in these categories 
is not taken into consideration. There are countries that are characterized by rather 
unequal distributions, such as Bangladesh, which has 78% of women in the lowest 
education category and 1% in the highest or Yemen with 98% and 0% respectively, 
and other that are characterized by a more uniform distribution such as Peru, Sri 
Lanka or Mexico where each of the five different educational categories contains from 
10% to 30% approximately of the women's population. Since basing a variable on 0% 
of the population is unsatisfactory, we employed a different measure for differential 
fertility. This new variable is the weighted least squares measure of differential fer- 
tility (Wtd-DTFR) used by Kremer and Chen (2002). They approximate differential 
fertility as the coefficient from the weighted least squares regression of ln(TFR) on 
years of education, where observations are weighted by the percentage of women in 
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the education category. l0 Weighting observations reduces the noise with which fer- 
tility is measured at, especially, the extreme levels of educational attainment. The 
correlation between DTFR and Wtd-DTFR is 0.73 (significant at the 5% level), low 
enough to characterize them as similar but not identical measures. 
Regression (5) is identical to Regression (4) apart from using Kremer and Chen's 
measure for differential fertility. The original data sources are common in these two 
different measures and the differences are hence interesting. Including differential 
fertility in a standard growth regression does not weaken the negative relationship 
between inequality and growth as DLCD found. More specifically, the Gini coefficient 
is significant, has the correct sign and the negative relationship between inequality 
and growth not only isn't weakening, but is now getting stronger. Total Fertility 
and Differential Fertility have no explanatory power for growth. Moreover, the mea- 
sure of differential fertility is now positively linked to growth and a change of one 
standard deviation in Wtd-DTFR increases growth by 1.29 percentage points. The 
Likelihood Ratio test verifies the above results since the null cannot be rejected for 
Wtd-DTFR according to the LRl test whereas the joint insignificance of GINI and 
TFR is rejected. 
We employ a weak identification test to control for the correlation between the 
instruments and the endogenous regressors. This test uses the F-statistic of the 
first stage regression. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide the critical values to which 
the F-statistic should compare. Unfortunately, the critical values are calculated for 
a maximum of three endogenous regressors. For a greater number of endogenous 
regressors we follow a rule-of-thumb which suggests that an instrument is weak if the 
F-statistic of the first stage regression is less than 10. The values of the test suggests 
that the instruments used are weak in all regressions. 
Checking the individual t-tests of the first stage regression can also give some 
suggestive information about the two critical instruments i. e. the log of initial GDP 
'°Their data are from four comparative studies (United Nations 1987, Jones 1982, United Nations 
1995 and Mboup and Saha 1998) and are the same with those that De La Croix and Doepke use. 
Note that the percentage distribution of women is only available for data from UN. 
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per capita squared and initial fertility squared. The two instruments which are the 
squared values of the explanatory variables are never important statistically. " 
Hansen's J-tests indicates that the null is rejected for all five regressions except 
for Regression (4). The instruments, hence, seem to be incorrectly excluded from the 
regression. One explanation could be the existence of nonlinear effects between the 
level of development and inequality to growth rates in line with Barro (2000) and 
Banerjee and Dufio (2003). Since some of the excluded instruments are the squares 
of the RHS variables, the value of the J-test may signify the need to include them in 
the regression. However, it is not clear why the same set of instruments seems to be 
valid in Regression (4). 
It is obvious that there is a problem in the chain between inequality, differential 
fertility and growth. We check whether the first part of this chain, from inequality to 
differential fertility, is problematic (rather than the second, which DLCD examine). 
Kremer and Chen (2002) show that the fertility differential between the educated 
and non-educated women is greater in less equal countries. Moreover, we estimated 
regressions with differential fertility as the dependent variable and use various specifi- 
cations. Our results are qualitatively similar and verify Kremer and Chen's arguments 
(Table 8). So, having ruled out the possibility of a weak link between inequality and 
differential fertility, it seems that differential fertility is not a transmission mechanism 
from inequality to growth. Instead inequality affects growth directly and/or through 
channels other than differential fertility. 
Another matter for consideration is the estimation method. 12 GMM estimators 
are consistent but biased and only asymptotically normal and the finite sample prop- 
erties of GMM estimators are not fully understood. DLCD have a sample size of 83 
observations, critical enough to justify an indubitable use of GMM and even more 
critical for the smaller data set we use. In order to check the robustness of our results 
-"Actually, the null cannot be rejected for most of the instruments. 
12Benhabib and Spiegel (1998), Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000), all look at the relationship 
between growth and inequality using fixed effects estimates, arguing that there are omitted country 
specific effects that cause a bias. 
However, countries' fixed effects cannot be used here due to the 
small sample size since only 11 countries 
have observations for both periods. 
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we re-estimate the above regressions by using Instrumental Variables (IV), which is a 
special case of GMM. IV needs a "large" sample size too since it has similar small and 
large sample properties to GMM. And although it does not have the efficiency gains 
that GMM acquires by the use of optimal weighting matrix and the relaxation of the 
i. i. d. assumption, if IV reproduces similar results to GMM it will signal a greater 
soundness of our arguments. Table 9 provides the estimation results of the same 
five regressions when IV is employed. The three first regressions have no important 
differences from the GMM estimates. Gini is always significant except for the case 
that DTFR is included, plus now the fact that both measures of differential fertility 
are insignificant (the difference in the signs of the two measures is present here too). 
4.3 Further Discussion of Problems with the Data: Some 
Cross-Section Results 
There are two major problems with the data that call for further discussion. The first 
one refers to the choice of the periods used and more specifically to the inclusion of 
the years 1973-1976 in the first period; the second problem is the time correspondence 
of the differential fertility data. We check the consequences of these two problems by 
forming two new data sets and doing a cross sectional analysis. 
The inclusion of the years after 1973's oil shock in the first period can result in 
misleading conclusions since there were significant effects for world economies which 
lingered on throughout 70s. We estimate the above regressions for a shorter first 
period leaving out the years from 1973 to 1976. The correlation between the growth 
rate of 1960-1973 and the growth rate of 1960-1976 is 0.947. Table 10 gives the 
descriptive statistics and Table 11 gives the results of the GMM estimation for this 
cross sectional estimation. The information we get from this cross-section data set 
is rather poor. The most robust result is the significant and positive coefficient of 
I/GDP, a common fact in growth regressions (IV and OLS estimation-Tables 12 and 
13 respectively- give similar results). Differential fertility is not significant and the 
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coefficient of Wtd-DTFR is still positive. J-test gives credit to the instruments used 
and the p-value is much higher in Regression (5) compared to the other four regres- 
sions. However, instruments are weak and the null cannot be reject for (InGDP)2 
and (lnTFR)2 in the first stage regression.. 
Looking at the critical variable of De La Croix and Doepke's model, namely at 
differential fertility, we notice that the year that the observations are supposed to 
describe and the year they are from are not compatible. For the early period (1960- 
1976), 24 out of 40 observations belong to years after the period. More specifically, 
24 observations come from 1977-1982 and the remaining 16 come from 1974-1976. 
For the period 1976-1992 the representation is slightly better. The surveys used 
give data for 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 with 10 observations out of 43 coming from 
years later than 1992. DLCD comment, "... the observations on fertility differentials 
are close to the end of the period over which we compute the growth rates. Since 
the fertility observations are five year averages and result from decisions and actions 
taken earlier, the endogeneity problem is not too severe. We correct for potential 
endogeneity of the differentials by using instrumental variables". " However, because 
40% of the data come from years out the period of interest and the rest correspond 
to the end we estimate the above regressions as a cross-section for the second period 
only but using the differential fertility observations of the first period. 
Table 14 provides the descriptive statistics for this new data set. The sample size 
is constrained by the availability of the data, mainly of DTFR. We complete the data 
set using the same sources and the same procedures for all the calculations as earlier. 
Table 15 provides the estimation results. Inequality has no explanatory power in all 
four regressions. Differential fertility is significant when measured by either DTFR 
or Wtd-DTFR. Moreover, both measures are negatively linked to growth, contrary 
to previous findings. The weak identification test implies that the instruments are 
weak in all specifications. An interesting result is the evolution of the p-value of the 
J-test; it is much higher for the fourth and fifth regression, which gives a direction for 
further research, especially because there was a similar result for the 1960-1973 when 
"De La Croix and Doepke, (2003), p. 1106. 
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Wtd-DTFR was introduced. Moreover, (InGDP)2 and (InTFR)2 are statistically 
insignificant in the first stage regression. 
Estimation with N (Table 16) draws a similar picture to GMM but Gini and 
Wtd-DTFR are now significant at 10% in Regression (5). OLS give totally different 
results with I/GDP and initial GDP being the only robustly significant determinants 
of growth for all five regressions (Table 17). 
Summarizing the information we get from these two cross-sectional data sets, 
there is one thing we can argue with confidence: there is a problem of robustness. 
The three different econometric techniques used to estimate the same regressions give 
different findings, a result not really unexpected, and create a rather cloudy picture. 
Inequality is not linked to growth and the evidence for the differential fertility is 
inconclusive. 
4.4 The Appropriate Measure of Inequality 
The theoretical model of DLCD predicts that inequality in human capital leads to 
inequality in education and a differential fertility effect -more children provided with 
lower education- that lowers future average human capital and hence lowers growth. 
In spite of the distribution of human capital being the relevant source of inequal- 
ity, DLCD use income inequality data to proxy it. This approach is probably a 
compromise forced by the data availability (the majority of the relevant surveys 
are actually performed using the income inequality data provided by Deininger and 
Squire (1996)). Castello and Domenech (2002) exploited the updated information 
which Barro and Lee (2001) provide about educational attainments and calculate a 
human capital Gini coefficient. Surprisingly, they find that there is a low correlation 
between the human capital and the income Gini coefficient (0.27). Motivated by such 
a finding, we use the data for human capital Gini to check whether the invalidation 
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of differential fertility as a transmitting mechanism between inequality and growth 
accrues from a mistaken proxy used for inequality. 
The low correlation that Castello and Domenech (2002) mention between the two 
inequality indicators is verified for our sample too. The correlation, shown in Figure 
1, is negligible (-0.063) and even carries a negative sign. 
Table 18 shows the descriptive statistics of the data set and Table 19 gives the 
estimation results. The four equations are identical to the former Regressions (2), (3), 
(4) and (5) but now the human capital Gini coefficient (HC GINI) is used instead of 
the income Gini. We keep instrumenting the HC Gini coefficient to correct for possible 
endogeneity. Regression (2) reproduces similar results to the case when the income 
Gini is used. The human capital inequality appears to be significant for growth, 
similarly to the case of the income Gini. At Regression (3) the results are consistent 
with our earlier findings when fertility is introduced. The coefficient on the HC Gini 
retains the correct sign and significance whereas fertility is significant but only at 
the 10% level, contrary to the predictions of DLCD. Including the critical variable of 
differential fertility doesn't bring any surprises. Regression (4) suggests that growth 
is not related to human capital inequality but it is related to DTFR. An increase 
of one standard deviation in DTFR coefficient decreases growth by 2.07 percentage 
points. Regression (5) suggests that human capital inequality is significant, and 
the increase of one standard deviation decreases growth by 1.39 percentage points. 
Wtd-DTFR is insignificant and the increase of one standard deviation in Wtd-DTFR 
decreases growth by 1.95 percentage points. However, both measures of differential 
fertility now suggest that the link between differential fertility and growth is negative. 
Hansen's test validates the instrument set only when differential fertility is included 
as a RHS variable but the instruments are weak. Moreover, the critical instruments 
(InGDP)2 and (InTFR)2 are insignificant in the first stage regression. 
Using these human capital inequality data , we 
do three more robustness checks. 
First, we estimate the panel by N; second, we estimate the cross section version 
using the above "time correspondence improved data set" on differential fertility; 
and third, we estimate a more general form of the above regressions for the panel. 
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The N estimations (Table 20) reproduces the main facts of the GMM estimation 
with respect to differential fertility. The negative signs of the coefficients of both 
measures are verified. DTFR gives credit to the differential fertility as a determinant 
of growth whereas Wtd-DTFR refutes it. 
The cross-section estimation (Table 21) reproduces the qualitative findings of 
the cross-sectional estimation in the case that the income Gini is used. However, 
compared to the panel estimation, only the crucial fact of differential fertility's lack 
of robustness as a transmitting mechanism between inequality and growth is repro- 
duced. More analytically, HC Gini is never significant and initial total fertility is only 
significant when differential fertility is not included in the regression. Both measures 
of differential fertility imply that it has some explanatory power over growth at the 
10% only level of significance. The negative signs of the coefficients of both measures 
are verified. 
For the last check, we estimate a more general form of the above four regressions 
by introducing three extra variables relevant to the human capital nature of the 
model. The first variable is the human capital Gini, already used as an alternative to 
the income Gini. The second is the human capital accumulation rate, proxied by the 
average ratio of the total gross enrollment ratio in secondary education from Barro 
and Lee (2001). This is the counterpart to the physical capital accumulation rate 
I/GDP. We instrument it by the initial human capital accumulation rate to correct 
for possible endogeneity. The third variable is the human capital stock, proxied by 
the average of the total years for schooling of the population aged 15 and over from 
Barro and Lee (2001). There is a high and statistically significant correlation between 
human capital inequality and the stock of human capital (-0.8787) and it is possible 
that the former is picking up the effect of the latter on growth. We instrument it by 
the initial stock of human capital. 14 Finally, we follow Toya, Skidmore and Robert- 
son (2004) and use natural disasters as an instrument for changes in schooling. We 
measure natural disasters as the "Logarithm of one plus the number of natural disas- 
ter events normalized by land area". We estimate various versions of this "general" 
14We have tried using initial human capital stock both as an instrument and as a regressor. 
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specification, especially by trying different instrument sets (see Tables 22 (a), (b) 
and (c)). The significance of the regressors and the validation of the instrument set 
vary but there is a robust result: differential fertility is never significant, and this is 
unrelated to the choice of the index used to measure it. 
Finally the results for the critical instruments, the log of initial GDP per capita 
squared and the initial fertility squared, do not change much when inequality is 
measured by human capital Gini. The t-statistics of the first stage regression suggest 
that the null cannot be rejected (although (lnGDP)2 has some explanatory power 
for human capital stock or the human capital accumulation rate and (lnTFR)2 for 
differential fertility). 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the empirical relationship between income inequality 
and growth and challenge the empirical findings of De La Croix and Deopke (2003) 
who argue that the fertility-differential effect accounts for most of the empirical re- 
lationship between these two variables. The empirical evidence advanced here does 
not support that claim. Using panel data estimation we are unable to replicate 
their results and, on the contrary, we get strong evidence that differential fertility 
is not linked to growth. Using either a better measure of differential fertility than 
the one used by DLCD or a more general specification leads us to conclude that the 
significance of differential fertility is open to considerable doubt. The evidence on 
the explanatory power that human capital inequality has on growth is not so strong 
though. It is quite probable that there is a different channel other than inequality in 
education and the differential fertility effect that links inequality to growth. Further 
research is needed to reach a sound conclusion for the cross section case since al- 
though differential fertility and inequality seems to have no explanatory variable for 
growth, the samples used may be too small to give reliable results. Finally, finding 
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instruments that are exogenous and also have high correlation with the instrumented 




Table 1- Descriptive Statistics ofDe La Croix & Doepke Results 
Standard 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
1960-1976 40 GR 1.95 3.65 -5.75 8.44 
GINI 44.32 11.14 23.38 68.00 
TFR 5.56 1.89 2.02 7.93 
DTFR 2.23 1.56 0.22 5.30 
1976-1992 43 GR 0.39 1.89 -3.46 4.97 
GINI 45.91 9.56 28.90 69.00 
TFR 6.06 1.08 3.37 8.00 
DTFR 2.41 0.99 0.10 4.50 
Total 83 GR 1.14 2.97 -5.75 8.44 
GINI 45.14 10.32 23.38 69.00 
TFR 5.82 1.54 2.02 8.00 
DTFR 2.32 1.29 0.10 5.30 
Table 2- De La Croix & Doepke Regression Results 
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant A 12.35"' (1.31) 12.79"" (1.33) 15.30"' (1.46) 13.920" (1.69) 
Constant B 10.41"" (1.36) 10.98" (1.38) 13.40""(1.45) 12.18'" (1.63) 
Ln(GDP) -1.330" (0.17) -1.21"' (0.16) -1.3700 (0.15) . 1.55"0 (0.20) 
I/(GDP) 0.140" (0.02) 0.13"" (0.02) 0.07" (0.03) 0.08"" (0.04) 
G/GDP -0.080" (0.03) -0.0700 (0.03) -0.05" (0.03) -0.050 (0.03) 
AFR -1.75" (0.35) -1.80" (0.35) -1.9500 (0.32) -2.41" (0.44) 
GINI -0.03"" (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 
Ln(TFR) . 1.84"" (0.87) -1.01 (1.01) 
Ln(DTFR) -1.22" (0.50) 
J-test 17.71 [0.48] 17.11 [0.45] 16.79 [0.40] 9.58 [0.85] 
LR, 5.53 [0.01] 
LR3 2.08 [0.35] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Instruments and tests as described in the main text 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. I-test is the test for over-identifying restrictions of 
Hansen (1982), asymptotically )e distributed with n degrees of freedom, where n is the number of over-identifying 
restrictions. Corresponding p-values are reported in brackets. LR1 is a quasi likelihood ratio test for the absence of the 
differential fertility in the equation. LR2 is the test for the absence of both Gini and total fertility. The statistics are computed 
as the normalized difference between the constrained objective function and the unconstrained one (see Gallant (1987)). The 
constrained estimation is computed with the weighting matrix provided by the unconstrained estimation. The corresponding 
p-values are reported in brackets. 'Significant at the 10 % level. "" Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3- Replication Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
1960-1976 40 GR 3.57 2.05 -0.58 8.44 
GINI 44.32 11.13 23.38 68 
TFR 5.47 1.94 2.02 7.93 
DTFR 2.23 1.56 0.22 5.3 
1976-1992 43 GR 0.39 1.89 -3.46 4.97 
GINI 45.91 9.56 28.9 69 
TFR 6.06 1.08 3.37 8 
DTFR 2.41 0.99 0.10 4.5 
Total 83 GR 1.92 2.53 -3.46 8.44 
GINI 45.14 10.32 23.38 69 
TFR 5.77 1.57 2.02 8 
DTFR 2.32 1.29 0.1 5.3 
Table 4 
Regression- De La Croix & Doepke Data 
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant A 12.11" (1.37) 13.13** (1.52) 18.60*' (4.04) 14.80" (6.82) 
Constant B 10.04*1 (1.46) 10.95" (1.58) 16.46" 4.00) 12.84' (6.59) 
Ln(GDP) -1.31*' (0.19) -1.09*' (0.21) -1.84*' (0.54) -1.61"' (0.65) 
I/(GDP) 0.14** (0.03) 0.09*" (0.03) 0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.07) 
G/GDP -0.06*" (0.03) -0.06* (0.03) -0.01 (0.07) -0.03 (0.08) 
AFR -2.01" (0.42) -2.01** (0.44) -2.55** 
(0.78) -2.73*' (0.78) 
GINI -0.04'* (0.02) 0.13 
(0.12) 0.11 (0.13) 
Ln(TFR) 4.61 (3.19) -2.23 (4.72) 
Ln(DTFR) -1.07 (1.45) 
J-test 13.55 [0.06] 10.99 [0.09] 4.63 [0.461 4.92 [0.30] 
LR1 1.69 (0.19] 
I, R2 0.63 [0.73] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real p er capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. 
Instruments and test statistics 
as described in the main text. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 % level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 5 
Regression- De La Croix & Doepke Data but with 22 Instruments 
Variable 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
ConstantA 12.05** (1.22) 12.78"" (1.41) 14.85"" (1.49) 14.00"0 (1.49) 
Constant B -1.82"" (0.32) -1.79"" (0.32) -1.8600 (0.32) -1.71"' (0.35) 
Ln(CDP) -1.31'" (0.16) -1.13** (0.17) -1.31** (0.15) -1.50"0 (0.16) 
I/(GDP) 0.14"" (0.02) 0.11"" (0.03) 0.08** (0.04) 0.08*" (0.04) 
G/GDP -0.08" (0.03) -0.06"" (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
AFR -1.92"" (0.39) -1.96** (0.41) -2.18"" (0.41) -2.54"0 (0.44) 
GINI -0.04"" (0.01) -0.00 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) 
Ln(TFR) -1.33 (0.93) -0.92 (0.99) 
Ln(DTFR) -1.00'" (0.44) 
J-test 23.27 [0.18] 18.47 [0.36] 17.14 [0.38] 13.572 [0.56] 
LR1 6.26 [0.01] 
LR3 2.01 [0.37] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. The eleven instruments 
previously used are interacted with each period dummy. Test statistics as described in the main text. Heteroskedasticity. 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 % level. 
"" Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 6- Re-collected Data Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
1960-1976 32 GR 2.99 1.87 -0.63 8.05 
GIN! 45.86 11.28 25.30 75.82 
TFR 5.57 1.84 2.41 7.93 
DTFR 2.27 1.52 0.22 5.10 
1976-1992 36 GR 0.88 2.05 -2.64 5.66 
GIN[ 45.10 7.48 28.9 60.29 
TFR 5.95 1.15 3.37 8 
DTFR 2.32 1.08 0.10 4.5 
Total 68 GR 1.88 2.22 -2.64 8.05 
GIN! 45.46 9.39 25.3 75.82 
TFR 5.77 1.52 2.41 8 
DTFR 2.30 1.30 0.1 5.1 
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Table 7 
Regressions - Re-collected Data 
Constant_A 6.59** (2.29) 11.75'" (2.45) 6.56 (4.21) -3.93 (8.34) 10.98 (10.02) 
Constant B -0.85" (0.42) -0.86** (0.39) -0.92"" (0.39) -0.91" (0.41) -1.27S* (0.49) 
InGDP -0.67" (0.33) -0.95'" (0.31) -0.49 (0.44) 0.04 (0.62) -0.72 (0.87) 
VGDP 0.12" (0.03) 0.14** (0.03) 0.17'" (0.04) 0.1400 (0.05) 0.170" (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.04" (0.02) -0.04"' (0.02) -0.04.0 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
AFR -1.01'" (0.51) -1.15" (0.54) -0.91 (0.58) -1.27' (0.71) 0.77 (0.83) 
GINI -0.07" (0.02) -0.11*0 (0.04) -0.06 (0.06) -0.160" (0. (4) 
1nTFR 1.64 (1.23) 4.88** (2.48) -0.03 (2.94) 
InDTFR -2.05' (1.17) 
Wtd DTFR 36.82 (29.91) 
N 68 68 68 68 68 
Weak ID test 17.03 5.74 2.00 0.60 0.37 
J-test 14.81 [0.04] 15.55 [0.02) 13.49 [0.02] 8.17 [0.09] 9.64 [0.047] 
LR1 3.06 [0.08] 1.52 [0.22] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. Standard errors are clustered 
by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as 
described in the main text. 'Significant at the 10 % level., " Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 8- Differential Fertility-Inequality 
DTFR Wtd-DTFR 
1 (2) (3) (4) 5 (6) (7) 8 
Constant -1.13'" -2.82" 0.08 -2.30'" -0.02 -0.04' 0.07" -0.01 
(0.38) (0.45) (0.27) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
GINI 0.04" 0.03" 0.00" 0.00" 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
InTFR 1.33"" 1.89'" 0.01 0.06" 
(0.23) (0.32) (0.01) (0.02) 
HC GINI 0.01"" -0.01 -0.00 -0.00" 
(0.00) (0.00) 0.00 0.00 
N 68 68 69 69 68 68 69, 69 
Notes: The dependent variable is DTFR for columns (1) to (4) and Wtd-DTFR for columns (5) to (8). Estimation by OLS. 
Standard errors are clustered by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significant at the 10% level., "" Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 9 
Regressions - Re-collected Data 
Constant A 7.95" (2.60) 11.250' (3.06) 8.58' (4.56) -2.42 (8.50) 20.90' (10.88) 
Constant_B -0.76' (0.44) -0.83"0 (0.41) -0.79' (0.40) -0.69 (0.42) -0.80 (0.52) 
InGDP . 0.89" (0.35) -0.83" (0.35) -0.60 (0.47) -0.00 (0.63) -1.62' (0.94) 
I/GDP 0.14"" (0.04) 0.15"' (0.03) 0.16"' (0.04) 0.15" (0.05) 0.17" (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.04" (0.02) -0.04' 
(0.02) -0.04' (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
AFR -0.70 (0.56) -0.60 (0.58) -0.58 (0.59) -0.94 (0.74) 0.87 (0.85) 
GINI -0.09" (0.03) -0.11" (0.05) -0.08 (0.07) -0.16" (0.04) 
InTFR 1.04 (1.39) 4.59' (2.51) -2.52 (3.17) 
InDTFR -1.85 (1.19) 
Wtd DTFR 49.80 (31.64) 
6R 68 68 68 68 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by IV. Standard errors are clustered by 
country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as described 
in the main text. *Significant at the 10 % level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 10 - Descriptive Statistics 
Cross-Section 1960-1973 
Standard 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
1960-1973 31 GR 2.94 1.84 -1.63 6.52 
GINI 46.50 10.86 25.3 75.82 
TFR 5.65 1.81 2.41 7.93 
DTFR 2.30 1.53 0.22 5.1 
Table II 
Cross-Section 1960-1973 
Constant A -0.50 (3.17) 2.83 (4.21) -5.46 (6.52) -9.48 (13.75) 49.34 (61.56) 
InGDP 0.27 (0.32) -0.14 (0.42) 0.45 (0.55) 0.25 (0.64) -3.55 (4.62) 
IIGDP 0.05 (0.03) 0.10"" (0.05) 0.16'" (0.06) 0.1300 (0.06) 0.33" (0.18) 
G/GDP 0.03 (0.07) 0.04 (0.07) 0.07 (0.08) 0.20 (0.21) -0.47 (0.60) 
AFR -0.20 (1.02) -0.73 (1.13) -0.19 (1.16) -1.02 (1.42) 7.03 (6.29) 
GINI -0.02 (0.03) -0.06 (0.04) 0.01 (0.08) -0.36 (0.31) 
InTFR 2.08 (1.31) 3.69 (3.68) -8.69 (12.32) 
InDTFR -2.06 (2.69) 
Wtd DTFR 187.86 (194.85) 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
Weak ID test 14.92 7.31 4.72 0.21 0.08 
J-test 7.61 [0.27] 8.69 [0.12] 6.56 [0.16] 6.75 [0.08] 0.30 [0.96] 
LR1 0.58 [0.45] 0.93 [0.33] 
LR: 0.95 0.62 1.70 0.43 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. Standard errors are clustered 
by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as 





2.03 (4.45) 6.56 (5.37) 5.48 (8.09) 1.18 (15.00) 47.40 (68.02) 
InCDP -0.15 (0.43) -0.53 (0.49) -0.45 (0.66) -0.38 (0.71) -3.41 (5.04) 
UGDP 0.10"" (0.05) 0.15 " (0.05) 0.16"" (0.06) 0.14** (0.07) 0.30 (0.20) 
G/GDP 0.01 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 0.14 (0.23) -0.45 (0.69) 
AFR -0.24 (1.30) 0.09 (1.25) 0.13 (1.24) -0.21 (1.48) 6.16 (7.45) 
GIN! -0.07"0 (0.03) -0.08"" (0.04) -0.04 (0.09) -0.33 (0.36) 
InTFR 0.37 (1.59) 1.73 (3.81) -8.21 (13.65) 
InDTFR -1.11 (2.85) 
DTFR Wtd 172.15 (229.58) 
_ N 31 31 31 31 31 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by IV. Standard errors are clusu red by 
country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as described 




Constant A 2.39 (4.66) 5.50 (5.51) 6.72 (8.66) 7.87 (8.02) 11.37 (8.82) 
InGDP -0.12 (0.44) -0.34 (0.47) -0.44 (0.68) -0.46 (0.68) -0.73 (0.73) 
I/GDP 0.09' (0.05) 0.12** (0.05) 0.11* (0.06) 0.11* (0.06) 0.10' (0.06) 
G/GDP -0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.00 (0.07) -0.02 (0.06) 
AFR -0.37 (1.41) -0.21 (1.37) -0.23 (1.42) -0.17 (1.53) 0.32 (1.60) 
GINT -0.05' (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) -0.06 (0.04) 
InTFR -0.36 (1.78) -0.81 (1.98) -1.71 (2.18) 
InDTFR 0.26 (0.71) 
Wtd DTFR 17.69 (14.12) 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
TL_ a---, Io.,.., e.; shl.. ;. th e..... nti . nta .f.. sI n~ .. s..;., nno c c. e..,? e., 4 ... h, Al rcs are clustered 
by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 'Significant at the 10 % level. "" 
Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 14 - Descriptive Statistics 
Cross- Sectional 1976-1992 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1976-1992 35 GR 1.15 1.67 -2.31 6.42 
35 GINI 42.57 8.30 23.2 56.02 
35 TFR 4.74 1.97 1.69 8 
35 DTFR 2.32 1.60 0.22 5.3 
Table 15 
Cross- Sectional 1976-1992 
Constant 7.90*" (2.91) 8.79*" (2.76) 16.620" (4.92) 12.18 (8.79) 9.98 (8.26) 
InGDP -1.10*" (0.42) -0.96** (0.40) -1.5100 (0.54) -1.48 (0.90) -1.25 (0.83) 
I/GDP 0.18** (0.06) 0.15*" (0.07) 0.07 (0.06) -0.04 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) 
G/GDP -0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 
AFR -1.01"" (0.41) -1.00"* (0.41) -1.6800 (0.59) -3.880" (1.39) -4.61"" (1.54) 
GINI -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) 0.08 (0.07) 0.130 (0.08) 
InTFR -1.95*" (0.99) 0.13 (2.25) -0.51 (1.66) 
InDTFR -2.5900 (1.20) 
Wtd DTFR -47.830" (20.79) 
N 35 35 35 35 35 
Weak ID test 5.67 2.28 2.38 0.89 0.96 
J-test 12.53 [0.08] 11.96 [0.06] 11.03 [0.051] 1.52 (0.82) 2.27 [0.69] 
LR1 4.67 [0.03] 5.30 [0.02] 
LR2 1.34 [0.511 2.89 0.24 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth ra te of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. Standard errors are clustn ed 
by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as 
described in the main text. *Significant at the 10 % level. *" Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 16 
Cross- Sectional 1976-1992 
Constant 6.55" (3.37) 8.57"" (3.42) 19.53"' (5.48) 11.29 (9.74) 11.19 (8.64) 
InGDP -0.87" (0.52) -0.87" (0.53) -1.93'0 (0.69) -1.83" (1.01) -1.55" (0.86) I/GDP 0.13 (0.09) 0.11 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 0.04 (0.11) 0.08 (0.09) 
G/GDP -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 
AFR -1.10* (0.57) -1.03" (0.62) -1.45** (0.65) 4.20" (1.44) 4.44** (1.63) 
GINI -0.04 (0.04) 0.02 (0.05) 0.14 (0.09) 0.17' (0.09) 
InTFR -3.04"* (1.10) 0.22 (2.41) -1.37 (1.89) InDTFR -2.95"" (1.33) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by IV. Standard errors are clustered by 
country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as described 
in the main text. *Significant at the 10 % level.. º* Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 17 
Cross- Sectional 1976-1992 
Constant 7.87" (3.14) 7.90' (3.95) 17.92'" (5.92) 17.86" (6.53) 17.00" (6.49) 
InGDP -1.12" (0.44) -1.12" (0.45) -2.02'" (0.55) -2.01'" (0.57) -1.94" (0.59) I/GDP 0.17'" (0.06) 0.17'" (0.06) 0.14'0 (0.06) 0.14'" (0.06) 0.1400 (0.06) 
G/GDP -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) AFR -0.97' (0.55) -0.97 (0.59) -1.240" (0.57) -1.26' (0.74) -1.540 (0.78) GINI -0.00 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04) 
InTFR -2.42"0 (1.06) -2.39"' (1.17) -2.18' (1.10) 
InDTFR -0.02 (0.46) 
Wtd DTFR -4.90 7.19 
N 35 35 35 35 35 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 'Significant at the 10 % level. "' 
Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 18 - Descriptive Statistics 
Human Capital Giui 
Sample Observations Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum maximum 
1960-1976 34 GR 2.84 1.77 -0.48 8.05 
HC GINI 43.54 25.10 10.80 91.69 
TFR 5.57 1.80 2.41 7.93 
DTFR 2.33 1.62 0.22 5.3 
1976-1992 35 GR 0,84 2.08 -2.64 5.66 
HC GINI 56.81 19.21 25.39 91.79 
TFR 5.97 1.17 3.37 8 
DTFR 2.37 1.09 0.1 4.5 
Total 69 GR 1.82 2.17 -2.64 8.05 
HC GINI 50.27 23.12 10.80 91.79 
TFR 5.77 1.52 2.41 8 
DTFR 2.35 1.37 0.1 5.3 
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Table 19 
Regressions - Human Capital Gini 
Constant A 15.89"" (3.39) 21.41"" (3.83) -3.53 (11.46) 6.73 (10.13) 
Constant 
_B -0.66" 
(0.36) -0.69" (0.36) -0.78' (0.45) -0.80 (0.51) InGDP -1.52*" (0.40) -1.93'" (0.40) -0.12 (0.90) -0.59 (1.02) 
I/GDP 0.09"" (0.03) 0.07*" (0.03) 0.08' (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 
C/GDP -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
AFR -0.95' (0.53) -1.24" (0.55) -1.36 (0.94) -3.01"" (1.32) 
HC GINI -0.05"' (0.01) -0.05"" (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) -0.06"' (0.02) InTFR -1.25" (0.73) 5.32' (3.02) 3.87 (3.14) 
InDTFR -2.61 (1.25) 
Wtd DTFR -55.66 (34.33) 
N 69 69 69 69 
Weak ID test 8.52 9.65 1.40 0.66 
J-test 14.20 [0.03] 13.97 [0.02] 5.08 [0.28] 6.46 (0.17] 
LR1 4.35 [0.04] 2.63 [0.10] 
LR2 5.21 0.07 7.01 0.03 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. Standard errors are clustered by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as described in the main text. 'Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 20 
Regressions - Human Capital Gini 
Constant A 13.32"" (3.63) 17.58" (4.11) -4.91 (12.11) 3.98 (11.02) 
Constant 7B -0.71' (0.38) -0.77" (0.38) -0.64 (0.52) -0.76 (0.51) 
InGDP -1.29" (0.43) -1.53" (0.42) 0.01 (0.95) -0.27 (1.09) 
I/GDP 0.09" (0.03) 0.08** (0.03) 0.09' (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.03" (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 
AFR -0.82 (0.61) -0.95 (0.63) -1.41 (0.94) -2.55' (1.38) 
HC GINI -0.03" (0.02) -0.03' (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
InTFR -1.58" (0.79) 5.54* (3.11) 3.57 (3.35) 
InDTFR -2.90" (1.28) 
Wtd DTFR -54.05 (36.02) 
N 69 69 69 69 
Notes: 1 ne ucpcuucut vw, autc is uic gruwtu rate o1 reai per capita UUY. bsnmanOn by IV. Standard errors are clustered by 
country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Instruments and test statistics as described 
in the main text. *Significant at the 10 % level. "' Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 21 
Cross-Section HC 1976-1992 
Constant 6.30*" (2.89) 9.31"" (3.45) 14.96"" (5.41) 18.41" (10.99) 18.81" (11.33) 
InGDP -0.84*" (0.42) -1.0100 (0.42) -1.34"" (0.57) -1.67 (1.06) -1.47 (1.12) 
I/GDP 0.15"" (0.06) 0.11 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) -0.10 (0.12) -0.05 (0.12) G/GDP -0.02"" (0.01) -0.02'" (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) 
AFR -0.87" (0.44) -0.98"" (0.47) -1.70"0 (0.48) -3.92"0 (1.61) -4.45"0 (2.09) 
HC_GINI -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0,02) -0.07 (0.05) -0.10 (0.07) 
InTFR -2.41"" (0.82) 2.13 (3.58) 2.75 (3.78) 
InDTFR -2.59" (1.40) 
Wtd DTFR -50.700 (29.77) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
Weak ID test 4.03 6.60 7.35 0.70 0.57 
J-test 12.24 [0.09] 11.14 [0.08] 10.59 [0.06] 0.37 [0.99] 0.88 [0.93] 
LR1 3.41 [0.06] 2.90 [0.09] 
LR= 2.05 0.36 3.12 0.21 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. Standard errors are clustered by country. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses . Instruments and test statistics as described in the main text. 'Significant at the 10 % level. 00 Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 22 -General form 
Table 22a - 3'" Regression 
Constant_A 19.88'" (3.83) 6.51 (5.12) 13.61 " (5.74) 8.10 (4.95) 8.831* (4.01) 
Constant 
-B -0.54 
(0.35) -0.47 (0.38) -3.48"" (1.11) -0.54 (0.36) -1.65"' (0.47) 
InGDP -1.71*1 (0.39) -0.06 (0.52) -1.04" (0.56) -0.32 (0.49) -0.28 (0.41) 
I/GDP 0.08"1 (0.03) 0.2101 (0.05) 0.11 (0.06) 0.201* (0.05) 0.15'1 (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.04) -0.05 *0 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) AFR -1.351* (0.56) -0.61 (0.63) 0.08 (0.79) -1.02'1 (0.49) -0.04 (0.62) 
GIN[ -0.15"* (0.03) -0.07 (0.06) -0.14*1 (0.03) -0.131* (0.03) HC_GINI -0.04"0 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) 
HC_Acc rate -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) -0.08'" (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) -0.05" (0.02) InTFR -1.410 (0.80) 1.78* (0.96) -1.44 (1.65) 1.49 (0.92) 0.61 (0.92) 
HC -0.20 (0.37) 11,54*1 (3.36) -0.14 (0.36) 4.87"1 (1.37) 
HC Ini -10.93'1 (3.16) -4.801" (1.27) 
N 69 60 60 60 60 
Weak ID test 9.54 3.33 0.57 2.98 2.64 
J-test 17.50 0.00 12.42 [0.011 4.22 0.24 13.38 0.02 10.11 0.04 
Table 22b - 4" Regression 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) 
Constant A -6.81 (12.00) -2.83 (10.59) -2.53 (14.85) 0.99 (10.06) -1.94 (10.72) 
Constant 
-B -0.14 
(0.45) -0.26 (0.41) -3.42** (1.11) -0.49 (0.38) -1.751* (0.54) 
InGDP 0.64 (1.07) 0.56 (0.80) 0.06 (1.14) 0.15 (0.75) 0.46 (0.77) 
I/GDP 0.12*' (0.04) 0.22" (0.05) 0.14** (0.07) 0.22*' (0.05) 0.191* (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.05" (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) 
AFR -2.24** (0.95) -1.52* (0.90) -0.33 (0.97) -1.36' (0.72) -0.39 (0.92) 
GINI -0.13*" (0.04) -0.05 (0.07) -0.13" (0.03) -0.12" (0.04) 
HC_GINI -0.03 (0.03) -0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
InTFR 4.74 (2.92) 3.91* (2.28) 2.28 (3.65) 2.84 (1.92) 2.95 (2.58) 
HC_Acc_rate -0.07** (0.03) -0.07* (0.04) -0.13'* (0.05) -0.05 (0.04) -0.09'* (0.04) 
InDTFR -3.00" (1.37) -1.41 (1.12) -1.94 (1.69) -0.73 (1.02) -1.17 (1.25) 
HC 0.13 (0.49) 12.25'' (3.55) 0.08 (0.45) 5.43" (1.54) 
HC ini -11.34** 3.34 . 5.061* 1.41 
N 69 60 60 60 60 
Weak ID test 0.77 0.51 0.66 0.56 0.56 
J-test 10.15 0.04 10.96 0.01 2.45 0.29 12.87 (0.011 7.68 0.05 
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Table 22c - 5b Regression 
Constant A 20.46' (9.46) IU. BU (13.11) 4.43 (14.48) 19.38' (11.44) 12.76 (9.57) 
Constant_B -0.68' (0.40) -0.62 (0.50) -4.21 (1.50) -0.89' (0.47) - (0.46) 
1.46" 
InGDP -1.80' (1.06) -0.56 (1.23) -0.19 (1.40) -1.40 (1.00) -0.63 (0.91) 
I/GDP 0.06" (0.03) 0.21" (0.06) 0.10 (0.07) 0.20" (0.07) 0.14" (0.05) 
G/GDP -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
AFR -1.21 (1.25) 0.75 (1.27) -1.05 (1.94) 1.63 (1.02) 0.48 (1.16) 
CIM - (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.19" (0.04) - (0.03) 0.18" 0.13" 
HC_GINI -0.03' (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) 
InTFR -1.88 (2.58) 0.06 (2.69) 0.33 (3.19) -1.68 (2.44) -0.33 (1.93) 
Wtd DTFR 4.45 (32.46) 32.62 (38.12) -38.23 (55.62) 60.87" (29.96) 17.37 (29.86) 
HC Ace rate 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) -0.13 (0.08) 0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) 
HCHC_ini 
HC -0.28 (0.38) 14.55"' (5.24) -0.31 (0.39) 3.91" (1.57) 
HC ini - (4.77) - (1.38) 
13.59" 3.99" 
N 69 60 60 60 60 
Weak ID test 0.35 0.32 0.20 0.36 0.23 
J-test 18.65 [0.00] 8.79 [0.03] 3.30 [0.19] 8.24 [0.081 9.25 10.031 
Notes for Tables 23 (a), (b) and (c): The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM 
Standard errors are clustered by country. Heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors are reported in parentheses The 
instrument set used varies as follows; all specifications include the 12 instruments used earlier but also: HC accumulation 
rate initial for column (1), initial HC accumulation rate for column (2), initial HC stock, initial HC accumulation rate for 
column (3) , 
initial HC accumulation rate, initial HC stock, Natural disasters for column (4) and initial HC accumulation 
rate , 
Natural disasters for column (5). 
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Documentation for the Data 
De La Croix & Doepke 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Rep., Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Rep., 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, U. K., U. S. A., Uganda, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Marianthi Anastasatou 
My final sample consists of 57 countries instead of 68 since there are 11 countries that had 
to be excluded from the initial list due to data availability. They are Burkina Faso, 
Czechoslovakia, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Romania, Sudan, Togo, Yemen and 
Yugoslavia. This leaves the first sample with 32 observations instead of 40 and the second 
sample with 36 instead of 43. 
GROWTH 
I recalculate all the growth rates for both samples using "Real GDP per capita (Constant 
Prices: Chain series)" from PWT 6.1. It is quite possible that DDC &D has used an earlier 
version of PWT namely Version 5.6 or 6.0. In PWT 6.1, the base year is 1996; so all the 
constant price series will be substantially higher than PWT 5.6. 
National Accounts: Many of the underlying national accounts of countries will have been 
revised since 1995 and these changes have been incorporated in the new version. PWT6.0 
was mainly based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2000 disk, while PWT6.1 
uses the WDI 2002 national accounts for non-OECD countries, and the OECD 2002 
national accounts for 30 OECD countries. Data for years not in the WDI or OECD disks 
are obtained from previous national accounts files used in PWT5.6 and earlier versions. 
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1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1. The availability of them starts at 1990, 
which of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Haiti: Growth rate for the first sample is restricted to the use of 1967-1976 values due to 
data availability. 
3. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
4. Poland: Growth rate for the first sample is calculated by using "Real GDP per capita 
(Constant Prices: Laspeyrs)" for 1970-1976 and for the second period I use "Real GDP per 
capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)" but for 1979-1992 due to data availability. 
5. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
6. Tunisia: Growth rate for the first sample is restricted to the use of 1961-1976 values due 
to data availability. 
7. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
8. Yu osg lavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
INITIAL GDP 
I use "Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)" for 1960 and 1976 
respectively. 
1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1. Availability of them starts at 1990 that 
of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Haiti: The initial GDP for the first period refers to 1967 due to data availability. 
3. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
4. Poland: First period's initial GDP represents "Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: 
Laspeyrs)" for 1970 and second's period initial GDP represents "Real GDP per capita 
(Constant Prices: Chain series)" for 1979. 
5. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
6. Tunisia: Relevant observation refers to 1961. 
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7. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
8. Yugoslavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
INITIAL I/GDP 
1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1 Availability of them starts at 1990 
which of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
3. Poland: The relevant observation corresponds to 1970. 
4. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
5. Tunisia: Relevant observation refers to 1961. 
6. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
7. Yugoslavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
INITIAL G/GDP 
1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1 Availability of them starts at 1990 
which of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
3. Poland: The relevant observation corresponds to 1970. 
4. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
5. Tunisia: Relevant observation refers to 1961. 
6. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
7. Yugoslavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
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I/GDP 
I recalculate the average rates for both samples. I use "Investment Share of CGDP" 
(CGDP stands for Real GDP per capita). 
1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1 Availability of them starts at 1990 
which of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Haiti: The average rate is calculated without 1966 due to data availability. 
3. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
4. Poland: The average rate for the first period is calculated for the years 1970-1976 
whereas 1978 is excluded from second period's average due to data availability. 
5. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
6. Tunisia: The average rate for the first period is calculated for the years 1961-1976 due 
to data availability. 
7. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
8. Yugoslavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
G/GDP 
I recalculate the average rates for both samples. I use "Government Share of CGDP" 
(CGDP stands for Real GDP per capita) 
1. Czechoslovakia: No data are given by PWT 6.1 Availability of them starts at 1990 
which of course refer to Czech Republic. 
2. Haiti: The average rate is calculated without 1966 due to data availability. 
3. Liberia: No data are available for both samples. 
4. Poland: The average rate for the first period is calculated for the years 1970-1976 
whereas 1978 is excluded from second period's average due to data availability. 
5. Sudan: No data are available for both samples. 
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6. Tunisia: The average rate for the first period is calculated for the years 1961-1976 due 
to data availability. 
7. Yemen: Data are available only for 1990-1992 and hence the country has to be 
excluded. 
8. Yugoslavia: No data are available for both samples. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (PWT) Version 6.1 
AFRICA DUMMY 
Notes I have checked the case that the "Africa Dummy" stands for a "Sub-Saharan 
Dummy", but I had rejected such a hypothesis. 
(D=1 if country belongs to Africa) 
DLC &D 
Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
MA 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Egypt, Ghana, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
FERTILITY 
Note: Initial Total Fertility refers to 1960 for the first period and 1975 for the second 
period. 
Guyana's Initial Fertility for '60-'76: 6.88 according to De La Croix 
: 6.14 according to Barro-Lee 
Data Source: Barro & Lee (1994) 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 
Note: Life Expectancy refers to 1960 for the first period and 1975 for the second period. 
Ecuador's Initial Life Expectancy for '60-'76: 53.40 according to De La Croix 
: 54.30 according to Barro-Lee 
Data Source: Barro & Lee (1994) 
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TROPICS DUMMY AND ACCESS DUMMY 
DLC &D 
Data source: Sachs and Warner (1997) ACCESS and TROPICS variables. 
ACCESS: Physical access to international waters is measured by our land-locked variable. 
A country that borders the ocean (a "coastal economy") and that has a container port is 
given a value of 0, reflecting complete access to international shipping. A landlocked 
country without navigable access to the sea via rivers is given a value of 1. 
TROPICS: Tropical climate is measured by a variable that takes the value I for a country 
in which the entire land area is subject to a tropical climate, and 0 for a country with no 
land area subject to a tropical climate. Countries in between these two extremes are 
assigned a fraction representing the approximate proportion of land area subject to a 
tropical climate. 
MA 
I use dummies (TROPICS=1 if country lies between the two Tropics, ACCESS=l if 
country does not have access to the sea) 
Sachs & Warner De La Croix & Doepke MA 
COUNTRY TROPICS ACCESS TROPICS ACCESS TROPICS ACCESS 
BANGLADESH 0.1 0 0.10 0 0 0 
BENIN 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
BOLIVIA 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 
BOTSWANA 0.5 1 0.00 0 1 1 
BRAZIL 0.5 0 0.00 0 I 0 
BURKINA FASO 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 
BURUNDI 1 1 0.00 0 1 1 
CAMEROON 1 0 1.00 0 1 0 
CENTRAL AFR. R 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 
COLOMBIA 1 0 1.00 0 1 0 
COSTA RICA 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 0.00 0 0 1 
DENMARK 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
DOMINICAN REP. 1 0 1.00 0 1 0 
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Sachs & Warner De La Croix & Doepke MA 
ECUADOR 1 0 0.00 01 0 
EGYPT 1 0 1.00 00 0 
EL SALVADOR 1 0 0.00 01 0 
FINLAND 0 0 0.00 00 0 
FRANCE 0 0 0.00 00 0 
GHANA 1 0 1.00 01 0 
GUATEMALA 1 0 0.00 01 0 
GUYANA 1 0 0.00 01 0 
HAITI 1 0 0.00 01 0 
INDONESIA 1 0 1.00 01 0 
ITALY 0 0 0.00 00 0 
IVORY COAST 1 0 0.00 01 0 
JAMAICA 1 0 0.00 01 0 
JORDAN 0 l 0.00 10 0 
KENYA 1 0 1.00 01 0 
KOREA, SOUTH 0 0 0.00 00 0 
LESOTH 0.00 00 1 
LIBERIA 0.00 01 0 
MADAGASCAR 0.9 0 0.90 01 0 
MALAWI I 1 1.00 11 1 
MALAYSIA 1 0 0.00 01 0 
MALI I I 0.00 01 1 
MEXICO 0.5 0 0.00 01 0 
MOROCCO 0 0 0.00 00 0 
NAMIBIA 0.00 01 0 
NIGER I 1 1.00 11 I 
NIGERIA 1 0 1.00 01 0 
NORWAY 0 0 0.00 00 0 
PAKISTAN 0 0 0.00 00 0 
PANAMA 0.00 01 0 
PARAGUAY 0.5 1 0.50 11 1 
PERU 1 0 1.00 0l 0 
PHILIPPINES 1 0 1.00 01 0 
POLAND 0.00 00 0 
ROMANIA 0.00 00 0 
RWANDA 1 1 1.00 11 1 
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Sachs & Warner De La Croix & Doepke MA 
SENEGAL 1 0 1.00 0 1 0 
SPAIN 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
SRI LANKA 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
SUDAN 0.00 0 1 0 
SYRIA 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
THAILAND 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
TOGO 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
TUNISIA 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
TURKEY 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
U. K. 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
U. S. A. 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 
UGANDA 1 1 0.00 0 1 1 
VENEZUELA 1 0 0.00 0 1 0 
YEMEN 0.00 0 1 0 
YOGOSLAVIA 0.00 0 0 0 
ZAMBIA I 1 1.00 1 1 1 




DLC &D MA 
Quality Year Cini Quality Year Gini 








CAMEROON accept 1983 49.00 
CENTRAL AFR. R. 
COLOMBIA nn 1960 59.22 nn 1960 59.22 
COSTA RICA accept 1961 50.00 accept 1961 50 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA accept 1958 27.19 accept 1958 P 27.19 
DENMARK ps 1963 39.00 ps 1963 39 
DOMINICAN REP. nn 1969 49.28 196911 nn 49.28 
ECUADOR nn 1965 67.83 nn 1965 67.83 
EGYPT 
EL SALVADOR 
FINLAND accept 1966 31.80 ps 196211 
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FRANCE accept 1962 49.00 accept 1962 49 
GHANA accept 1988 35.90 
GUATEMALA 




ITALY accept 1974 41.00 accept 1974 41 
IVORY COAST ps 1959 45.56 ps 1959 P 
39.6 
JAMAICA accept 1958 54.31 accept 1958 54.31 
JORDAN accept 1980 40.80 
KENYA ps 1976 68.00 ps 1961 48.8 
KOREA REP. accept 1961 32.00 accept 1961 32 










MALAYSIA accept 1970 50.00 cs 1958 36 
MALI 
MEXICO accept 1957 55.10 accept 1963 55.5 




NORWAY accept 1962 37.52 accept 1962 37.52 
PAKISTAN ps 1963 34.70 ps 1963 
38.65 
PANAMA accept 1970 57.00 nn 1962 36.09 
PARAGUAY nn 1983 45.10 
PERU accept 1971 55.00 nn 1961 75.82 
PHILIPPINES accept 1961 49.71 accept 1961 49.71 
POLAND wg 1960 27.19 ps 1965 26 
ROMANIA accept 1989 23.38 
RWANDA 
SENEGAL 
ps 1960 56.00 
SPAIN accept 1965 31.99 accept 1965 31.99 
SRI LANKA 
SUDAN 





TRINIDAD&TOBACO accept 1958 46.02 accept 1958 46.02 
TUNISIA 
TURKEY 
U. K. accept 1961 25.30 accept 1961 25.3 
U. S. A. accept 1960 34.88 accept 1960 34.88 
UGANDA 
VENEZUELA nn 1962 45.20 ps 1962 53.1 
YEMEN 






Quality Year Gini Quality Year Cinl 
BANGLADESH accept 1977 33.34 accept 1977 33.34 
BENIN 
BOLIVIA nn 1986 51.57 nn 1986 51.57 
BOTSWANA nn 1975 52.00 nn 1975 52.00 
BRAZIL accept 1976 60.29 accept 1976 60.29 
BURKINA FASO accept 1995 39.00 
BURUNDI 42.00 42.00 
CAMEROON accept 1983 49.00 accept 1983 49.00 
CENTRAL AFR. R. 43.00 43.00 




DOMINICAN REP. accept 1976 45.00 accept 1976 45.00 
ECUADOR wg 1970 68.26 wg 1987 44.53 
EGYPT accept 1975 38.00 accept 1975 38.00 
EL SALVADOR accept 1977 48.40 accept 1977 48.40 
FINLAND 
FRANCE 
GHANA accept 1988 35.90 accept 1988 35.90 
GUATEMALA accept 1979 49.72 accept 1979 49.72 
GUYANA 
HAITI 




JORDAN accept 1980 40.80 accept 1980 40.80 
KENYA tax 1974 69.00 ps 1976 52.00 
KOREA REP. 
LESOTHO 
LIBERIA ps 1974 43.00 ps 1974 43.00 
MADAGASCAR nn 1980 48.90 nn 1980 48.90 
MALAWI nn 1977 51.80 nn 1977 51.80 
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DLC&D MA 
Quality Year Cini Quality Year Gin[ 
MALAYSIA 
MALI accept 1994 54.00 
MEXICO accept 1975 57.90 accept 1977 50.00 
MOROCCO nn 1977 51.80 an 1977 51.80 
NAMIBIA 43.00 43.00 
NIGER accept 1992 36.10 
NIGERIA ps 1975 35.50 ps 1975 35.50 
NORWAY 
PAKISTAN accept 1979 32.32 accept 1979 32.32 
PANAMA 
PARAGUAY on 1983 45.10 an 1983 45.10 
PERU accept 1981 49.33 accept 1981 49.33 
PHILIPPINES accept 1971 49.39 cs 1975 45.20 
POLAND 
ROMANIA 
RWANDA accept 1983 28.90 accept 1983 28.90 
SENEGAL accept 1991 54.12 
SPAIN 
SRI LANKA accept 1973 35.30 accept 1979 43.50 
SUDAN accept 1968 38.72 
SYRIA 
THAILAND accept 1975 41.74 accept 1975 41.74 
TOGO ps 1957 33.80 
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO accept 1976 46.09 accept 1976 46.09 
TUNISIA accept 1975 44.00 accept 1975 44.00 
TURKEY accept-cov 1973-1978 51.00 accept 1973 51.00 
U. K. 
U. S. A. 




ZAMBIA accept 1976 51.00 accept 1976 51.00 
ZIMBABWE accept 1990 56.83 accept 1990 56.83 
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Notes: There is a trade-off between the quality of the data available and precision (the 
Gini coefficient should belong to the initial year or as close as possible). The rule I follow 
is the use of the observation that comes from the first five years of the period in interest if 
it compensates by its quality. Lower quality observation is used if no data are available for 
that first quinquenniad. As for the recipient unit household equivalent is preferred to 
person equivalent. 
Data Sources: 
" Deininger & Squire (1996). 
" For Benin, Burundi, Central Africa and Namibia data come from the Economic 
Report on Africa 1999: The challenges of Poverty Reduction and Sustainability, 
UN (2000). There is no reference to year. 
" For Haiti and Syria I use the predicted values that De La Croix has used i. e. the 




There is a correspondence problem concerning the year that the observations are supposed 
to describe and the year that they are actually belong to. The observations of 24 out of 40 
countries belong to years outside the period in interest. So, 24 observations come from 
1977-1982 and the rest 16 come from 1974-1976. 
1. Sudan: An observation is available by United Nations, 1987 but is assigned to second 
sample period. 
2. Senegal: Same as above. 
Source: United Nations, 1987 and Jones, 1982 
Sample '76-'92 
The representation is slightly better. The surveys used give data for 1985-1989 and 1990- 
1994 with 10 observations out of 43 coming from years later than 1992. In the cases that 
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there are two observations from the Demographic and Health Surveys, I follow De La 
Croix and average the two resulting values. 
1. Sudan: The observation comes from the data set used for the first sample. The 
observation comes from 1978 and although it belongs to the sample period, it shows 
inconsistency on the criteria used by the authors. 
2. Senegal: They average two values but one observation is coming from the data set used 
for the first sample period. So, they are using 7 and 3.6 for f+, f- respectively (United 
Nations, 1995) and 7.3 and 4.5 (United Nations, 1987). Later values come from 1978 but 
again once again although it belongs to the sample period, it shows inconsistency on the 
criteria used by the authors. I correct this by using 7 and 3.6 for f+, f- respectively (United 
Nations (1995)) and 5.85 and 3.19 for f+, f- respectively (Mboup and Saha (1998)). 
3. Trinidad & Tobago: They set f+ equal to 4.3 whereas according to the original source it 
is 2.3. 
Source: United Nations (1995) and Mboup and Saha (1998). 
WEIGHTED DIFFERENTIAL FERTILITY 
I approximate Wtd-DTFR as the coefficient from the weighted least squares regression of 
ln(TFR) on years of education, where observations are weighted by the percentage of 
women in the education category In the cases that there are two observations from the 
Demographic and Health Surveys. I average the two resulting values. 
Source: Kremer and Chen (2002) 
HUMAN CAPITAL GINI 
I follow Castello and Domenech (2002) and use the Gini coefficient that is based on the 
educational information for the population aged 15 and over, not the one of the population 
aged 25 and over, since the great part of my sample corresponds to developing countries 
where large portion of the labour force is younger than 25. (I use percentages). 
Data Source: http: //iei. uv. es/ rdomenec/human h ineq. html 
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HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION RATE 
1960-1976: Average of "Total gross enrolment ratio for secondary education" 
1976-1992: Average of "Total gross enrolment ratio for secondary education" 
(I use percentages). 
Data Source: Barro and Lee (1994) 
INITIAL HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION RATE 
"Total gross enrolment ratio for secondary education" for 1960 and 1975 respectively. 
(I use percentages). 
Data Source: Barro and Lee (1994) 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
1960-1976: Average of "Average schooling years in the total population" 
1976-1992: Average of "Average schooling years in the total population" 
Data Source: Barra and Lee (2001) 
INITIAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
"Average schooling years in the total population" for 1960 and 1975 respectively. 
Data Source: Barro and Lee (2001) 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
Logarithm of 1+ number of natural disaster events normalized by land area. 
Data Source: EAMAT, The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database for number of 
disasters, CIA (2005) for land area in million square kilometers 
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1960-1973 
The countries used are the same as in the second set of regressions except from Poland 
which has to be excluded because PWT 6.1 gives data on I/GDP, G/GDP and "Real GDP 
per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series)" after 1970. The period now is shorter and I 
believe that the growth rates and averages will not be representative values of the period in 
interest. 
GROWTH 
Haiti: Growth rate is calculated for 1967-1973. 
Tunisia: Growth rate is restricted to the use of 1961-1976 values due to data availability. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (P WT) Version 6.1 
I/GDP 
Haiti: The average rate is calculated without 1966 due to data availability. 
Tunisia: The average rate is calculated for the years 1961-1976 due to data availability. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (P WT) Version 6.1 
G/GDP 
Haiti: The average rate is calculated without 1966 due to data availability. 
Tunisia: The average rate is calculated for the years 1961-1976 due to data availability. 
Data Source: Penn World Table (P WT) Version 6.1 
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1976-1992 
The comments made in Appendix I for the second period hold for this data set too. 
Countries 
Bangladesh, Benin, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Rep., 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Rep., 
Lesotho, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Spain, Syria, Trinidad & Tobago, U. K., U. S. A., Uganda, 
Venezuela. 
GINI 
Data come from Deininger and Squire apart from Benin (Source: Economic Report on 
Africa 1999: The challenges of Poverty Reduction and Sustainability, UN (2000)) and 
Syria (I use the predicted values that De La Croix has used). 
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COUNTRY COMMENTS YEAR GINI 
BANGLADESH 33.34 
BENIN UN 43 
CAMEROON 49 
COLOMBIA 54,5 
COSTA RICA accept 1977 50.00 
DENMARK accept 1976 31.00 
DOMINICAN REP. 45 
ECUADOR 44.53 
FINLAND accept 1977 30.45 
FRANCE accept 1975 43.00 
GHANA 35.9 
ITALY accept 1976 35.00 
IVORY COAST accept 1985 41.21 
JAMAICA accept 1975 44.52 
JORDAN 40.8 
KENYA 52 
KOREA REP. accept 1976 39.10 
LESOTHO accept 1987 56.02 
MALAYSIA accept 1976 53.00 
MEXICO 50 
MOROCCO 51.8 
NORWAY accept 1976 37.30 
PAKISTAN 32.32 




POLAND accept 1976 25,81 
SENEGAL ps 1970 49,00 
SPAIN accept 1973 37.11 
SYRIA Jazairy 1979 49.46 
RINIDAD&TOBAGO 46.09 
U. K. accept 1976 23.20 
U. S. A. accept 1976 34.42 
VENEZUELA accept 1976 43.63 
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Chapter 5 
Problems with Instrumental 
Variables estimation when an 
endogenous variable is 




In Chapter 4 we saw that Doepke and De La Croix (2003) used as instruments the 
squared value of some of the endogenous variables. Such a specification might cap- 
ture any possible non-linear effects between the RHS variables and the independent 
variable and thus improve the fit of the regression. However, the properties of such 
instruments as well as the implications for the Instrumental Variables (1V) estimator 
'This paper is joint work with Dr Edmund Cannon. 
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have not been investigated. In this paper we show that whether the squared value of 
an endogenous RHS variable is a weak instrument and whether the IV estimator is 
biased depend on the distribution of the errors of the first and second stage regression 
in the 2SLS process of estimating IV when the sample is large. Then, we investigate 
the sensitivity of the bias of the IV estimator to various Monte Carlo data generating 
processes. Finally, we suggest two measures of testing the size of the bias of the N 
estimator specific to the case when an endogenous variable is instrumented by its 
squared value. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the theoretical background and 
presents the conditions which need to be investigated. The implications of using the 
square of a RHS variables as instrument in large samples are explained in Section 
3. Section 4 investigates the bias of the IV estimator in small samples. Section 5 
concludes. 
5.2 Potential problems from using x2 as an instrument 
for x 
Consider the relationship: 
Y{=CY+#Xi+ui 
where E [ui] =0 and E [Xiu; ] # 0. De-meaning the data (equivalent to including a 
constant in every regression) means this can be rewritten as: 
yi=ßx: +u; (5.1) 
where yt = Yi - Y, x; = Xi -X and E [ui] = 0, E [x; u, J 0 0. 





2x; xg -a+ x3 
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and thus the bias is: E x? ui 
bias = ,3 (5.2) E 9 
Everything then depends upon the ratio of the two moments on the RHS of (5.2). If 
the sample is small then a valid instrument implies E x? u; = 0. However, if E xi is 
small then x2 is a weak instrument for x and the IV estimator of Q might be biased. 
Similarly, If the sample is large then by construction E [x? u; ] =0 and if E [x; ]=0 
then x2 is a weak instrument for x and the IV estimator of ß might be inconsistent. 
In what follows, we investigate the conditions under which x2 is a weak instrument 
for x and 61 is biased for large and small samples respectively. 
5.3 Results for large samples 
5.3.1 xi and ui are jointly normally distributed 
In the specific scenario where xi and u; are jointly Normally distributed, both the 
numerator and denominator of the expression (5.2) are zero in expectation (due to 
the symmetry of the Normal distribution). So, since the correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the instrument is zero, xj2 is a weak instrument for x;. 
Moreover, the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator is the same as the asymptotic 
bias of the OLS estimator. This is not immediately obvious, but it can be shown by 




( 0, x axau2 
(ui) 
QxCuP au 










We calculate the N estimator in two stages. We first fit: 
xi =a+yx? +ei 






E (x? - (ax + M2»] 
E [x - (orz + µx)] 
2 
2µy + 72 
since the raw moments for the Normal distribution are E [xi] =a+ µi, E [x3] = 
3Qýµx µy and E [x4] = µ4 + 6µxox + 3Qx. Then, we regress yj on the estimated 
values of xi from the first stage i. e. we estimate: 
yi = ßI + ui 
Thus, the IV estimator is: 
and 
E yA QIV _= 
E X? 
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E [(ß (xi - µx) + ui) 
(2µ 
z x? -Fix/ 1 plimßty = 
\3 
2l 
21x+Qx 2i var 
(ßlix2µxo, 
x + 2pxaxoup) 2µx + Qx)2 




since E [xi] =p and E 
[x? ui] = 2/1 o auP" 
Summarizing, we find that when the sample is large and x; and u; are jointly 
Normally distributed, x? is a weak instrument for xi, which follows from the obvious 
fact that the Normal distribution is not skew, and the N estimator is biased. 
5.3.2 More general cases 
We now turn to investigating more general cases. When there are considerations 
about the endogeneity of xi, it is E [x; u; ] 0. The non-zero correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the error can be proxied by a linear function: 
Xi = Au; + ii 
For the purpose of this taxonomy we only consider situations where u; and v; are 
independent. To investigate the asymptotic bias of QIv as well as check whether x2 
is a good instrument for x, we need to calculate the expectations of the following two 
expressions: 
x? us = \2u3 + v? u{ + 2Au; v; 
x; _ \3uý + 3A2u2u + 3Au; v? + v; % 
It is obvious that everything now hinges on whether the distributions of u; and 
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vi are skew. The possible cases are outlined in Table 1. 
U 
Not skew Skew 
E [x? u; ] =0 E [xiu, ] = \2skew(u) >0 
E [x3] =0 E [xj3] = \3skew(u) >0 
Not skew ß1V biased 
ýlv biased 
weak instrument non-weak instrument 
x; not skew xi skew 
In general 
v E [x? ut] = \2skew(u) 
E [xt] = \3skew(u) + skew(v) 
E [x? ui] =0 QIV biased 
E [xi] = skew(v) #0 non-weak instrument 
Skew ßiv unbiased xi skew 
non-weak instrument 
x; skew If f . \3skew(u) + skew(v) =0 
E [x? u, ] = \2skew(u) 
E [x3] =0 
01V biased 
weak instrument 
x; not skew 
Table 1 
If the distribution of xi is not skew (which we can observe from the data) then 
xj2 will be a weak instrument; this follows automatically from the fact that x? is a 
symmetric function of x; i. e. E 
(x3) = 0. This result is regardless of the skewness 
of the residuals (which, in principle, we could attempt to infer from the estimated 
residuals), since we would be unable to test whether we were in the top left hand side 
box or the bottom right hand side box with the condition placed upon the skewness 
of ui and vi. 
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If the distribution of x; is skew (which we can observe from the data), then x2i 
will not be a weak instrument for xi since E (x3) # 0. In other words, there will be a 
relationship between xi and x?, which will be picked up in the F-statistic of the first 
stage regression in the 2SLS process of estimating IV. However, the IV estimate of ß 
will still be asymptotically biased unless u; is known to be symmetric and v; known 
to be asymmetric. A possible test for this, probably with reasonable size properties, 
would be to see whether the estimated residuals were not skew. If it were possible 
to reject skewness then it would be impossible to reject the null hypothesis that we 
were in the bottom left hand side box of the table, given that the distribution of x; is 
skew. However, the power of test would be deficient since, given the biased estimates 
of , ß, we might 
fail to reject the null (non skewness of ü; ) even if we were in either of 
the RH boxes of the table, which constitutes the alternative. 
Summarizing, we find that when the sample is large and x; and u; are jointly 
Normally distributed, x, is a weak instrument for xi, which follows from the obvi- 
ous fact that the Normal distribution is not skew, and the IV estimator is biased. 
However, in more general cases, xi2 is a good instrument for x; and the IV estimator 
is asymptotically unbiased only when the error from the first stage regression in the 
2SLS process of estimating IV is skew and the error from the second stage is not 
skew. 
5.4 Results for small samples 
In the case of a small sample we check the effect of using xj2 as an instrument of x; by 
the use of simulations. We define u; to be normally distributed (not skewed) and v; 
to be distributed according to the XK distribution where k is the degrees of freedom. 




Xi =Cl +Au: +Vi 
We generate the errors using a Monte Carlo repeated random sampling. Under 
the null #0 =0 and , Q1 = 1. Thus, the data generating process for y; is: 






















all replications only replications with F> 10 
bias(ßjv) bias(/31v) % of replications 
0.239 0.216 95.35 
0.153 0.153 99.73 
0.115 0.115 100 
0.1 0.1 100 
0.231 0.217 95.515 
0.155 0.154 99.73 
0.115 0.115 100 
0.1 0.1 100 
0.233 0.219 95.66 
0.158 0.157 99.71 
0.114 0.114 100 
0.099 0.099 100 
0.236 0.219 95.68 
0.159 0.159 99.7 
0.115 0.115 100 
0.099 0.099 100 
IV estimator (benchmark case) 
Yi=Xi+Ui 
and the data generating process for x; is: 
xi = 0.5u; + vi 
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where u; -N (0,1) and v; N Xi (1,2) (i. e. the degrees of freedom are K=1 so the 
distribution is highly skewed). We call this scenario (A = 1/2) the benchmark case. 
An obvious method to check whether xj2 is a good instrument for xi is to use the 
F-statistic (or the squared value of the t-statistic) of the first stage regression in the 
2SLS. More specifically, one could filter the above replications by the value of the 
F-statistic and keep those observations for which the instrument appears non-weak. 
Stock and Yogo (2005) provide the critical values to which the F-statistic should 
compare. Unfortunately, the critical values are calculated for a minimum of three 
excluded instruments and cannot be used in our case. Thus, we need to follow a 
rule-of-thumb which suggests that an instrument is weak if the F-statistic of the first 
stage regression is less than 10.2 
In Table 2 we present the bias of the IV estimator for n= 10,20,50 and 100 
sample size and for 10,000,20,000,50,000 and 100,000 number of replications. 
We find that the bias decreases as the sample size increases. When we drop the 
replications for which x? is a weak instrument for x;, i. e. those replications for which 
F< 10, we find that the bias decreases in small sample sizes only, whereas it has 
no impact in bigger samples. Finally, as expected, the number of replications has a 
very small impact on the bias of the N estimator. So, Monte Carlo replication error 
appears significantly small that it can be safely ignored. Thus, for the rest of the 
analysis we report the results for 50,000 replications only. 
How do the results change if ui is distributed according to a skew distribution 
other than the Normal? If ui is distributed according to the Uniform distribution 
then the bias of the N estimator is smaller compared to the case where u; -N (0,1). 
However, x? is a good instrument for x; for all replications regardless of the sample 
size (see Table 3). If ui is distributed according to the Student's t-distribution, with 
3 degrees of freedom, the asymptotic bias of the IV estimator is greater than both 
previous cases (see Table 4). Finally, the bias decreases as the sample size increases 
2Notice that there are no issues about normality as we are not using the F-test to identify 
significance but we only use the value of the F-statistic as a filter. Moreover, the value 10 is high 
enough (much higher than e. g. 2 that would be a typical value). 
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whether ui is distributed according to the Uniform or the student's t distribution. 
n all replications only replications where F> 10 
bias(/31v) bias(, Oly) % of the replications 
10 0.031 0.031 100 
20 0.017 0.017 100 
50 0.012 0.012 100 
100 0.01 0.01 100 
Table 3. Relative bias of the IV estimator when u; is distributed 
according to the Uniform distribution 
n all replications 
bias(ßiv) 
only replications where F> 10 
bias(ßjv) % of the replications 
10 0.693 0.414 86.49 
20 0.681 0.342 92.70 
50 0.304 0.280 96.90 
100 0.320 0.254 98.11 
Table 4. Relative bias of the IV estimator when ui is distributed 
according to t3 distribution 
We next look on the role of A or, more generally, the role of the relative weight 
of ui and vs. Thus, if the data generating process for x; is: 
xi = Aui + ryvi 
then for u;, ,N (0,1) and vi x (1,2) we obtain: 
var (xi) = \2 + 2ry2 
For the benchmark case we have assumed that A= 1/2 and y=1. Therefore, the 
variance of xi is greatly accounted for by the variance of v;. If however, A=y=1 
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i. e. equal weight of the errors in the data generating process of x;, the bias of the 
N estimator is higher than the benchmark case (see Table 5). If we allow for equal 
weights of u; and vi on the variance of x;, then A=f and 'y =1 and the bias of 
the IV estimator becomes higher, although is smaller than the case A= ry =1 (see 
Table 6). Finally, if the weight of vi for the variance of xi is very small e. g. A=1 but 
ry = 0.1, the bias of 
QIv appears bigger than all other scenarios. Moreover, xi2 is a 
weak instrument for xi for the majority of the replications (see Table 7). For the first 
two scenarios, the bias decreases with the sample size but there is a non-monotonic 
relation for the last case. 
n all replications only replications where F> 10 
bias(ßjv) bias(ßjv) % of the replications 
10 0.321 0.278 79.45 
20 0.242 0.233 93.31 
50 0.190 0.190 99.84 
100 0.171 0.171 100 
Table 5. Relative bias of the IV estimator for \= ry =1 
n all replications 
bias(Qiv) 
only replications where F> 10 
bias(, Qly) % of the replications 
10 0.304 0.291 66 
20 0.275 0.254 81.59 
50 0.214 0.22 97.83 
100 0.203 0.203 99.96 
Table 6. Relative bias of the IV estimator for A= and y=1 
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n all replications only replications where F> 10 
bias(ßrv) bias(131y) % of the replications 
10 1.071 0.978 26.41 
20 2.012 0.976 22.19 
50 1.268 0.972 22.40 
100 1.184 0.968 26.07 
Table 7. Relative bias of the N estimator for A=1 and ry = 0.1 
However, in order to use the alternative test which we suggested ein the case of 
the large sample and test the skewness of the estimated residuals, things are more 
complicated. The choice of the skewness statistic is not obvious. Various measures 
of sample skewness have been suggested. For very large samples the differences in 
definition is not important. However, in relatively smaller samples there might be 
differences in the size of the bias and the variance among the measures. We follow 
Joanes and Gill (1998) and use the following measure: 
m3 n-1 
3/2 
M3 (n - 1) 
3/2 ý (x 
- 2)3 bl 
S3 _( 77 m3/2 Ti x-2 
3/2 
2 (E( ) 
They have shown that in Normally distributed small samples, blis unbiased and has 
the smallest mean-squared error among some popular measures whereas is biased 
but has the smallest mean square error in 100.000 samples of various sample sizes 
generated from X2 distributions with 1,10 and 50 degrees of freedom. 
However, we have no prior as to how skewed x; should be. In other words, we 
don't know when the correlation between x; and xi is "high enough". Moreover, we 
cannot assume normality and thus trivial t-tests cannot be performed. Thus, we use 
the following approach. We calculate the skewness of xi for each replication, rank 
the skewness statistic and then calculate the bias of the IV estimator for various 
percentages of the replications which exhibit the highest skewness statistic. Finally, 
we compare the percentage of the samples dropped with the ones dropped when the 
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F-statistic test is used. 
The results of this approach are given in Table 8. The bias of the IV estimator 
is greater when the filtering criterion for keeping the better performing replications 
is the skewness statistic compared to the F-statistic of the first stage regression in 
the 2SLS process, regardless of the sample size (for the sake of comparability we use 
the values of A and y of the benchmark case). Moreover, there is some evidence that 
the F-statistic might be a better test to check the desirability of xi as an instrument 
for xi for small samples. The bias for even the 20% best replications according to 
the F-statistic is higher than the bias of the 80% best replications according to the 




F bi F bi F bi F bi 
80% 0.178 0.223 0.130 0.148 0.104 0.108 0.098 0.095 
70% 0.160 0.223 0.121 0.145 0.102 0.105 0.098 0.093 
60% 0.145 0.224 0.113 0.140 0.100 0.103 0.098 0.091 
50% 0.132 0.225 0.107 0.138 0.098 0.100 0.097 0.089 
40% 0.120 0.224 0.100 0.133 0.096 0.097 0.096 0.086 
30% 0.107 0.230 0.192 0.128 0.093 0.092 0.094 0.083 
20% 0.092 0.246 0.085 0.123 0.088 0.087 0.093 0.079 
Table 8. Relative bias of the IV estimator 
5.5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the conditions under which the squared value of an endoge- 
nous variable is a non-weak instrument to use with Instrumental Variable estimation 
method and the implications for the N estimator. The analysis shows that x? is 
a non-weak instrument for xi and the N estimator is asymptotically unbiased only 
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when the errors of the N estimation are not skew and the errors of the first stage 
regression in the 2SLS process of estimating IV are skew. A possible test for that is 
to check the skewness of the estimated residuals. If it were possible to reject skewness 
then it would be impossible to reject the null hypothesis that the squared value of 
the endogenous variable is a non-weak instrument and the N estimator is consistent. 
Simulations have shown that the bias decreases with the sample size and is highly 
sensitive to the error structure of the data generating process. We also find that the 
F-statistic of the first stage regression in the 2SLS process of estimating IV might 
be a better test than a test on the skewness of xi in assessing whether x? is a good 
instrument for xi especially if the sample is relatively small. In other words, our 
results caution about the use of the squared value of a right hand side variable as an 
instrument since the regression might suffer from the weak instrument problem and 




This thesis examines four questions broadly involved with growth economics. Chapter 
2 investigates the relation between credit markets and growth by modeling informa- 
tional imperfections in a more rigorous manner compared to the existing literature. 
The technology used to obtain information about potential borrowers is allowed to 
be imperfect in the sense that lenders can identify the true type of the borrowers who 
declare themselves as high-risk with certainty but can draw an imperfect inference 
if borrowers declare themselves as low-risk. The importance of such an assump- 
tion is apparent in the light of the current crisis which pointed out that modem 
computerised screening techniques such as credit scoring are still far from perfect. 
The innovative prediction of the chapter is that although credit rationing can be 
used by all countries as a mechanism of separating borrowers, this does not hold for 
screening, contrary to earlier findings. More specifically, the analysis shows that in 
undeveloped countries rationing is the only equilibrium way of separating borrowers 
and the screening cost needs to decrease, or the difference in the rates of return be- 
tween the home technology and an investment project to increase above a threshold, 
for the screening contract to become relevant. In developed economies, lenders can 
separate borrowers by denying credit to a fraction of them at low levels of capital 
accumulation whereas they start using a screening technology to obtain information 
about potential borrowers as capital accumulates. Such a transition from rationing 
219 
to screening may imply a lower or higher dynamic path and steady state for the 
capital stock. The economic environment can change the equilibrium contract terms 
within each regime but can also change the equilibrium regime itself. Moreover, a 
screening regime does not always dominate a rationing regime in the sense of de- 
livering higher dynamic capital paths and steady state level for capital, contrary to 
preexisting findings. Finally, the model verifies earlier findings about the "threshold 
effect" of the screening cost in the sence that a marginal change in policy may not 
be sufficient to push the economy to a higher growth path and steady state capital 
stock. Furthermore, it predicts that there are cases where the quality of screening 
should also be above a threshold level before it can affect an economy's growth path 
and the steady-state of capital. 
These findings are important for policy makers since they will affect the priority 
which they attach to reforming financial sector policies. Consider, for example, a gov- 
ernmental policy to improve the informational infrastucture of the credit market by 
affecting the cost which screening entails or by setting specific monitoring standards. 
Such a policy would tend to cause an upward shif in the capital accumulation path 
and thus result to a higher steady state capital stock. However, our model shows 
that there are exceptions to this rule. In other words, the most important policy 
implication of this chapter is that it cautions not to folow the "one-fits-all" policy 
rule which past reasearch suggests. Measures that have been suggested to shift the 
capital accumulation path upwards and thus result to a higher steady state capital 
stock might be ineffective or even have a negative effect depending on the specifics 
of an economy. 
An interesting extension of this work would be to endogenise the screening cost. 
This can be done by a two stage game solved by backward induction where the lenders 
choose to use the quality of screening which maximizes their expected payoff, given 
the contract terms which maximize the expected payoff of the borrowers. Another 
direction would be to allow the screening cost to depend on the quality of screening 
and allow learning to have a beneficial effect on the quality of the screening or its cost 
or allow for imperfections in the screening process of both risk-types of borrowers. 
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The third chapter suggests that financial development lead to lower markups in 
the Eurozone and US over the period 1981-2004. The empirical evidence advanced in 
this thesis suggests that financial depth has a greater effect on competition in sectors 
where firms are unusually dependent on external finance. This relation appears to be 
stronger over the period 1995-2004, perhaps due to the increased implementation of 
the EU Directives about the financial services industry and the adoption of the Euro. 
However, these results are not robust to the use of different measures for financial 
development or external dependence. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that the 
trade openness of countries is linked with higher competition and thus lower markups. 
This finding appears to be stronger for industries traditionally defined as tradable. 
Controlling simultaneously for trade openness and financial development shows that 
trade openness has greater explanatory power for the extent of competition compared 
to financial depth. 
These findings are of obvious interest to competition authorities who would like 
to know whether specific policies are conducive to competition. The findings of 
this study suggest that both financial development and trade openness have pro- 
competitive effects with the later being more effective. Moreover, policy makers 
should be aware that the relation might be more sensitive for particular industries. 
Thus, measures enhancing the financial development or opening the country to trade 
might increase the competition in different industries disproportionately. This might 
also raise welfare considerations if the people who get affected belong to sensitive 
groups of the economy. 
What remains an open question is whether openness has explanatory power for 
the extent of competition because it captures cross-country variation, in the sense 
that more open countries have lower markups overall, or is it due to cross-time effects 
i. e. more openening a country over time leads to smaller markups. The existence of 
a natural clustering which lead to openness having relatively higher significance for 
particular industries should also be investigated. Answering these questions would 
be natural extension of the present work. 
The empirical relationship between income inequality and growth is the focal 
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point of Chapter 3. The empirical findings of De La Croix and Doepke (2003) are 
challenged. They argue that the fertility-differential effect accounts for most of the 
empirical relationship between these two variables. Unfortunately, the empirical ev- 
idence advanced here does not support that claim. The replication of this result has 
not been possible. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that differential fertility 
is not linked to growth. Using either a better measure of differential fertility than 
the one used by DLCD or a more general specification leads to conclusion that the 
significance of differential fertility is open to considerable doubt. The evidence on 
the explanatory power which human capital inequality has on growth is not so strong 
though. It is quite probable that there is a different channel other than inequality in 
education and the differential fertility effect that links inequality to growth. Further 
research is needed to reach a sound conclusion for the cross section case since al- 
though differential fertility and inequality seems to have no explanatory variable for 
growth, the samples used may be too small to give reliable results. Finally, finding 
instruments that are exogenous and also have high correlation with the instrumented 
variables is a challenge for future work. 
Chapter 5 addresses one of the points raised in the previous chapter about the 
reliability of the instrument set used. More specifically, the conditions under which 
the squared value of an endogenous variable is a non-weak instrument to use with 
Instrumental Variable estimation method and the implications for the IV estimator 
are investigated. The findings caution about the use of the squared value of a right 
hand side variable as an instrument since the regression might suffer from the weak 
instrument problem and the IV estimator might be biased. More specifically, the 
analysis shows that x? is a non-weak instrument for z; and the IV estimator is as- 
ymptotically unbiased only when the errors of the IV estimation are not skew and 
the errors of the first stage regression in the 2SLS process of estimating IV are skew. 
It also suggests testing for that by checking the skewness of the estimated residuals. 
If it were possible to reject skewness then it would be impossible to reject the null hy- 
pothesis that the squared value of the endogenous variable is a non-weak instrument 
and the IV estimator is asymptotically unbiased. The Monte Carlo repeated random 
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sampling suggests a negative relation between the size of the bias and the sample 
size and high sensitivity to the error structure of the data generating process. The 
F-statistic of the first stage regression in the 2SLS process of estimating IV might be 
a more reliable test in assessing whether xj2 is a good instrument for x; compared to 
testing the the skewness of xi, especially if the sample is relatively small. 
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